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Cited by 263Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceFree Will and Agency

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 143 of the 145 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet.

Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.

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Limanowski, Jakub, Blankenburg, Felix·2013·Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
DOI 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547PMC PMC3770917
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Abstract

The term "minimal phenomenal selfhood" (MPS) describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body as both part of the physical world, and the enabling condition for being in this world (Gallagher, 2005a; Grafton, 2009). A recent account of MPS (Metzinger, 2004a) centers on the consideration that minimal selfhood emerges as the result of basic self-modeling mechanisms, thereby being founded on pre-reflective bodily processes. The free energy principle (FEP; Friston, 2010) is a novel unified theory of cortical function built upon the imperative that self-organizing systems entail hierarchical generative models of the causes of their sensory input, which are optimized by minimizing free energy as an approximation of the log-likelihood of the model. The implementation of the FEP via predictive coding mechanisms and in particular the active inference principle emphasizes the role of embodiment for predictive self-modeling, which has been appreciated in recent publications. In this review, we provide an overview of these conceptions and illustrate thereby the potential power of the FEP in explaining the mechanisms underlying minimal selfhood and its key constituents, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective, and the experience of mineness. We conclude that the conceptualization of MPS can be well mapped onto a hierarchical generative model furnished by the FEP and may constitute the basis for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-referral, as well as the understanding of other minds.

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Figure 1 Schematic proposal for a mapping of the phenomenal self-model onto a hierarchical generative model (format adapted from Bastos et al., 2012). Shown here is only the system’s model of itself, where representational nodes at each level generate descending predictions to increasingly specialized lower levels (symbolized by darker arrows). In this special case, the single modeled cause of sensations is the minimal phenomenal self (Metzinger, 2004a), which generates predictions about the state of one or many sensory modalities (blue circles). The inversion of this generative model (a predictive coding scheme, lighter arrows) infers hidden causes—and thus ultimately, the self as the single cause—of sensory input via minimization of prediction error (Friston, 2011). For simplicity, only one intermediate level of nodes within the hierarchy is displayed, consisting of the basic properties of minimal selfhood as reviewed (white circles). As a (simplified) illustration of the hierarchical generative processing, the case of the 1PP is highlighted. Here, descending predictions of the unified self-model (black arrows) generate sensory data s(i) in the respective modalities (auditory and visual). This happens via a hierarchy of hidden states x(i) and hidden causes v(i) (the 1PP), which generate predictions about data in the level below. The green gradient symbolizes increasing transparency of the accompanying phenomenal states with ascending hierarchy, where the final cause (the self) is completely transparent. Note that at this (highest) level, there is no further representational node; this acknowledges the fact that the perception of a unified minimal self is the result of a temporally extended predictive process, not a static representation (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy, 2007). The experience of “mineness” of the self (and of perception and action in general, Hohwy, 2007) is a result of the model’s successful predictions and thus implicitly symbolized by the arrows. Input into this system-model comes from intero- and exteroception (blue circles), while active inference is a means of changing predicted input in all modalities through interaction with the environment. As the model-evidence is evidence for the agent’s existence (Friston, 2011; Friston, 2013b), the model will necessarily be a veridical model of the agent: if there was too much unexplained prediction error, the model would be abandoned in favor of a model with a higher evidence; the self in the present form would cease to exist (Hohwy, 2010; Friston, 2011; Friston, 2012b).
Figure 1 Schematic proposal for a mapping of the phenomenal self-model onto a hierarchical generative model (format adapted from Bastos et al., 2012). Shown here is only the system’s model of itself, where representational nodes at each level generate descending predictions to increasingly specialized lower levels (symbolized by darker arrows). In this special case, the single modeled cause of sensations is the minimal phenomenal self (Metzinger, 2004a), which generates predictions about the state of one or many sensory modalities (blue circles). The inversion of this generative model (a predictive coding scheme, lighter arrows) infers hidden causes—and thus ultimately, the self as the single cause—of sensory input via minimization of prediction error (Friston, 2011). For simplicity, only one intermediate level of nodes within the hierarchy is displayed, consisting of the basic properties of minimal selfhood as reviewed (white circles). As a (simplified) illustration of the hierarchical generative processing, the case of the 1PP is highlighted. Here, descending predictions of the unified self-model (black arrows) generate sensory data s(i) in the respective modalities (auditory and visual). This happens via a hierarchy of hidden states x(i) and hidden causes v(i) (the 1PP), which generate predictions about data in the level below. The green gradient symbolizes increasing transparency of the accompanying phenomenal states with ascending hierarchy, where the final cause (the self) is completely transparent. Note that at this (highest) level, there is no further representational node; this acknowledges the fact that the perception of a unified minimal self is the result of a temporally extended predictive process, not a static representation (Metzinger, 2004a; Hohwy, 2007). The experience of “mineness” of the self (and of perception and action in general, Hohwy, 2007) is a result of the model’s successful predictions and thus implicitly symbolized by the arrows. Input into this system-model comes from intero- and exteroception (blue circles), while active inference is a means of changing predicted input in all modalities through interaction with the environment. As the model-evidence is evidence for the agent’s existence (Friston, 2011; Friston, 2013b), the model will necessarily be a veridical model of the agent: if there was too much unexplained prediction error, the model would be abandoned in favor of a model with a higher evidence; the self in the present form would cease to exist (Hohwy, 2010; Friston, 2011; Friston, 2012b).CC BY · PubMed Central

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. de Vignemont F. Tsakiris M. Haggard P. (2005). “Body mereology,” in Human Body Perception from the Inside Out, eds Knoblich G. Thornton I. M. Grosjean M. Shiffrar M. (New York: Oxford University Press), 147– 170
  2. Pennebaker J. W. Skelton J. A. (1981). Selective monitoring of bodily sensations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 41, 213– 223 7277203
  3. Varela F. Thompson E. Rosch E. (1994). The Embodied Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

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Metadata

Authors
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F.
Affiliations
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (DE)
Corresponding author
Limanowski, Jakub
ORCID
Venue
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2013
Volume
7
Pages
547-547
ISSN
1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547
PMC
PMC3770917
OpenAlex
W2148544865
Cited by
263
References
145
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 4
FWCI
0.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • edoc Publication server (Humboldt University of Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Universitätsbibliothek der FU Berlin Hochschulschriftenstelle u. Dokumentenserver (cc-by)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (088130)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
free energy principle, active inference, embodiment, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective taking, mineness, self-referral, other minds, hierarchical generative models

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