What can body ownership illusions tell us about minimal phenomenal selfhood?
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Several proposals of minimal self-model implementations under a predictive coding scheme treat the self as a hypothesis within the HGM, which tries to maximize its evidence by minimizing prediction errors.
“In the last couple of years, several proposals of ‘minimal’ self-model implementations under a predictive coding scheme have been advanced (Seth, 2013; Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013; Limanowski, 2014; Apps and Tsakiris, 2014; Ishida et al., 2015; Allen and Friston, 2016). These proposals have in common that they treat the ‘self’ as a hypothesis within the HGM, which tries to maximize its”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Limanowski, 2014
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“On the other hand, the adjustment of physiological responses (Ehrsson et al., 2007; Moseley et al., 2008; Barnsley et al., 2011) might imply that BOIs also affect higher levels of the self-model (Seth, 2013).”
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“The special importance of these illusions lies in the fact that what they manipulate— the sense of having a body—is one of the enabling conditions of minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS, Gallagher, 2000; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Metzinger, 2013a).”
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- Authors
- Limanowski, J.
- Affiliations
- Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Limanowski, Jakub
- ORCID
- Limanowski, Jakub
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014-11-24
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 946-946
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4241829
- OpenAlex
- W2046624418
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 2
- FWCI
- 2.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Universitätsbibliothek der FU Berlin Hochschulschriftenstelle u. Dokumentenserver (cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- body ownership illusion, self-consciousness, body image, embodiment, first-person experience
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