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Cited by 777Electoral Systems and Political ParticipationPolitical Theory and DemocracyMedia Influence and Politics

Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed Electorate

BULLOCK, JOHN G.·2011·American Political Science Review
DOI 10.1017/s0003055411000165
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Abstract

An enduring concern about democracies is that citizens conform too readily to the policy views of elites in their own parties, even to the point of ignoring other information about the policies in question. This article presents two experiments that undermine this concern, at least under one important condition. People rarely possess even a modicum of information about policies; but when they do, their attitudes seem to be affected at least as much by that information as by cues from party elites. The experiments also measure the extent to which people think about policy. Contrary to many accounts, they suggest that party cues do not inhibit such thinking. This is not cause for unbridled optimism about citizens' ability to make good decisions, but it is reason to be more sanguine about their ability to use information about policy when they have it.

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Crossref · 10.1017/s0003055411000165

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  • A growing number of empirical studies have uncovered evidence that people update their political attitudes and beliefs in line with evidence and arguments presented to them.

    “Consistent with this view, a growing number of empirical studies have uncovered evidence that people update their political attitudes and beliefs in line with evidence (e.g., refs. 4,13,27–29) and arguments23,30,31 presented to them.”

    From Factual knowledge can reduce attitude polarization (2025) · cites this paper as [27]

  • Follow-up research indicated that the in-party policy proposal effect was true for Republican but not Democratic supporters.

    “However, follow-up research indicated that this was true for Republican but not Democratic supporters86.”

    From Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social-communicative contexts (2022) · cites this paper as [86]

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Authors
BULLOCK, J. G.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Corresponding author
BULLOCK, JOHN G.
ORCID
BULLOCK, JOHN G.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2011-08
Volume
105
Issue
3
Pages
496-515
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
DOI
10.1017/s0003055411000165
OpenAlex
W3124069454
Cited by
777
References
103
Citations by year
2026: 42 · 2025: 73 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 90 · 2022: 88 · 2021: 49 · 2020: 66 · 2019: 64 · 2018: 70 · 2017: 60 · 2016: 25 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 31 · 2013: 20 · 2012: 16
FWCI
154.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 24 d)
Locations
American Political Science Review (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
elite influence, public opinion, party cues, policy information, party identification, democratic decision-making

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