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The control of politicians: An economic model
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Metadata
- Authors
- Barro, R. J.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 1973-03
- Volume
- 14-14
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 19-42
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2056552158
- Cited by
- 1,553
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 30.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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