Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
(1976) · Cited by 10,423
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×
“An infinitely large population of cooperators cannot be invaded by defectors under deterministic selection dynamics (32).”
BackgroundEvolutionary games and spatial chaos
Nowak, M. A., & May, R. M. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/359826a0 · Cited by 4,463
Self-citationFehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- Wilson EO. Sociobiology. Harvard Univ. Press; Cambridge, MA: 1975. [Google Scholar]
- Axelrod R. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books; New York: 1984. [Google Scholar]
- Fudenberg D, Maskin E. Am Econ Rev. 1990;80:274. [Google Scholar]
- Michod RE. Darwinian Dynamics. Princeton Univ. Press; Princeton, NJ: 1999. [Google Scholar]
- Nowak MA. Evolutionary Dynamics. Harvard Univ. Press; Cambridge: 2006. [Google Scholar]
- Nakamaru M, Iwasa Y. Evol Ecol Res. 2005;7:853. [Google Scholar]
Cited by
Items 801–900 of 1,029
Beyond the modern synthesis: A framework for a more inclusive biological synthesis
Corning, P. A. (2020) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2020.02.002 · Cited by 52
Wang, G., & Wanying, H. U. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.656412 · Cited by 59
“It refers to a kind of joint action or way between individuals or groups to achieve a common purpose and cooperate with each other (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundTzamali, E., Poirazi, P., Tollis, I. G., & Reczko, M. (2011) · BMC Systems Biology · doi:10.1186/1752-0509-5-167 · Cited by 53
“Further analysis regarding the evolutionary stability of the strain communities and their survival from ‘cheats’, who only gain the benefit from others [11,13,19,66-69], is particularly interesting.”
BackgroundCapuchin monkeys are not prosocial in an instrumental helping task
Skerry, A. E., Sheskin, M., & Santos, L. R. (2011) · Animal Cognition · doi:10.1007/s10071-011-0399-0 · Cited by 52
“However, an extensive body of theoretical work in evolutionary biology and beyond has explored how behaviors that are altruistic at the proximate level can nonetheless be evolutionarily stable strategies (Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971; Axelrod 1984; see Nowak 2006 for recent review).”
BackgroundZhang, Y., Wang, J., Ding, C., & Xia, C. (2017) · Knowledge-Based Systems · doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2017.09.011 · Cited by 52
Schroeder, J., & Schroeder, M. (2018) · Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences · doi:10.24251/hicss.2018.061 · Cited by 46
Quan, J., Caixia, T., Zhou, Y., Wang, X., & Yang, J. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109517 · Cited by 52
Rhoads, S. A., Cutler, J., & Marsh, A. A. (2021) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsab079 · Cited by 53
“, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; de Waal, 2008; Fowler and Christakis, 2010; FeldmanHall, 2017) and within societies (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundFrom Infanticide to Parental Care: Why Spatial Structure Can Help Adults Be Good Parents
Lion, S., & van Baalen, M. (2007) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/519462 · Cited by 51
“In a recent review, Nowak (2006) suggests that cooperation on networks evolves via “network reciprocity,” a mechanism that he claims is distinct from kin selection.”
ON THE EVOLUTION OF DIFFERENTIATED MULTICELLULARITY
Willensdorfer, M. (2009) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2008.00541.x · Cited by 51
“It opened a door to a whole 5 new world of possibilities (Bonner, 1965; Buss, 1988; Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 1997; 6 Bonner, 2001; Knoll, 2003; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundFrom Prelife to Life: How Chemical Kinetics Become Evolutionary Dynamics
Chen, I. A., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Accounts of Chemical Research · doi:10.1021/ar2002683 · Cited by 50
Self-citationA Nobel Prize for Governance and Institutions: Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom
Earl, P. E., & Potts, J. (2011) · Review of Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09538259.2011.526291 · Cited by 50
“In recognizing these distinct mechanisms, Ostrom's research program (along with many colleagues and other researchers; see Nowak, 2006 ) turned toward laboratory-based experimental endeavours to isolate and examine the institutional mechanisms that contributed to resolving social dilemmas in CPR governance (Ostrom, 20…”
BackgroundLü, P., & Wang, F. (2015) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2015.03.053 · Cited by 50
Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection
Safarzyńska, K., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.04.003 · Cited by 58
Coevolution of Vertex Weights Resolves Social Dilemma in Spatial Networks
Shen, C., Chen, C., Guo, H., Ши, Л., & Duan, J. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-15603-2 · Cited by 50
Winner-weaken-loser-strengthen rule leads to optimally cooperative interdependent networks
Ши, Л., Shen, C., Geng, Y., Chen, C., Meng, H., Perc, M., Boccaletti, S., & Wang, Z. (2019) · Nonlinear Dynamics · doi:10.1007/s11071-019-04772-6 · Cited by 50
Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
Ghang, W., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.09.036 · Cited by 55
“Nowak). Journal of Theoretical Biology 365 (2015) 1–11”
BackgroundSelf-citationReproductive value in graph-structured populations
Maciejewski, W. (2014) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.09.032 · Cited by 51
“311 The fundamental result concerning the temperatures on an evolutionary graph is the 312 isothermal theorem of [18] (see also [20]).”
BackgroundOpting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation
Zhang, B., Fan, S.-J., Li, C., Zheng, X.-D., Bao, J.-Z., Cressman, R., & Tao, Y. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep35902 · Cited by 57
Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates
Santos, F. P., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep37517 · Cited by 50
“While SJ and SS preserve the status of norms that noticeably sustain more cooperation, there are important effects worth pointing for large values of μ : (1) IS and SS benefit, in most cases, from higher exploration rates; (2) the cooperation rate under SH and SJ slightly decreases for high exploration rates and (3) a…”
BackgroundSynergy punishment promotes cooperation in spatial public good game
Liu, J., Meng, H., Wang, W., Li, T., & Yu, Y. (2018) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.01.019 · Cited by 50
Dynamic-sensitive cooperation in the presence of multiple strategy updating rules
Szolnoki, A., & Danku, Z. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.08.007 · Cited by 51
“Albeit a clear and intuitive taxonomy of potential cooperation supporting mechanisms was already given by Martin Nowak [16], but this framework can mostly be considered as an inspiring starting point for subsequent research efforts.”
BackgroundEvolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity
Su, Q., Zhou, L., & Wang, L. (2019) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006947 · Cited by 54
Cooperation in Microbial Populations: Theory and Experimental Model Systems
Cremer, J., Melbinger, A., Wienand, K., Henríquez, T., Jung, H., & Frey, E. (2019) · Journal of Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jmb.2019.09.023 · Cited by 56
“To further illustrate the dilemma of cooperation, let us consider one specific situation, the prisoner's dilemma [13], which has become a mathematical metaphor to describe cooperative behavior [98,226,261,262].”
BackgroundInfluentialImpact of reputation assortment on tag-mediated altruistic behaviors in the spatial lattice
Jian, Q., Li, X., Wang, J., & Xia, C. (2021) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2020.125928 · Cited by 56
The Effect of Memory Size on the Evolutionary Stability of Strategies in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Li, J., & Kendall, G. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2013.2286492 · Cited by 55
“IPD is considered an ideal test bed for the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals and it has attracted wide interest since Robert Axelrod’s IPD tournaments and the Evolution of Cooperation [4], [5], [11], [21], [27], [28].”
BackgroundStable public goods cooperation and dynamic social interactions in yeast
MacLean, R. C., & Brandon, C. E. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2008.01579.x · Cited by 55
“Hamilton, 1981; Bull & Rice, 1991; Maynard Smith & Sza´thmary, 1995; Taylor & Frank, 1996; Hauert & Doebeli, 2004; Sachs et al., 2004; Nowak, 2006; West et al., 2006), this work presents one of the first long-term experimental investigations of this topic (see also Kerr et al., 2006; Sandoz et al., 2007).”
BackgroundHow is the equilibrium of continuous strategy game different from that of discrete strategy game?
Zhong, W., Kokubo, S., & Tanimoto, J. (2011) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2011.10.001 · Cited by 50
Resolving Conflicts During the Evolutionary Transition to Multicellular Life
Rainey, P. B., & Monte, S. D. (2014) · Annual Review of Ecology Evolution and Systematics · doi:10.1146/annurev-ecolsys-120213-091740 · Cited by 53
Origins of music in credible signalingPreprint
Mehr, S. A., Krasnow, M. M., Bryant, G. A., & Hagen, E. H. (2020) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/nrqb3 · Cited by 59
“Instead, these relationships must be targeted at specific categories of individuals, such as kin, neighbors, or those likely to reciprocate, and adjusted to local socio-ecological conditions (Markham, Gesquiere, Alberts, & Altmann, 2015) such that long-run benefits are provided only when they exceed long-run costs to…”
InfluentialCooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2 · Cited by 50
“Together, the three requirements in (2) define a three-dimensional polyhedron within the space of all memory-1 strategies (Fig.”
Self-citationLarge-scale cooperation driven by reputation, not fear of divine punishment
Ge, E., Chen, Y., Wu, J., & Mace, R. H. (2019) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.190991 · Cited by 50
Reputation-based co-evolutionary model promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
Gong, Y., Liu, S., & Bai, Y. (2020) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126233 · Cited by 51
Estimating the Social Gap With a Game Theory Model of Lane Changing
Ji, A., & Levinson, D. M. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2020.2991242 · Cited by 49
“More details about the reciprocity mechanisms can be seen in [32].”
BackgroundThe evolution of universal cooperation
Gross, J., Méder, Z. Z., Dreu, C. K. W. D., Romano, A., Molenmaker, W. E., & Hoenig, L. C. (2023) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.add8289 · Cited by 58
Evolution of cooperation driven by sampling punishment
Xiao, J., Liu, L., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2023) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2023.128879 · Cited by 52
Evolution of cooperation in the public goods game with Q-learning
Zheng, G., Zhang, J., Deng, S., Cai, W., & Chen, L. (2024) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2024.115568 · Cited by 54
Strategical incoherence regulates cooperation in social dilemmas on multiplex networks
Matamalas, J. T., Poncela-Casasnovas, J., Gómez, S., & Arenas, À. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep09519 · Cited by 55
“Specifically, we find that in the stationary state, there are individuals that play the same strategy in all layers (coherent), and others that don’t (incoherent).”
BackgroundBacteria and game theory: the rise and fall of cooperation in spatially heterogeneous environments
Lambert, G., Vyawahare, S., & Austin, R. H. (2014) · Interface Focus · doi:10.1098/rsfs.2014.0029 · Cited by 49
On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
Berger, U., & Grüne, A. (2016) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.003 · Cited by 51
“Nowak (2006) surveys the most important such mechanisms from the biologist’s point of view.”
Emergence of cooperation during an emergency evacuation
Cheng, Y., & Zheng, X. (2017) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2017.10.011 · Cited by 49
Reiter, J. G., Hilbe, C., Rand, D. G., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 · Cited by 50
“(2) and (3) can be further simplified for well-mixed populations.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe evolution of lying in well-mixed populations
Capraro, V., Perc, M., & Vilone, D. (2019) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2019.0211 · Cited by 52
Eco-evolutionary dynamics of multigames with mutations
Roy, S., Chowdhury, S. N., Mali, P. C., Perc, M., & Ghosh, D. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0272719 · Cited by 51
Third-Party Punishment as a Costly Signal of High Continuation Probabilities in Repeated Games
Jordan, J., & Rand, D. G. (2017) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.04.004 · Cited by 53
A choice for ‘me’ or for ‘us’? Using we-reasoning to predict cooperation and coordination in games
Butler, D. (2011) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/s11238-011-9270-7 · Cited by 50
“The model therefore fits comfortably with the underlying logic of both evolutionary biology and economics and is consistent with the five rules for the evolution of cooperation identified by Nowak (2006).”
ResultEmergent behaviours in multi-agent systems with Evolutionary Game Theory
Han, T. A. (2022) · AI Communications · doi:10.3233/aic-220104 · Cited by 65
“Several mechanisms responsible for promoting cooperative behavior have been recently identified, ranging from kin and group ties, to different forms of reciprocity and networked populations (see surveys in [61,67,76]).”
Much ado about nothing: Nowak et al.’s charge against inclusive fitness theory
Rousset, F., & Lion, S. (2011) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2011.02251.x · Cited by 51
“…understanding the links between one’s results and existing theory, such as the conceptual framework of inclusive fitness theory, is both a way to move forward and a safeguard against rediscovering special cases of known results (e.g. Nowak, 2006), as previously emphasized by Lehmann et al. (2007).”
Collective action in the fraternal transitions
Birch, J. (2012) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-012-9312-8 · Cited by 51
“When we take these into account, weighting them by the relatedness (r) between the players, the payoff matrix is transformed, and the prospects for cooperation seem considerably brighter (see Maynard Smith 1982; Nowak 2006; Taylor and Nowak 2007):”
BackgroundCiliates and the Rare Biosphere—Community Ecology and Population Dynamics
Weisse, T. (2014) · Journal of Eukaryotic Microbiology · doi:10.1111/jeu.12123 · Cited by 51
“Network reciprocity, where clusters of cooperators outcompete defectors, has been identified as one mechanism promoting the evolution of cooperation (Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundWhat controls network reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma game?
Yamauchi, A., Tanimoto, J., & Hagishima, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.07.017 · Cited by 52
Social Dilemmas and Cooperation
Raub, W., Buskens, V., & Corten, R. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-01164-2_21 · Cited by 53
Cooperation in defence against a predator
Garay, J. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.11.010 · Cited by 58
“(Nowak, 2006) and group formation on phenotypic similarity (Burtsev and”
BackgroundEffect of assessment error and private information on stern-judging in indirect reciprocity
Uchida, S., & Sasaki, T. (2013) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.08.006 · Cited by 52
Strategy changing penalty promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Jin, Q., Wang, Z., Wang, Z., & Yi-Ling, W. (2012) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2012.01.004 · Cited by 49
Games among relatives revisited
Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.04.031 · Cited by 55
“the simplified Prisoner’s Dilemma game (13) and with payoff affecting reproductive rate, the condition for cooperation often takes the form b × (something) > c (Nowak, 2006b).”
BackgroundSelf-citationGames in the Philosophy of Biology
O’Connor, C. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108616737 · Cited by 49
Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents
Chen, Z., Gao, J., Cai, Y., & Xu, X. (2011) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2011.01.004 · Cited by 52
“One of possible mechanisms accounting for the establishment of cooperation is the so-called network reciprocity [3].”
BackgroundWang, B., Pei, Z., & Wang, L. (2014) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/107/58006 · Cited by 47
Corpus-Based Intention Recognition in Cooperation Dilemmas
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., & Santos, F. C. (2012) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/artl_a_00072 · Cited by 51
“Pairwise comparisons [27, 68, 47] of the three strategies lead to the conclusions that AllC is dominated by IR and that IR is an evolutionary stable strategy [27] if which always holds for m ≥ 3 (since 2 R > T + P and R > P ).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialEvolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks
Iyer, S., & Killingback, T. (2016) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004779 · Cited by 49
“A number of different approaches to understanding the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas have been studied [36].”
BackgroundBear, A., Kagan, A., & Rand, D. G. (2017) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2016.2326 · Cited by 51
“5) and perfectly sensitive deliberation (yd 1⁄4 1).(1) Therefore, in addition to their metacognitive threshold T, agents have four additional strategy parameters which specify their cooperation choices.”
BackgroundMobility can promote the evolution of cooperation via emergent self-assortment dynamics
Joshi, J., Couzin, I. D., Levin, S. A., & Guttal, V. (2017) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005732 · Cited by 48
“Thirdly, studies have argued that spatial or network structures can facilitate assortment [49].”
BackgroundResultThe self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2021) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ac0756 · Cited by 47
The psychology of cooperation in animals: an ecological approach
McAuliffe, K., & Thornton, A. (2015) · Journal of Zoology · doi:10.1111/jzo.12204 · Cited by 51
“…individuals may be expected to assist those who have assisted them (direct reciprocity: Trivers, 1971) or other group members (indirect reciprocity: Nowak, 2006) in the past to trade goods and services with others (biological market theory; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994) or to punish uncooperative…”
The Rules of Information Aggregation and Emergence of Collective Intelligent Behavior
Bettencourt, L. M. A. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2009.01047.x · Cited by 56
Cooperation in group-structured populations with two layers of interactions
Zhang, Y., Fu, F., Chen, X., Xie, G., & Wang, L. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep17446 · Cited by 51
“In a single-step update, the frequency of the strategy (1, 1) denoted by x(1,1) is increased in two ways: an existing individual with the strategy (1, 1) reproduces, and the offspring does not mutate to other strategies; an existing individual with other strategies reproduces, and the offspring mutates to the strategy…”
BackgroundMethodCompetition, Cooperation and Collective Choice
Markussen, T., Reuben, E., & Tyran, J. (2012) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/ecoj.12096 · Cited by 57
How Groups Can Foster Consensus: The Case of Local Cultures
Groeber, P., Schweitzer, F., & Press, K. (2009) · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000156548 · Cited by 50
Increasing plant group productivity through latent genetic variation for cooperation
Wuest, S. E., Pires, N. D., Luo, S., Vasseur, F., Messier, J., Grossniklaus, U., & Niklaus, P. A. (2022) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3001842 · Cited by 46
“Evolutionary game theory predicts that an allele that promotes cooperation will be selected against in a natural plant population, except under special circumstances [38].”
BackgroundWhen selection pays: Structured public goods game with a generalized interaction mode
Han, J., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2024) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0201582 · Cited by 48
Introduction to AI Safety, Ethics, and Society
Hendrycks, D. (2024) · CRC Press eBooks · doi:10.1201/9781003530336 · Cited by 111
Random allocation of pies promotes the evolution of fairness in the Ultimatum Game
Wang, X., Chen, X., & Wang, L. (2014) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep04534 · Cited by 46
Indirect Reciprocity under Incomplete Observation
Nakamura, M., & Masuda, N. (2011) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002113 · Cited by 49
“Several mechanisms can explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperation [1,2].”
BackgroundThe coevolutionary ultimatum game
Gao, J., Li, Z., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2011) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/93/48003 · Cited by 48
Stochastic dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma with cooperation facilitators
Mobilia, M. (2012) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.86.011134 · Cited by 47
Different Reactions to Adverse Neighborhoods in Games of Cooperation
Zhang, C., Zhang, J., Weissing, F. J., Perc, M., Xie, G., & Wang, L. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183 · Cited by 47
“Past research has identified several key mechanisms (comprehensively reviewed in [7]) that promote the evolution of cooperation.”
BackgroundAn fMRI study of the social competition in healthy subjects
Polosan, M., Baciu, M., Cousin, É., Perrone‐Bertolotti, M., Pichat, C., & Bougerol, T. (2011) · Brain and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2011.08.018 · Cited by 50
“According to the evolutionary theory, the social competition would be essential to natural selection and social organization (Bowles, 2006; Nowak, 2006).”
Group size effects in social evolution
Peña, J., & Nöldeke, G. (2018) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.08.004 · Cited by 46
Second-Order Reputation Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Dong, Y., Sun, S., Xia, C., & Perc, M. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2922200 · Cited by 48
“[12] S. Ono, K. Misawa, K. Tsuji, and M. A. Nowak, ‘‘Effect of group selection on the evolution of altruistic behavior,’’ J. Theor.”
BackgroundInfluentialWang, Y., & Redmiles, D. (2015) · Empirical Software Engineering · doi:10.1007/s10664-015-9407-3 · Cited by 49
“We can then use empirical study to validate these generatively-developed propositions, which forms the integrated process of scientific knowledge development that ensures both rigorousness and relevance (Montuschi 2003).”
MethodFrom genes to games: Cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive
Traulsen, A., & Reed, F. A. (2011) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.032 · Cited by 49
Synthetic ecology: A model system for cooperation
Dunham, M. J. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0611067104 · Cited by 46
Molleman, L., Quiñones, A. E., & Weissing, F. J. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.06.001 · Cited by 50
“This mode of group selection has been coined ‘trait-group’ selection (Wilson, 1975), ‘new’ group selection (West et al., 2007b), or multilevel selection 1 (Okasha, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialPup guarding by greater spear-nosed bats
Bohn, K. M., Moss, C. F., & Wilkinson, G. S. (2009) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0776-8 · Cited by 51
“This scenario is plausible given the long life span and group fidelity exhibited by females (McCracken and Bradbury 1981; Nowak 2006).”
BackgroundQuan, J., Liu, W., Chu, Y., & Wang, X. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8 · Cited by 45
Spatial reciprocity for discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups
Kokubo, S., Wang, Z., & Tanimoto, J. (2015) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2015.03.018 · Cited by 45
“In particular, Nowak recently attributed these achievements to five mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection [10], these mechanisms can be somewhat related to the reduction of an opposing player’s anonymity relative to the existing well-mixed situatio…”
BackgroundWhy do Managers Engage in Trustworthy Behavior? A Multilevel Cross‐Cultural Study in 18 Countries
Reiche, B. S., Cardona, P., Lee, Y., Canela, M. Á., Akinnukawe, E., Briscoe, J. P., Bullara, C., Caparas, M. V., Caprar, D. V., Charlemagne, D., et al. (2013) · Personnel Psychology · doi:10.1111/peps.12038 · Cited by 51
Impact of link deletions on public cooperation in scale-free networks
Jiang, L.-L., Perc, M., Wang, W.-X., Lai, Y., & Wang, B.-H. (2011) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/93/40001 · Cited by 47
Adaptive and Bounded Investment Returns Promote Cooperation in Spatial Public Goods Games
Chen, X., Liu, Y., Zhou, Y., Wang, L., & Perc, M. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036895 · Cited by 47
“The emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals is an intensively studied problem [1,2].”
BackgroundThe collaborative factory of the future
Moghaddam, M., & Nof, S. Y. (2015) · International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing · doi:10.1080/0951192x.2015.1066034 · Cited by 55
“…mechanism for the survival and evolution of any natural and artificial organisation, from genomes, multi-cellular organisms, social insects and human societies (Nowak 2006) to the networks of sensors, computers, robots and global manufacturing enterprises (Nof 2003, 2006, 2007; Nof et al. 2015).”
Autocratic strategies for alternating games
McAvoy, A., & Hauert, C. (2016) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2016.09.004 · Cited by 45
Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior
Capraro, V., Giardini, F., Vilone, D., & Paolucci, M. (2016) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500004800 · Cited by 44
“Comprehension questions about the Prisoner’s Dilemma were exactly the same as in the previous studies and so we do not report them again.”
Working dogs cooperate among one another by generalised reciprocity
Gfrerer, N., & Taborsky, M. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep43867 · Cited by 48
“This uncertainty can be reduced by repeatedly interacting with the same social partner, which enables tit for tat – like stable cooperation 37,38 .”
Artificial Intelligence and Social Simulation: Studying Group Dynamics on a Massive Scale
Hoey, J., Schröder, T., Morgan, J. H., Rogers, K. B., Rishi, D., & Nagappan, M. (2018) · Small Group Research · doi:10.1177/1046496418802362 · Cited by 51
“More recently, cooperative behavior has been linked to altruism through factors like kinship, direct reciprocity, or indirect reciprocity via reputation (M. Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundWang, J., Wang, R., Yu, F., Wang, Z., & Li, Q. (2019) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2019.124887 · Cited by 51
Zhang, L., Xie, Y., Huang, C., Li, H., & Dai, Q. (2020) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2020.109675 · Cited by 45
Chen, X., Fu, F., & Wang, L. (2007) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2007.09.044 · Cited by 45
The role of noise in the spatial public goods game
Javarone, M. A., & Battiston, F. (2016) · Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment · doi:10.1088/1742-5468/2016/07/073404 · Cited by 50
“The emergence of cooperation [8] in structured populations [9], in particular in games characterized by a Nash equilibrium of defection, is one of the main topics studied in this field.”
BackgroundFoster, K. R. (2009) · Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology · doi:10.1101/sqb.2009.74.041 · Cited by 69
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.