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Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases
Open accessAbstract
The authors review studies conducted by themselves and coauthors that document a 'self-serving' bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations. They discuss experimental evidence showing that (1) the bias causes impasse; (2) it is possible to reduce impasses by debiasing bargainers; and (3) the bias results from selective evaluation of information. The authors also review results from a field study of negotiations between teachers' unions and school boards in Pennsylvania that both document the fairness bias in a naturalistic setting and demonstrates its impact on strikes.
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that a self-serving bias — the tendency to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself — is a major cause of bargaining impasse, operating even when disputants have identical information and no incentive to be strategic. Evidence from a controlled tort-case experiment, a field study of Pennsylvania teacher negotiations, and reinterpretations of prior bargaining experiments links biased assessments of fairness to higher rates of impasse and strike activity.
Key findings
- In the Texas tort experiment (80 University of Chicago undergraduates and 80 University of Texas law students), plaintiffs' predictions of the judge's award averaged $14,527 higher than defendants', and plaintiffs' fair-settlement values averaged $17,709 higher, both statistically different from zero (p < .0001).
- Impasse tracked the size of the discrepancy: in one experiment only 4% of negotiations with below-median discrepancy ended in impasse versus 28% above the median; in the role-timing manipulation, 6% of negotiations were resolved by the judge when subjects learned their role after reading the case versus 28% when they knew their role initially.
- A debiasing intervention (informing subjects of the bias and asking them to list weaknesses in their own case) reduced the discrepancy in expectations from $21,783 to $4,674 (p < .05) and cut the impasse rate from 35% to 4% (p < .01). Merely informing subjects of the bias had no effect on their own predictions, though it made them more realistic about the other party's predictions.
- In the Pennsylvania teacher field study, union-listed comparable districts averaged $27,633 in salary versus $26,922 for board-listed districts (mean difference $711, about 2.4% of average teacher salary); a district where the union's list averaged $1,000 more than the board's was approximately 49% more likely to strike. Since 1971, roughly 8% of teacher contract negotiations ended in strikes, averaging 16.4 days.
Methods
- Controlled laboratory bargaining: a tort case based on a real Texas trial (motorcyclist suing for $100,000), with plaintiff and defendant subjects given identical 27 pages of case materials, asked to predict the judge's award and a fair settlement, then allowed 30 minutes to negotiate with accumulating court costs; a manipulation varied whether subjects learned their role before or after reading the case.
- Field study: surveys of union and school board presidents in all Pennsylvania school districts on which districts they viewed as comparable for salary negotiations, linked to district-level data on strikes, salaries, and demographics; regression of strike incidence on the difference in average salaries of the two parties' lists, controlling for district wealth and local labor market conditions. Response rates were 57% for union presidents and 35% for school board presidents.
- Reinterpretation of prior experimental results (Roth and Murnighan's lottery-chip game, shrinking-pie and ultimatum games, Thompson and Loewenstein's labor-management study, Babcock and Olson's Wisconsin arbitration study) as manifestations of the self-serving bias.
Limitations
- The paper states that the first tort experiment does not necessarily demonstrate that the self-serving bias causes impasse, since a third factor such as aggressiveness could drive both misestimation and unwillingness to settle; the role-timing manipulation was introduced to address this.
- The authors state an unresolved issue: whether it benefits a party to be less biased, holding the other party's beliefs constant, since reduced bias may lower impasse but also make a party less persuasive in negotiation.
- The paper notes (in a footnote) selectivity concerns in the field survey response rates; evident from the text, the debiasing interventions that worked (learning one's role late, listing weaknesses in one's own case) have limited practical applicability, and the essay-style perspective-taking intervention moved the discrepancy in the opposite direction to the intended one.
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Claims the paper makes
37 No full text of the sources · 26 Own interpretation · 16 Own result · 6 Sources not found · 4 No basis given · 3 Supported · 2 Not checked yet · 2 Own method · 1 Partly supported · accuracy not yet measured
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Comparisons of judges' and lawyers' responses revealed a self-serving bias in virtually every question in the survey.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Eisenberg (1994)Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section I, “The Data,” reports 205 lawyer responses and 150 judge responses. Section II and the discussion of Tables 1–3 describe substantial self-serving, or egocentric, differences between judges’ and lawyers’ responses. The paper establishes this pattern for the questions it analyzes, not for virtually every question in the survey. (LLM, conf=0.84)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The first row of the table shows that in this experiment, nonsetdement was strongly related to the discrepancy between the plaintiffs' and defendants' predictions of what the judge would award.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“The effect of this intervention was to diminish the discrepancy in the parties' expectations about the judge (see the second section of Table 2): the discrepancy averaged $21,783 in the control condition, in which neither party received this intervention, but only $4,674 when the subjects received the debiasing procedure (p < .05).”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Babcock, Loewenstein and Issacharoff, 1996
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The point estimate suggests that a district where the average salary of the union's list is $1000 greater than the board's list will be approximately 49 percent more likely to strike than a district where the average salaries of the union's and board's lists are the same.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > A Field Study: Public School Teacher Negotiations
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The average salary in districts listed by the union was $27,633, while the average salary in districts listed by the board was $26,922.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > A Field Study: Public School Teacher Negotiations
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Considering only the districts in which both the union and school board returned the survey, we found that both sides listed about the same number of districts as being comparable (about 4.5).”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > A Field Study: Public School Teacher Negotiations
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein, 1996 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Besides the evidence from our field study of Pennsylvania teachers, which shows that seasoned negotiators are subject to the bias”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We should also note that our results from the Pennsylvania field study are not consistent with the notion that experience will eliminate the bias.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This regression produced a significant effect of differences in the list of comparables on strike activity.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > A Field Study: Public School Teacher Negotiations
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, the actual districts listed by the two sides differed in a way that reflected a self-serving bias.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > A Field Study: Public School Teacher Negotiations
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 37
- Probably not a substantial claim. 16
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Thirty-seven percent of judges reported that they most frequently allow reimbursement at the”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Eisenberg (1994)
The section “Judges as Dispensers of Fair Treatment” reports that 37% of judges said they most frequently allow reimbursement at the value of services to the secured creditor, while only 15% of lawyers said judges reimburse at those rates. The claim preserves both figures and the comparison. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Sixty percent of lawyers report that they always comply with fee guidelines, but judges reported that only 18 percent of attorneys always comply.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Eisenberg (1994)
The discussion of Table 3, Question 41 states that over 60% of lawyers reported always complying with fee guidelines, while judges reported that only 18% of attorneys always comply. The table gives the corresponding figures as 60.2% and 18.3%, consistent with the citing sentence's rounded numbers. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“For example, 78 percent of judges reported that they rule on interim fee applications at the fee hearing, but only 46 percent of lawyers report that the judges rule so quickly.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Eisenberg (1994)
The discussion of Table 1, Question 3, explicitly reports that 78% of judges and 46% of lawyers said judges rule on interim fee applications at the fee hearing. Table 1 corroborates the rounded figures with responses of 77.6% and 45.5%, respectively. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
- Supported
In the paper
“Consistent with the psychology research, plaintiffs tended to weight arguments favoring the plaintiff as much more compelling than those favoring the defendant, and vice versa.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer, 1995
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our results indicate that informing subjects of the bias made them more realistic about the predictions of the other party.However, it did not cause them to modify their own predictions of the judge.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As in the previous experiment, the discrepancy in the parties' assessments of the judge's decision was related to settlement; only 4 percent of the negotiations in which the discrepancy was below the median ended in impasse while 28 percent of pairs above the median discrepancy failed to settle (see the second row of Table 1).”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Our first experiment with this framework found strong evidence that the negotiators formed self-serving assessments of the judge's award and that the discrepancy between the plaintiffs' and defendants' assessments was correlated with the parties' ability to reach voluntary settlements (Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer Table 1 Probability of Impasse by Discrepancy Between Plaintiffs' and Defendant”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer and Babcock, 1993 source
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This did change the discrepancy in expectations, and in a way that was marginally statistically significant, but opposite to the intended direction.Again, there was no significant impact on the settlement rate.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Consistent with a causal relationship running from the self-serving bias to impasse, when the subjects did not learn their roles until after they read the case and made their assessments of the judge and fairness, only 6 percent of the negotiations were resolved by the judge; however, when the subjects knew their roles initially, 28 percent of negotiations had to be resolved by the judge (this”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff and Camerer, 1995
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, being informed of the bias had no effect on the discrepancy in the parties' expectations, nor on the likelihood of settlement.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The self-serving bias was clear in that plaintiffs' predictions of the judge averaged $14,527 higher than defendants', and plaintiffs' fair settlement values averaged $17,709 higher than defendants', with both differences statistically different from zero (p < .0001).”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The mean difference of $711 is statistically and economically significant; it is equivalent to about 2.4 percent of average teacher salary at a time when salary increases averaged less than 5 percent per year.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > A Field Study: Public School Teacher Negotiations
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Undoubtedly, all of our experimental subjects, especially the law and business school students, had numerous experiences with bargaining prior to participating in our experiment, but this experience did not seem to alert them even to the existence of the self-serving bias, let alone actually give them the capacity to counteract it.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Since both parties are given the same case information and neither party has private information about the judge, differences in estimates between defendant and plaintiff cannot be attributed to differences in information.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Seven-hour subjects, on average, thought the 10-hour subject should be paid $30.29.However, the 10-hour subjects thought they should be paid $35.24.The difference between $30.29 and $35.24-$4.95-wascited as evidence of a selfserving bias in perceptions of fairness.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Messick and Sentis (1979) source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“One limitation of this study is that it does not necessarily demonstrate that the self-serving bias causes impasse.It is possible, for example, that there is a third factor, perhaps some element of personality such as aggressiveness, that causes certain subjects to misestimate the judge and to be unwilling to setde.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > An Experimental Investigation: A Texas Tort Case
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The evidence we review shows that the self-serving bias, and the impasses it causes, occurs even when disputants possess identical information, which suggests that private and incomplete information may not be as critical for nonsettlement as is commonly believed.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“Prior research on self-serving biases (Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg, 1989), and on biased processing of information in general (Darley and Gross, 1983), suggests that the bias results from selective information processing.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
What the sources say
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“When they learned about the bias, subjects apparently assumed that the other person would succumb to it, but did not think it applied to themselves.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Table 2 Discrepancy in Assessments of the Judge and Rates of Impasse by Condition
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“People also tend to attribute their successes to ability and skill, but their failures to bad luck (Zuckerman, 1979).”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Zuckerman, 1979 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Princeton students saw the Dartmouth team commit twice as many flagrant penalties and three times as many mild penalties as their own team.Dartmouth students, on the other hand, recorded an approximately equal number of penalties by both teams.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hastorf and Cantril (1954) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“A likely interpretation is that both sides viewed as fair the focal settlement that benefitted themselves, so the $20prize player was likely to hold out for half of the chips, while the $5-prize player demanded equal expected values.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Roth and Murnighan, 1982 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This should not be taken to mean that the bias comes from asymmetric information.Instead, what we have in mind is that the parties-even with complete information-interpret the situation in different ways.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Discussion
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Again, consistent with the self-serving bias, perhaps subjects whose pies shrank relatively slowly viewed this as justification for requesting a large fraction of the pie, but subjects whose pies shrunk quickly rejected the rate of pie-shrinkage as a criterion for allocating the pie.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“It seems that proposers in the contest condition felt self-servingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994 source
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In an experimental study of labormanagement negotiations, Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found that management estimates of a fair settlement were significantly lower than those provided by the union and observed a significant positive correlation between the difference in assessments of fairness and the length of strikes.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In a study by Camerer and Loewenstein (1993), subjects bargained over the sale of a piece of land, knowing only their reservation value.All pairs agreed on a sale price.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Will Experience and Learning Minimize the Bias?
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Camerer and Loewenstein (1993) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“But in practice, the modal offer is typically half the pie, and smaller offers are often rejected.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“As Cox and Isaac (1986) write, experiments in economics do not normally involve”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Cox and Isaac (1986)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
In the paper
“When neither player knew who would receive which payoff, subjects generally agreed to divide the chips about equally and only 12 percent of pairs failed to reach an agreement and ended up with no payoff.However, when both subjects knew who was assigned to which payoff, 22 percent failed to reach agreement.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Roth and Murnighan, 1982 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In one investigation of this game, Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) found that when the pie shrunk at the same rate for both individuals, the rejection rate was only 12 percent in the first round, but when the pie shrunk at different rates for each subject, the rejection rate was 57 percent in the first round.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Weg, Rapoport and Felsenthal (1990) source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, even in a very simple setting like this, as soon as asymmetries are introduced between the parties-for example, different nonagreement values or costs of nonsettlement, or subtle differences in roles-both parties' notions of fairness will tend to gravitate toward settlements that favor themselves.They will not only view these settlements as fair, but believe that their personal conception”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Discussion
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although ultimatum experiments have been used by economists to illustrate the importance of fairness considerations, rejections in these experiments can be explained by self-serving biases.Proposers, who view themselves in a powerful role, believe that they deserve more than half of the pie, whereas responders do not believe that role should affect the division of the pie.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Reinterpreting Findings from Previous Bargaining Experiments
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, failure to collect data on psychological constructs robs us of information that can contribute to more nuanced tests of theory.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Researchers who subscribe to the illusion that their particular experiment is”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“For example, Tracy (1986,1987) finds a positive relationship between investor uncertainty (a proxy for the union's uncertainty about the firm) and strike activity and cites this as evidence consistent with an asymmetric information model of impasse.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Tracy (1986,1987)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Indeed, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) have shown that people do not even seem able to remember with any great accuracy whether they were employed or unemployed during the past year.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Akerlof and Yellen (1985)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Because of the reluctance to collect and analyze data on intervening variables, economists have sometimes been forced into very coarse tests of their models' predictions.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“89 percent of subjects state correctly which cards need to be turned over (Cosmides, 1989).”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Cosmides, 1989 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“The response rate for returning the survey was 57 percent for the union presidents and 35 percent for the school board presidents.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Babcock, Wang and Loewenstein (1996) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“All economics involves psychology.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“When the problem is given to people in the abstract form just described, very few people give the correct answer, which is”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Cosmides, 1989 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Models that incorporate individuals' preferences for”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bolton, 1991
- Not matchedcites Rabin, 1993
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Bayes' rule, the rational expectations assumption and the theory of revealed preference are all psychological assumptions about how people form expectations and what motivates them.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“However, when the task is put into a familiar context, almost everyone answers correctly.”
§ Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases > Methods: Psychology and Economics
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Cosmides, 1989 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper relies on this without support.
Individuals are unlikely to be conscious of their biased processing of information, so increases in incentives will not cause them to be more conscientious.
“Second, individuals are unlikely to be conscious of their biased processing of information so that increases in incentives will not cause them to be more conscientious.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining.
“Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining, and each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.
“Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining, and each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There are undoubtedly many theories that could predict the positive correlation between investor uncertainty and strike activity.
“However, there are undoubtedly many theories that could predict this positive correlation.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Much of the data on behavior used in economic analyses comes from surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey and Current Population Survey, in which respondents provide information on such things as jobs, wages, spells of unemployment, and so on.
“Much of the data on”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G.
- Affiliations
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- ORCID
- Loewenstein, George
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1997-02-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 109-126
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2038552289
- Cited by
- 1,071
- References
- 59
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 51 · 2017: 36 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 42 · 2014: 50 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 49
- FWCI
- 36.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Conflict Management and Negotiation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- bargaining impasse, self-serving bias, fairness judgments, negotiation, bias mitigation, strikes, teachers' unions, school boards
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-23, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-23 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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