Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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Débarre, F., Hauert, C., & Doebeli, M. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms4409 · Cited by 147
Social tipping points in global groundwater management
Castilla‐Rho, J., Rojas, R., Andersen, M. S., Holley, C., & Mariethoz, G. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0181-7 · Cited by 161
The evolution of trust and trustworthiness
Kumar, A., Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0491 · Cited by 148
“The very fact that interactions are structured has been shown to promote cooperation, along the logic of network reciprocity: cooperators can form clusters to protect themselves from the invasion of defectors [8].”
BackgroundReputation drives cooperative behaviour and network formation in human groups
Cuesta, J. A., Gracia-Lázaro, C., Ferrer, A., Moreno, Y., & Sánchez, A. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep07843 · Cited by 145
Tung, V. W. S., Chen, P., & Schuckert, M. R. (2016) · Tourism Management · doi:10.1016/j.tourman.2016.07.010 · Cited by 167
Evaluation of collaborative consumption of food delivery services through web mining techniques
Correa, J. C., Garzón, W., Brooker, P., Sakarkar, G., Carranza, S. A., Yunado, L., & Rincón, A. (2019) · Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services · doi:10.1016/j.jretconser.2018.05.002 · Cited by 139
“The cost-benefit ratio, widely employed by evolutionary biologists (Nowak, 2006), was an inspiring concept for the theory on the efficiency of commons-based society proposed by the economist Elinor Ostrom (1990).”
BackgroundEcological and evolutionary approaches to improving crop variety mixtures
Wuest, S. E., Peter, R., & Niklaus, P. A. (2021) · Nature Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1038/s41559-021-01497-x · Cited by 165
Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2015) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.1975 · Cited by 150
“The importance of structured populations for the outcome of evolutionary social dilemmas was reporte d first by Nowak and May [44], and today the positive effects of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation are wel lknown as network reciprocity [45, 46].”
BackgroundFerguson, E. (2015) · Transfusion Medicine · doi:10.1111/tme.12233 · Cited by 158
“The general concept of reciprocity can be used to group a set of these MOAs: direct, indirect and strong reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialStructure and function in mammalian societies
Clutton-Brock, T. H. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0120 · Cited by 158
Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
Pan, L., Hao, D., Rong, Z., & Zhou, T. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep13096 · Cited by 149
“In equation (21), all the probabilities depend only on the elements in equation (2), which indicates that p(1) is unilaterally controlled by player 1.”
BackgroundDynamic remodeling of in-group bias during the 2008 presidential election
Rand, D. G., Pfeiffer, T., Dreber, A., Sheketoff, R. W., Wernerfelt, N. C., & Benkler, Y. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0811552106 · Cited by 140
Male tolerance and male–male bonds in a multilevel primate society
Patzelt, A., Kopp, G. H., Ndao, I., Kalbitzer, U., Zinner, D. P., & Fischer, J. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1405811111 · Cited by 147
“However, what are the evolutionary dynamics that give rise to multilevel systems in the first place, and how do social organization and cooperative tendencies stabilize each other? Evolutionary game theory has been used to model the conditions that favor cooperation among unrelated individuals (5, 6).”
BackgroundBeyond Good and Evil: What Motivations Underlie Children’s Prosocial Behavior?
Martin, A., & Olson, K. R. (2015) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691615568998 · Cited by 163
“…that human adults are willing to help strangers on the street (e.g., Moss & Page, 1972) and to share resources with recipients they have never met (Nowak, 2006), it is also clear that adults are more prosocial toward people with whom they are familiar or close (Clark & Mills, 1979; Cole & Teboul,…”
BackgroundA multilevel evolutionary framework for sustainability analysis
Waring, T. M., Kline, M. A., Brooks, J. S., Goff, S. H., Gowdy, J., Janssen, M. A., Smaldino, P. E., & Jacquet, J. (2015) · Ecology and Society · doi:10.5751/es-07634-200234 · Cited by 135
“Fourth, evolutionary research on multilevel selection (Okasha 2006, Field 2008) provides a foundation determining when and how cooperation can emerge because of competition between groups (Gürerk et al. 2006, Puurtinen and Mappes 2009).”
Percolation threshold determines the optimal population density for public cooperation
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2012) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.85.037101 · Cited by 140
A review of game theory models of lane changing
Ji, A., & Levinson, D. M. (2020) · Transportmetrica A Transport Science · doi:10.1080/23249935.2020.1770368 · Cited by 141
Zhang, Y., Wang, Z., & Zhou, G. (2013) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2013.10.021 · Cited by 151
The relative roles of kinship and reciprocity in explaining primate altruism
Schino, G., & Aureli, F. (2010) · Ecology Letters · doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2009.01396.x · Cited by 135
Social dilemmas in an online social network: The structure and evolution of cooperation
Fu, F., Chen, X., Liu, L., & Wang, L. (2007) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2007.05.116 · Cited by 150
Spatial dilemmas of diffusible public goods
Allen, B., Gore, J., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.01169 · Cited by 135
“In this case, absent some mechanism to support cooperation (Nowak, 2006), public goods production is expected to disappear under competition from cheaters, resulting in the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).”
BackgroundSelf-citationAdaptive social strategies in a solitary carnivore
Elbroch, L. M., Levy, M., Lubell, M. N., Quigley, H. B., & Caragiulo, A. (2017) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.1701218 · Cited by 149
“We estimated ERGMs for the network with both dichotomized edges and edges that represented multiple counts of tolerance between a puma dyad to account for assumptions of multiple interactions in theories of the development of social behaviors (7).”
BackgroundMethodSocial evolution in micro-organisms and a Trojan horse approach to medical intervention strategies
Brown, S. P., West, S. A., Diggle, S. P., & Griffin, A. S. (2009) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0055 · Cited by 161
Evolutionary game theory: cells as players
Hummert, S., Bohl, K., Basanta, D., Deutsch, A., Werner, S., Theißen, G., Schroeter, A., & Schuster, S. (2014) · Molecular BioSystems · doi:10.1039/c3mb70602h · Cited by 151
Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4 · Cited by 135
Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations
Wang, Z., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2014) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.90.032813 · Cited by 141
Social efficiency deficit deciphers social dilemmas
Arefin, M. R., Kabir, K. M. A., Jusup, M., Ito, H., & Tanimoto, J. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-72971-y · Cited by 136
Evolution of prosocial behaviours in multilayer populations
Su, Q., McAvoy, A., Mori, Y., & Plotkin, J. B. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01241-2 · Cited by 159
“Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain their widespread abundance [8], most notably spatial structure, which constrains interaction and dispersal patterns within a population [9–17].”
BackgroundAnticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.11.001 · Cited by 167
“4 Relatedly, the fact that people are generally more cooperative when they are allowed to interact face to face or merely to see their opponents, as documented by Ostrom and Walker (1997) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) respectively, could in principle be due either to increased empathy or to reputational effects.”
BackgroundIndirect Punishment and Generosity Toward Strangers
Ule, A., Schram, A., Riedl, A., & Cason, T. N. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1178883 · Cited by 132
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.