Cited by 1,077Conflict Management and NegotiationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 149 references it cites were found in a registry or an index, and 1 are not checked yet; 4 of the 54 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases

Open access
Babcock, Linda, Loewenstein, George·1997·Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

The authors review studies conducted by themselves and coauthors that document a 'self-serving' bias in judgments of fairness and demonstrate that the bias is an important cause of impasse in negotiations. They discuss experimental evidence showing that (1) the bias causes impasse; (2) it is possible to reduce impasses by debiasing bargainers; and (3) the bias results from selective evaluation of information. The authors also review results from a field study of negotiations between teachers' unions and school boards in Pennsylvania that both document the fairness bias in a naturalistic setting and demonstrates its impact on strikes.

Verified 2026-10-23 · 1 reference not checked yet

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that a self-serving bias — the tendency to conflate what is fair with what benefits oneself — is a major cause of bargaining impasse, operating even when disputants have identical information and no incentive to be strategic. Evidence from a controlled tort-case experiment, a field study of Pennsylvania teacher negotiations, and reinterpretations of prior bargaining experiments links biased assessments of fairness to higher rates of impasse and strike activity.

Key findings

  • In the Texas tort experiment (80 University of Chicago undergraduates and 80 University of Texas law students), plaintiffs' predictions of the judge's award averaged $14,527 higher than defendants', and plaintiffs' fair-settlement values averaged $17,709 higher, both statistically different from zero (p < .0001).
  • Impasse tracked the size of the discrepancy: in one experiment only 4% of negotiations with below-median discrepancy ended in impasse versus 28% above the median; in the role-timing manipulation, 6% of negotiations were resolved by the judge when subjects learned their role after reading the case versus 28% when they knew their role initially.
  • A debiasing intervention (informing subjects of the bias and asking them to list weaknesses in their own case) reduced the discrepancy in expectations from $21,783 to $4,674 (p < .05) and cut the impasse rate from 35% to 4% (p < .01). Merely informing subjects of the bias had no effect on their own predictions, though it made them more realistic about the other party's predictions.
  • In the Pennsylvania teacher field study, union-listed comparable districts averaged $27,633 in salary versus $26,922 for board-listed districts (mean difference $711, about 2.4% of average teacher salary); a district where the union's list averaged $1,000 more than the board's was approximately 49% more likely to strike. Since 1971, roughly 8% of teacher contract negotiations ended in strikes, averaging 16.4 days.

Methods

  • Controlled laboratory bargaining: a tort case based on a real Texas trial (motorcyclist suing for $100,000), with plaintiff and defendant subjects given identical 27 pages of case materials, asked to predict the judge's award and a fair settlement, then allowed 30 minutes to negotiate with accumulating court costs; a manipulation varied whether subjects learned their role before or after reading the case.
  • Field study: surveys of union and school board presidents in all Pennsylvania school districts on which districts they viewed as comparable for salary negotiations, linked to district-level data on strikes, salaries, and demographics; regression of strike incidence on the difference in average salaries of the two parties' lists, controlling for district wealth and local labor market conditions. Response rates were 57% for union presidents and 35% for school board presidents.
  • Reinterpretation of prior experimental results (Roth and Murnighan's lottery-chip game, shrinking-pie and ultimatum games, Thompson and Loewenstein's labor-management study, Babcock and Olson's Wisconsin arbitration study) as manifestations of the self-serving bias.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the first tort experiment does not necessarily demonstrate that the self-serving bias causes impasse, since a third factor such as aggressiveness could drive both misestimation and unwillingness to settle; the role-timing manipulation was introduced to address this.
  • The authors state an unresolved issue: whether it benefits a party to be less biased, holding the other party's beliefs constant, since reduced bias may lower impasse but also make a party less persuasive in negotiation.
  • The paper notes (in a footnote) selectivity concerns in the field survey response rates; evident from the text, the debiasing interventions that worked (learning one's role late, listing weaknesses in one's own case) have limited practical applicability, and the essay-style perspective-taking intervention moved the discrepancy in the opposite direction to the intended one.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/jep.11.1.109

Cites

60 of 149 references verified0 citation errors · 88 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

4 of 54 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 51 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 37
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 16
46 of 46
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Individuals are unlikely to be conscious of their biased processing of information, so increases in incentives will not cause them to be more conscientious.

    “Second, individuals are unlikely to be conscious of their biased processing of information so that increases in incentives will not cause them to be more conscientious.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining.

    “Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining, and each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.

    “Most people find themselves only sporadically involved in bargaining, and each bargaining situation differs from past situations on numerous dimensions.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are undoubtedly many theories that could predict the positive correlation between investor uncertainty and strike activity.

    “However, there are undoubtedly many theories that could predict this positive correlation.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Much of the data on behavior used in economic analyses comes from surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey and Current Population Survey, in which respondents provide information on such things as jobs, wages, spells of unemployment, and so on.

    “Much of the data on”
5 of 5

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Metadata

Authors
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
1997-02-01
Volume
11
Issue
1
Pages
109-126
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2038552289
Cited by
1,071
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 36 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 35 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 51 · 2017: 36 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 42 · 2014: 50 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 49
FWCI
36.68
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Conflict Management and Negotiation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
bargaining impasse, self-serving bias, fairness judgments, negotiation, bias mitigation, strikes, teachers' unions, school boards

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