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Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Abstract
Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)
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Metadata
- Authors
- Rubinstein, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982-01
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 97
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2112374372
- Cited by
- 5,264
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 14.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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