Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
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Abstract
Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
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“The overall pattern is reminiscent of the successful ‘tit-for-two-tats’ or ‘generous tit-for-tat’ strategy in iterated prisoner’s dilemma, whereby the agent is prone to punish but quick to forgive37–39.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [39]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredIn the citing paper
“Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
In the citing paper
“Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the likelihood of cooperation ( 11 ), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of repeated interactions because of 'social viscosity,' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity ( 1-2 ).”
From Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks (2010) · cites this paper as [1]
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BackgroundCooperation among cancer cells: applying game theory to cancer
Archetti, M., & Pienta, K. J. (2019) · Nature Reviews Cancer · doi:10.1038/s41568-018-0083-7 · Cited by 201
Friends of friends: are indirect connections in social networks important to animal behaviour?
Brent, L. J. N. (2015) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.01.020 · Cited by 191
“For reputation-based exchange, nonhumans may lack some of the necessary skills, such as the ability to retain large amounts of information on the relationships of others and to use complex language to share information regarding the actions of others (Nowak, 2006; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003).”
BackgroundThe sense of should: A biologically-based framework for modeling social pressure
Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2020.01.004 · Cited by 201
Comparison of online social relations in volume vs interaction: a case study of cyworld
Chun, H., Kwak, H., Eom, Y.-H., Ahn, Y., Moon, S., & Jeong, H. (2008) · ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC) · doi:10.1145/1452520.1452528 · Cited by 222
“Reciprocal interaction is considered as one mechanism to help the evolution of cooperation in society [5,20,33] and characterizes”
BackgroundSzolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Physical Review X · doi:10.1103/physrevx.3.041021 · Cited by 202
“Al though key mechanisms have been identified that promote the evolution of cooperation [17], there is still disagreement between theory and experiment on many key issues.”
BackgroundSpatial epidemiology of networked metapopulation: an overview
Wang, L., & Li, X. (2014) · Chinese Science Bulletin · doi:10.1007/s11434-014-0499-8 · Cited by 197
The evolution of human cooperation
Apicella, C. L., & Silk, J. B. (2019) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2019.03.036 · Cited by 187
Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2012) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/14/9/093016 · Cited by 200
Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1407887111 · Cited by 198
“0 = p− pRep · v= αgi + βg−i + γ1 v= απi + βπ−i + γ: [3]”
Self-citationCompetition of individual and institutional punishments in spatial public goods games
Szolnoki, A., Szabó, G., & Czakó, L. (2011) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.84.046106 · Cited by 198
Dynamics in the mixed microbial concourse
Wintermute, E. H., & Silver, P. A. (2010) · Genes & Development · doi:10.1101/gad.1985210 · Cited by 193
How Biology Became Social, and What it Means for Social Theory
Meloni, M. (2014) · The Sociological Review · doi:10.1111/1467-954x.12151 · Cited by 179
“…in a selfish world (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod 1984); indeed, these accounts have grown to such a point that, today, ‘natural cooperation’ has been labelled as ‘a third fundamental principle of evolution beside mutation and natural selection’ (Nowak, 2006: 1563; Nowak and Highfield, 2011).”
BackgroundThe validity and value of inclusive fitness theory
Bourke, A. F. G. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.1465 · Cited by 175
The emergence of contingent reciprocity in young children
Warneken, F., & Tomasello, M. (2013) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2013.06.002 · Cited by 177
Evolution of Cooperation on Stochastic Dynamical Networks
Wu, B., Zhou, D., Fu, F., Luo, Q., Wang, L., & Traulsen, A. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0011187 · Cited by 193
“However this cooperative behavior apparently contradicts natural selection [5]: Selfish behavior will be rewarded during competition between individuals, because selfish individuals enjoy the benefits from the cooperation of others, but avoid the associated costs.”
BackgroundThe Pre-History of Urban Scaling
Ortman, S. G., Cabaniss, A. H. F., Sturm, J. O., & Bettencourt, L. M. A. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0087902 · Cited by 184
“by trading goods, sharing information and developing cooperative strategies [32].”
BackgroundSocial semantics: how useful has group selection been?
WEST, S. A., GRIFFIN, A. S., & GARDNER, A. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2007.01458.x · Cited by 191
“…1981; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Gintis, 2000; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003; Peck, 2006; Kreft, 2005; Wilson & Hölldobler, 2005; Nowak, 2006; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006; Taylor & Nowak, 2007); (c) as discussed in detail in our original review, the group selection literature often…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe role of diversity in the evolution of cooperation
Santos, F. C., Pinheiro, F. L., Lenaerts, T., & Pacheco, J. M. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.003 · Cited by 197
How Children Solve the Two Challenges of Cooperation
Warneken, F. (2018) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011813 · Cited by 178
Vinci, M., Burford, A., Molinari, V., Kessler, K., Popov, S., Clarke, M., Taylor, K. R., Pemberton, H. N., Lord, C. J., Gutteridge, A., et al. (2018) · Nature Medicine · doi:10.1038/s41591-018-0086-7 · Cited by 179
Social dilemmas among unequals
Hauser, O. P., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2019) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1488-5 · Cited by 181
Self-citationCapraro, V., & Rand, D. G. (2018) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500008858 · Cited by 166
“One answer to this question is offered by work demonstrating myriad long-run benefits that accrue from helping others: if I pay a cost to give you a benefit today, you may be more willing to help me in the future, as may others who observe my action (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Dal Bó, 2005; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; No…”
Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
Szolnoki, A., Wang, Z., & Perc, M. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00576 · Cited by 193
Conditional strategies and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2012) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.85.026104 · Cited by 192
Awe: a putative mechanism underlying the effects of classic psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy
Hendricks, P. S. (2018) · International Review of Psychiatry · doi:10.1080/09540261.2018.1474185 · Cited by 179
“In other words, awe is thought to facilitate a class of behaviours prized by evolution: cooperation (e.g. Gowdy & Krall, 2016; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundExtortion and cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1208087109 · Cited by 187
“Nonetheless, no strategy is universally best in such a tournament (8, 9), because a player’s performance depends on the strategies of her opponents.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Nowak, M. A.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Nowak, Martin A.
- ORCID
- Nowak, Martin A.
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 2006-12-08
- Volume
- 314
- Issue
- 5805
- Pages
- 1560-1563
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- PMC
- PMC3279745
- OpenAlex
- W2167062553
- Cited by
- 5,894
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 352 · 2025: 400 · 2024: 356 · 2023: 356 · 2022: 347 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 424 · 2019: 344 · 2018: 362 · 2017: 311 · 2016: 349 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 287 · 2013: 318 · 2012: 274
- FWCI
- 43.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institute of General Medical Sciences (R01GM078986)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, natural selection, levels of organization, social insects, multicellularity
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Family, Game Theory, Helping Behavior, Humans, Mathematics, Selection, Genetic, Community Networks
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.