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Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.
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The term "minimal phenomenal selfhood" (MPS) describes the basic, pre-reflective experience of being a self (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Theoretical accounts of the minimal self have long recognized the importance and the ambivalence of the body as both part of the physical world, and the enabling condition for being in this world (Gallagher, 2005a; Grafton, 2009). A recent account of MPS (Metzinger, 2004a) centers on the consideration that minimal selfhood emerges as the result of basic self-modeling mechanisms, thereby being founded on pre-reflective bodily processes. The free energy principle (FEP; Friston, 2010) is a novel unified theory of cortical function built upon the imperative that self-organizing systems entail hierarchical generative models of the causes of their sensory input, which are optimized by minimizing free energy as an approximation of the log-likelihood of the model. The implementation of the FEP via predictive coding mechanisms and in particular the active inference principle emphasizes the role of embodiment for predictive self-modeling, which has been appreciated in recent publications. In this review, we provide an overview of these conceptions and illustrate thereby the potential power of the FEP in explaining the mechanisms underlying minimal selfhood and its key constituents, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective, and the experience of mineness. We conclude that the conceptualization of MPS can be well mapped onto a hierarchical generative model furnished by the FEP and may constitute the basis for higher-level, cognitive forms of self-referral, as well as the understanding of other minds.
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“AIF agents aim to understand the underlying dynamics of the agent–environment coupling and model themselves as the ‘cause’ of changes to their own sensory states, developing their own sense of agency through active engagement and intervention onto the world”
From Active inference goes to school: the importance of active learning in the age of large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [55]
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“In order to regulate the body, interoception models the hidden causes of allostatic fluctuations by attributing them to a unified entity”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“prediction error is best minimized over the long term by attributing internally generated interoceptive sensations to a stable, unified entity, a self”
From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013
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“In this putative classification, interoception plays a key role in structuring experiences of ‘being and having a body’ (i.e. embodied selfhood) and may also shape selfhood at other, hierarchically higher levels.”
From Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain (2016) · cites this paper as [60]
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“In the last couple of years, several proposals of ‘minimal’ self-model implementations under a predictive coding scheme have been advanced (Seth, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Limanowski, 2014; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Ishida et al., 2015; Allen and Friston, 2016). These proposals have in common that they treat the ‘self’ as a hypothesis within the HGM, which tries to maximize its”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013
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Body-extension versus body-incorporation: Is there a need for a body-model?
PREESTER, H. D., & Manos Tsakiris, A. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-009-9121-y · Cited by 166
The motor hierarchy: from kinematics to goals and intentions
Hamilton, A. F. D. C., & Grafton, S. T. (1993) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231447.003.0018 · Cited by 165
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
Metzinger, T. (2003) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb · Cited by 162 · cited 8×
“Presence is hence a structural property of conscious experience (Seth, 2009) that is transparent in the sense that Metzinger (2003) uses the term (Seth et al., 2011).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe phenomenology and development of social perspectives
Fuchs, T. A. E. (2012) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-012-9267-x · Cited by 150
Explanatory correlates of consciousness: theoretical and computational challenges.
Seth, A. (2009) · Cognitive Computation · doi:10.1007/s12559-009-9007-x · Cited by 146
Active inference and free energy
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Self awareness and the body image
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Manos Tsakiris, A., & Haggard, P. (2009) · Acta Psychologica · doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2009.02.003 · Cited by 137
Motor ontology: the representational reality of goals, actions and selves
Gallese, V., & Metzinger, T. K. (2003) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/0951508032000121760 · Cited by 132
Hohwy, J., & Paton, B. K. (2010) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009416 · Cited by 131
Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition
Gallagher, S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511816826.003 · Cited by 131
SPATIAL SENSE AND MOVEMENTS OF THE EYE
Bannon, R. E. (1948) · Optometry and Vision Science · doi:10.1097/00006324-194808000-00010 · Cited by 124
Metzinger, T. K. (2000) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0026 · Cited by 100
The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception
Hohwy, J. (2007) · Cited by 97
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Free-Energy and Illusions: The Cornsweet Effect
Brown, H. R., & Friston, K. J. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00043 · Cited by 88
Embodied inference: or "I think therefore I am, if I am what I think"
Friston, K. J. (2011) · Cited by 84
Will studies of macaque insula reveal the neural mechanisms of self-awareness?
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Considerations on the visual egocentre
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Embodied inference and spatial cognition
Friston, K. J. (2012) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-012-0519-z · Cited by 44
Towards a psychodynamic neuroscience
Fotopoulou, A. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780199600526.003.0003 · Cited by 42
The Bodily Social Self: A Link Between Phenomenal and Narrative Selfhood
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The vestibular component in out-of-body experiences: a computational approach
Schwabe, L. (2008) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/neuro.09.017.2008 · Cited by 39
The hypothesis testing brain: some philosophical applications
Hohwy, J. (2010) · Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science · doi:10.5096/ascs200922 · Cited by 35
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Knoblich, G., Elsner, B., Aschersleben, G., & Metzinger, T. K. (2003) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2003.08.009 · Cited by 23
How many representations of the body?
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Delusions, Illusions and Inference under Uncertainty
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Reply to Gallagher: Different conceptions of embodiment
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Friston, K. J. (2013) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awt038 · Cited by 18
Metzinger's matrix: Living the virtual life with a real body
Gallagher, S. (2005) · Cited by 16
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Flagged first, then by citations
1 of the 145 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- de Vignemont F. Tsakiris M. Haggard P. (2005). “Body mereology,” in Human Body Perception from the Inside Out, eds Knoblich G. Thornton I. M. Grosjean M. Shiffrar M. (New York: Oxford University Press), 147– 170
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain
Seth, A. K., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0007 · Cited by 945
Behavioral, Neural, and Computational Principles of Bodily Self-Consciousness
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Interoception, contemplative practice, and health
Farb, N., Daubenmier, J., Price, C. J., Gard, T., Kerr, C., Dunn, B. D., Klein, A. C., Paulus, M. P., & Mehling, W. E. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00763 · Cited by 650
Kilteni, K., Maselli, A., Kording, K. P., & Slater, M. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00141 · Cited by 549
The neurobiology of interoception in health and disease
Quadt, L., Critchley, H., & Garfinkel, S. N. (2018) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/nyas.13915 · Cited by 488
Metadata
- Authors
- Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F.
- Affiliations
- Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Limanowski, Jakub
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 547-547
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC3770917
- OpenAlex
- W2148544865
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 145
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 44 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 4
- FWCI
- 0.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- edoc Publication server (Humboldt University of Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Universitätsbibliothek der FU Berlin Hochschulschriftenstelle u. Dokumentenserver (cc-by)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (088130)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- free energy principle, active inference, embodiment, multisensory integration, interoception, agency, perspective taking, mineness, self-referral, other minds, hierarchical generative models
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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