Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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InfluentialIsolated cell behavior drives the evolution of antibiotic resistance
Artemova, T., Gerardin, Y., Dudley, C., Vega, N. M., & Gore, J. (2015) · Molecular Systems Biology · doi:10.15252/msb.20145888 · Cited by 79
“These “cooperative” genotypes can be favored as the result of population structure that facilitates group/kin selection (Nowak, 2006; Damore & Gore, 2012).”
BackgroundThe performance of rooks in a cooperative task depends on their temperament
Scheid, C., & Noë, R. (2009) · Animal Cognition · doi:10.1007/s10071-009-0305-1 · Cited by 83
“…experimental (e.g. Chalmeau et al. 1997; Cronin et al. 2005; Hauser et al. 2003; Mendres and de Waal 2000) and theoretical studies (e.g. Nowak et al. 2004; Riolo et al. 2001; Sherratt and Roberts 1998) (see Dugatkin 1997; Noë 2006; Nowak 2006; Sachs et al. 2004 and West et al. 2007 for reviews).”
BackgroundPATHWAYS TO SOCIAL EVOLUTION: RECIPROCITY, RELATEDNESS, AND SYNERGY
Cleve, J. V., & Akçay, E. (2014) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/evo.12438 · Cited by 85
“Whereas early discussions of social evolution usually pitted one mechanism against another, recent efforts are increasingly focused on synthesizing and integrating the various pathways of social evolution (e.g., Marshall and Rowe, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; Nowak, 2006; West et al., 2007; Fle…”
BackgroundCapraro, V. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3409146 · Cited by 77
Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations
Xu, X., Rong, Z., Wu, Z.-X., Zhou, T., & Tse, C. K. (2017) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.95.052302 · Cited by 76
Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions
Nax, H. H., Perc, M., Szolnoki, A., & Helbing, D. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep12145 · Cited by 76
“Indeed, game theory provides many answers, including a variety of evolution ary [15, 16] and psychological [17–19] explanations, but on ly two based, in the language of game theory, on ‘rationality’.”
BackgroundUsing artificial systems to explore the ecology and evolution of symbioses
Momeni, B., Chen, C., Hillesland, K. L., Waite, A. J., & Shou, W. (2011) · Cellular and Molecular Life Sciences · doi:10.1007/s00018-011-0649-y · Cited by 81
“Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the origin of cooperation [64, 65].”
BackgroundSpecificity and transmission mosaic of ant nest-wall fungi
Schlick-Steiner, B. C., Steiner, F. M., Konrad, H., Seifert, B., Christian, E., Moder, K., Stauffer, C., & Crozier, R. H. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0708320105 · Cited by 81
Learning a commonsense moral theory
Kleiman-Weiner, M., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2017.03.005 · Cited by 53
“…models of reciprocity that were defined in terms of specific behaviors in specific situations, such as Tit-for-Tat in the prisoners dilemma (Axelrod, 1985; Nowak, 2006; Rand & Nowak, 2013), our principles of reciprocity are implemented in agents who can reciprocally value the utility of each other.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialThe one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
Ohtsuki, H., Bordalo, P., & Nowak, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.005 · Cited by 82
“…et al. 1993, Ficici & Pollack 2000, Komarova & Nowak 2003, Nowak et al. 2004, Taylor et al. 2004, 2006, Wild & Taylor 2004, Imhof et al. 2005, Fudenberg et al. 2006, Nowak 2006a, Ohtsuki & Nowak 2006, Ohtsuki et al. 2006, Traulsen & Nowak 2006, Ohtsuki et al. 2007, Traulsen et al. 2006a, 2007a).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationConjoining uncooperative societies facilitates evolution of cooperation
Fotouhi, B., Momeni, N., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0368-6 · Cited by 65
Self-citationPublic Goods With Punishment and Abstaining in Finite and Infinite Populations
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2008) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114 · Cited by 83
Self-citationSocial structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation
Voelkl, B., & Kasper, C. (2009) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2009.0204 · Cited by 72
Zhang, J., Zhang, C., Chu, T., & Perc, M. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021787 · Cited by 78
“Although several mechanism allowing for the evolution of cooperation have already been identified [4], the resolution of social dilemmas and the closely related avoidance of the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ [5] is still considered an open problem.”
BackgroundVaish, A., Hepach, R., & Tomasello, M. (2017) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2017.11.005 · Cited by 75
“This specificity in children’s reciprocity is likely an important mechanism by which early cooperative relationships are formed and maintained (Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971).”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics drives role specialization in a community of players
Jia, D., Wang, X., Song, Z., Romić, I., Li, X., Jusup, M., & Wang, Z. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0174 · Cited by 74
“evolutionary and spatial games) set new methodological standards, followed by a few decades of fruitful research that suggested kin selection, group selection, direct, indirect, and network reciprocity as general mechanisms that act as the promotors of cooperation [6].”
BackgroundBottom-Up Approaches to Synthetic Cooperation in Microbial Communities
Rodríguez Amor, D., & Dal Bello, M. (2019) · Life · doi:10.3390/life9010022 · Cited by 71
“Hence, for cooperation to be an evolutionarily-stable strategy, additional mechanisms promoting cooperation have to be at play [17,18].”
BackgroundMoney and trust among strangers
Camera, G., Casari, M., & Bigoni, M. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301888110 · Cited by 81
“Money here substitutes for the ability to rely on indirect reciprocity (7), which is difficult in societies of strangers.”
BackgroundInfluentialPlant Kin Recognition Enhances Abundance of Symbiotic Microbial Partner
File, A. L., Klironomos, J. N., Maherali, H., & Dudley, S. A. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045648 · Cited by 71
“However, kin selection among plants offers an alternate incentive for cooperation between mutualists [21,22] because for a plant, investing carbon in the mycorrhizal network linked to close relatives could increase one’s indirect fitness and may remove cheaters from the population [23] preventing a tragedy of the comm…”
BackgroundKnowing the past improves cooperation in the future
Danku, Z., Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-36486-x · Cited by 79
“Springer, (2015) [9] Nowak, M.”
BackgroundHamilton’s Rule and Its Discontents
Birch, J. (2013) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axt016 · Cited by 80
“This is one way of conceptualizing the ‘problem of cooperation’ within the framework of evolutionary game theory (Nowak [2006]; Nowak and Highfield [2011]).”
BackgroundInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.