Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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“produced by the cooperating individuals (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006).”
Dynamics of N-person snowdrift games in structured populations
Santos, M. D., Pinheiro, F. L., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.09.001 · Cited by 87
Measures of success in a class of evolutionary models with fixed population size and structure
Allen, B., & Tarnita, C. E. (2012) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-012-0622-x · Cited by 99
Formation of raiding parties for intergroup violence is mediated by social network structure
Glowacki, L., Isakov, A., Wrangham, R. W., McDermott, R., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1610961113 · Cited by 82
“This is also consistent with the cognitive and social complexity of humans and with prior observational work regarding the role of social ties in the emergence of both collective violence (10, 37, 42, 44) and altruism in humans (31, 32, 45).”
ResultUsing Social and Behavioural Science to Support COVID-19 Pandemic ResponsePreprint
Bavel, J. J. V., D, K. B. A., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A. K., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4178356 · Cited by 92
Death Before Dishonor: Incurring Costs to Protect Moral Reputation
Vonasch, A. J., Reynolds, T. A., Winegard, B., & Baumeister, R. F. (2017) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550617720271 · Cited by 105
“People use several strategies to avoid helping uncooperative others (Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundAn Evolutionary Game With the Game Transitions Based on the Markov Process
Feng, M., Pi, B., Deng, L.-J., & Kurths, J. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2023.3315963 · Cited by 90
“Moreover, a large number of mechanisms that can facilitate the evolution of cooperative behavior have also been investigated, among which the five rules proposed by Nowak in 2006 [17] are well-known.”
BackgroundCooperation and the evolution of intelligence
McNally, L., Brown, S. P., & Jackson, A. L. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0206 · Cited by 98
State-of-the-art of intention recognition and its use in decision making
Han, T. A., & Pereira, L. M. (2013) · AI Communications · doi:10.3233/aic-130559 · Cited by 85
“We study the performance of agents which are capable of intention recognition within a population of interacting agents – in order to investigate what is the role of intention recognition in the evolution of cooperative behaviors [60,84].”
BackgroundEvolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032 · Cited by 94
“Why are some individuals willing to pay a cost (thereby decreasing their own fitness) in order to help someone else? During the last decades, researchers have proposed several mechanisms that are able to explain why cooperation is abundant in nature (Nowak, 2006; Sigmund, 2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationCooperation, collective action, and the archeology of large‐scale societies
Carballo, D. M., & Feinman, G. M. (2016) · Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21506 · Cited by 85
Spatial reciprocity in the evolution of cooperation
Su, Q., Li, A., Wang, L., & Stanley, E. (2019) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2019.0041 · Cited by 99
Helbing, D., Yu, W., & Rauhut, H. (2011) · Journal of Mathematical Sociology · doi:10.1080/0022250x.2010.532258 · Cited by 91
“In the following, we will discuss how the result may change, if individuals have multiple interactions in space with the same or changing partners.”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations
Li, A., Broom, M., Du, J., & Wang, L. (2016) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.93.022407 · Cited by 89
Altruism and Prosocial Behavior, Sociology of
Wittek, R. P. M., & Bekkers, R. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.32158-4 · Cited by 104
Structure and evolution of co-authorship network in an interdisciplinary research field
Liu, P., & Xia, H. (2015) · Scientometrics · doi:10.1007/s11192-014-1525-y · Cited by 84
“It is also an interdisciplinary topic that crosses the boundaries of biology, economics, sociology, computer science and complexity science (Nowak 2006; Binmore and Samuelson 1992; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Fehr and Gächter 1999; Frank et al. 1993; Bó and Fréchette…”
BackgroundAn evolutionary explanation for ineffective altruism
Burum, B., Nowak, M. A., & Hoffman, M. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4 · Cited by 92
Self-citationTime Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas
Cone, J., & Rand, D. G. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115756 · Cited by 101
“Introduction Cooperation is, at once, both an essential feature of human social life and an enduring puzzle: why would anyone incur the personal costs that cooperative behavior demands in order to benefit the group when he or she could just as easily behave selfishly and hope to reap the rewards of others’ prosocialit…”
“Synergistic selection”: A Darwinian frame for the evolution of complexity
Corning, P. A., & Szathmáry, E. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.02.002 · Cited by 88
“Other recent theoretical support for the role of synergy includes a paper by Nowak (2006), where he identifies five “rules” for cooperation (kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection) and points out that each depends upon the benefit-cost…”
BackgroundHow can you capture cultural dynamics?
Kashima, Y. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00995 · Cited by 97
Effect of private information on indirect reciprocity
Uchida, S. (2010) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.82.036111 · Cited by 93
The explanatory logic and ontological commitments of generalized Darwinism
Stoelhorst, J. W. (2008) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/13501780802506661 · Cited by 100
“And yet, not only is cooperation a central feature of cultural evolution (Nowak 2006), according to Maynard Smith and Szathmary (1997) it is also central to the major transitions in biological evolution.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.