Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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“Besides well-mixed interactions, some researchers have also investigated the effect of spatial interactions [5,11,28,29], since it is known that they can support the survival or spreading of cooperators [30] (but this is not always the case [31,32]).”
Cooperation and the evolution of hunter-gatherer storytelling
Smith, D., Schlaepfer, P., Major, K., Dyble, M., Page, A. E., Thompson, J., Chaudhary, N., Salali, G. D., Mace, R., Astete, L., et al. (2017) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02036-8 · Cited by 333
“Distance was coded from one to four, reflecting increasing distance between ego and alter, with categories of; living in the same house as ego (1), living in the house next to ego (2), having a house between ego’s and alter’s (3) and living further away (4).”
BackgroundHomo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
(2013) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta10637 · Cited by 371
Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117 · Cited by 367
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B., & Thöni, C. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0135 · Cited by 346
“Our approach is different since our goal is to understand a more fundamental issue—do we find evidence that comparable subjects from modern developed societies that are characterized by large-scale cooperation but differ strongly with regard to historical and cultural values behave differently in games of cooperation?…”
Cancer Evolution: Mathematical Models and Computational Inference
Beerenwinkel, N., Schwarz, R. F., Gerstung, M., & Markowetz, F. (2015) · Systematic Biology · doi:10.1093/sysbio/syu081 · Cited by 345
“These conditions include different levels of reciprocity and group selection (Nowak 2006b).”
BackgroundInfluentialXia, C., Wang, J., Perc, M., & Wang, Z. (2023) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2023.05.002 · Cited by 339
“To be particularly mentioned that, five rules have been identified to support the emergence of cooperation, which include kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, group selection, spatial or network reciprocity [5].”
BackgroundInfluentialThe evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms1442 · Cited by 350
“Let Xi be the total number of players in the population of size N using strategy i, i ∈ [1, 24].”
MethodInfluentialSelf-citationEmergent cooperation in microbial metabolism
Wintermute, E. H., & Silver, P. A. (2010) · Molecular Systems Biology · doi:10.1038/msb.2010.66 · Cited by 344
“The fitness costs and benefits of biological interactions are often difficult or impossible to quantify (Boucher, 1988), but are required for the application of population dynamic models (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundOnymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments
Wang, Z., Jusup, M., Wang, R.-W., Shi, L., Iwasa, Y., Moreno, Y., & Kurths, J. (2017) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.1601444 · Cited by 343
“Much of the mentioned progress in understanding the evolution of cooperation has been ascribed to several mechanisms that promote cooperative behavior (26).”
Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans
Baldassarri, D., & Grossman, G. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105456108 · Cited by 330
“Peer punishment, as well as reward, provides a possibility of targeted interaction, thus fostering cooperation through mechanisms of direct and indirect reciprocity (11, 12).”
Indirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment
Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07601 · Cited by 337
Self-citationHeterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Gracia-Lázaro, C., Ferrer, A., Ruiz, G., Tarancón, A., Cuesta, J. A., Sánchez, A., & Moreno, Y. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1206681109 · Cited by 343
“The ensuing two decades have witnessed a wealth of theoretical studies that have concluded that this so-called network reciprocity (8) is, indeed, possible under a variety of circumstances, but in many other contexts, networks do not promote—or they even inhibit— cooperation (10, 11).”
BackgroundHaidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010) · Handbook of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002022 · Cited by 325
Xu, Y., Wang, J., Wu, Q., Anpalagan, A., & Yao, Y.-D. (2012) · IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing · doi:10.1109/jstsp.2011.2176916 · Cited by 330
“is motivated by local cooperation in biographical systems [37], [38].”
BackgroundWild justice: the moral lives of animals
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.47-1420 · Cited by 322
Touch Versus Tech: When Technology Functions as a Barrier or a Benefit to Service Encounters
Giebelhausen, M. D., Robinson, S. G., Sirianni, N. J., & Brady, M. K. (2014) · Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1509/jm.12.0056 · Cited by 289
“When an employee smiles at a customer or makes small talk, per the script, the customer feels obligated to respond in kind (Foa and Foa 1976; Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics of collective action in N -person stag hunt dilemmas
Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., Souza, M. O., & Skyrms, B. (2009) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.1126 · Cited by 310
“sustainability of cooperation at different levels of organization (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Maynard-Smith 1982; Axelrod 1984; Boyd & Richerson 1985; Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998; Skyrms 2001, 2004; Macy & Flache 2002; Hammerstein 2003; Nowak & Sigmund 2004; Nowak et al. 2004; Santos & Pacheco 2005; Nowak 2006; Ohtsuki et a…”
BackgroundGame theory and neural basis of social decision making
Lee, D. (2008) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn2065 · Cited by 299
“In theory, multiple mechanisms—including kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity and group selection—can increase the fitness of cooperators and thus sustain cooperatio”
BackgroundZhang, L., Feng, G., & Declerck, S. (2018) · The ISME Journal · doi:10.1038/s41396-018-0171-4 · Cited by 307
“, have been explored by scientists [3].”
The role of the striatum in social behavior
Báez-Mendoza, R., & Schultz, W. (2013) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2013.00233 · Cited by 312
“Studies in “Reward inequity”: (Moll et al., 2006; Fliessbach et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2008; Tricomi et al., 2010). has observed its “altruistic” behavior (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundRabinowitz, N. C., Perbet, F., Song, H. F., Zhang, C., Eslami, S. M. A., & Botvinick, M. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.07740
“Such models will be important for value alignment (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016) and flexible cooperation (Nowak, 2006; Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2016; Barrett et al., 2017; Kris Cao), and will likely be an ingredient in future machines’ ethical decision making (Churchland, 1996).”
BackgroundOptimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep02470 · Cited by 311
“Network reciprocity is amongst the most well-known mechanisms that may sustain cooperation in evolutionary games that constitute a social dilemma [1].”
BackgroundPlaying repeated games with large language models
Akata, E., Schulz, L., Coda-Forno, J., Oh, S. J., Bethge, M., & Schulz, E. (2025) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-025-02172-y · Cited by 91
“Consequently, GPT-4 tends to default to defection in uncertain situations, contrasting with human tendencies to anticipate and adjust based on future outcomes 24,45 .”
Giving leads to happiness in young children
Aknin, L. B., Hamlin, J. K., & Dunn, E. W. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0039211 · Cited by 304
Group selection and kin selection: Two concepts but one process
Lehmann, L., Keller, L., West, S., & Roze, D. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0700662104 · Cited by 291
Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments
Li, X., Jusup, M., Wang, Z., Li, H., Shi, L., Podobnik, B., Stanley, H. E., Havlin, S., & Boccaletti, S. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1707505115 · Cited by 302
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.