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Cited by 44Neurobiology of Language and BilingualismAction Observation and SynchronizationChild and Animal Learning Development

Non-literal language processing is jointly supported by the language and theory of mind networks: evidence from a novel meta-analytic fMRI approach

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Hauptman, Miriam, Blank, Idan, Fedorenko, Evelina·2023·Cortex
DOI 10.1016/j.cortex.2023.01.013PMC PMC10210011

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Abstract

Going beyond the literal meaning of language is key to communicative success. However, the mechanisms that support non-literal inferences remain debated. Using a novel meta-analytic approach, we evaluate the contribution of linguistic, social-cognitive, and executive mechanisms to non-literal interpretation. We identified 74 fMRI experiments (n = 1,430 participants) from 2001 to 2021 that contrasted non-literal language comprehension with a literal control condition, spanning ten phenomena (e.g., metaphor, irony, indirect speech). Applying the activation likelihood estimation approach to the 825 activation peaks yielded six left-lateralized clusters. We then evaluated the locations of both the individual-study peaks and the clusters against probabilistic functional atlases (cf. anatomical locations, as is typically done) for three candidate brain networks-the language-selective network (Fedorenko, Behr, & Kanwisher, 2011), which supports language processing, the Theory of Mind (ToM) network (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), which supports social inferences, and the domain-general Multiple-Demand (MD) network (Duncan, 2010), which supports executive control. These atlases were created by overlaying individual activation maps of participants who performed robust and extensively validated 'localizer' tasks that selectively target each network in question (n = 806 for language; n = 198 for ToM; n = 691 for MD). We found that both the individual-study peaks and the ALE clusters fell primarily within the language network and the ToM network. These results suggest that non-literal processing is supported by both i) mechanisms that process literal linguistic meaning, and ii) mechanisms that support general social inference. They thus undermine a strong divide between literal and non-literal aspects of language and challenge the claim that non-literal processing requires additional executive resources.

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  • Pragmatics likely engages a variety of neural mechanisms, including both the language network and other brain regions.

    “Pragmatics likely engages a variety of neural mechanisms [174, 175, 176], including both the language network and other brain regions.”

    From Dissociating language and thought in large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [176]

  • The theory of mind network is engaged more strongly during nonliteral language comprehension, including jokes, sarcasm, indirect speech, and conversational implicature.

    “Second, the theory of mind network is engaged more strongly during nonliteral language comprehension, including phenomena like jokes, sarcasm, indirect speech, and conversational implicature [176, 183]”

    From Dissociating language and thought in large language models (2024) · cites this paper as [176]

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Research works printed but not linked: 11

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  10. Searle J (1979). Metaphor. In Ortony A (Ed.), Metaphor and thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Authors
Hauptman, M., Blank, I., & Fedorenko, E.
Affiliations
  • McGovern Institute for Brain Research (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
  • Hauptman, Miriam
  • Fedorenko, Evelina
ORCID
Venue
Cortex
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2023-05
Volume
162
Pages
96-114
ISSN
0010-9452 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.cortex.2023.01.013
PMC
PMC10210011
OpenAlex
W4323665151
Cited by
44
References
234
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 6
FWCI
1.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Cortex (acceptedVersion)
  • bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Simons Foundation Autism Research Initiative
  • National Institutes of Health (NIH-R01, DC016950)
  • Simons Center for the Social Brain, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • McGovern Institute for Brain Research, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (R01DC016950, R01DC016607)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neurobiology of Language and Bilingualism
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
Keywords
metaphor, irony, reported speech, theory of mind, language network, multiple-demand network, executive function, social inference, brain networks, activation likelihood estimation
MeSH terms
Brain, Brain Mapping, Humans, Language, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Comprehension, Theory of Mind

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