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Rejecting impulsivity as a psychological construct: A theoretical, empirical, and sociocultural argument.

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Strickland, Justin C., Johnson, Matthew W. · 2021 · Psychological Review
Cited by 222

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 63 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We demonstrate through theoretical, empirical, and sociocultural evidence that the concept of impulsivity fails the basic requirements of a psychological construct and should be rejected as such. Impulsivity (or impulsiveness) currently holds a central place in psychological theory, research, and clinical practice and is considered a multifaceted concept. However, impulsivity falls short of the theoretical specifications for hypothetical constructs by having meaning that is not compatible with psychometric, neuroscience, and clinical data. Psychometric findings indicate that impulsive traits and behaviors (e.g., response inhibition, delay discounting) are largely uncorrelated and fail to load onto a single, superordinate latent variable. Modern neuroscience has also failed to identify a specific and central neurobehavioral mechanism underlying impulsive behaviors and instead has found separate neurochemical systems and loci that contribute to a variety of impulsivity types. Clinically, these different impulsivity types show diverging and distinct pathways and processes relating to behavioral and psychosocial health. The predictive validity and sensitivity of impulsivity measures to pharmacological, behavioral, and cognitive interventions also vary based on the impulsivity type evaluated and clinical condition examined. Conflation of distinct personality and behavioral mechanisms under a single umbrella of impulsivity ultimately increases the likelihood of misunderstanding at a sociocultural level and facilitates misled hypothesizing and artificial inconsistencies for clinical translation. We strongly recommend that, based on this comprehensive evidence, psychological scientists and neuroscientists reject the language of impulsivity in favor of a specific focus on the several well-defined and empirically supported factors that impulsivity is purported to cover. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

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Crossref · 10.1037/rev0000263

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Metadata

Authors
Strickland, J. C., & Johnson, M. W.
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
2021-03
Volume
128
Issue
2
Pages
336-361
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W3088470122
Cited by
222
References
63
FWCI
14.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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