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Sequential Equilibria
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982-07
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 863
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4248083116
- Cited by
- 1,692
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 21.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.