The DOI matches its Crossref record; 76 of the 94 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 129 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Psychological foundations of incentives
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper argues that economics' narrow self-interest model misses powerful non-pecuniary motives—reciprocity, social approval, and task-specific intrinsic motivation—that interact with material incentives and can make incentives backfire. It reviews experimental and field evidence showing that explicit incentives may reduce voluntary cooperation, while reciprocity and social approval can themselves generate strong incentives.
Key findings
- Explicit incentives can undermine voluntary cooperation: in Fehr and Gächter's gift-exchange experiment, adding a negatively framed fine reduced average effort below the enforceable level of e = 0.4; positively framed bonuses elicited more cooperation than fines but less than no explicit incentive. In Fehr and Rockenbach's trust-game variant, back-transfers as a share of the tripled transfer were 30.3% when the incentive was used, 47.6% when available but not used, and 40.6% when not available.
- Reciprocity can create material incentives: giving employers a reward/punishment opportunity decreased shirking from 83% to 26% of trades, increased exact provision of desired effort from 14% to 36%, increased overprovision from 3% to 38%, raised average effort from e = 0.37 to e = 0.65, and increased aggregate monetary payoff by 40%. In Fehr, Klein and Schmidt's multitask experiment, the bonus contract was chosen in 81% of cases and average effort was almost identical across tasks, fluctuating around e1 = e2 = 6.
- Social approval affects behavior and can interact perversely with fines: Rege and Telle found public-good contributions of 34% of endowment in the anonymous baseline and twice as high when contributions were observable. Gneezy and Rustichini's kindergarten fine roughly doubled late pickups from week 7 onward, and late pickups remained roughly twice the baseline after the fine was removed; in their volunteer-collection experiment, letting children keep 1% of donations reduced the amount collected by 36%, and keeping 10% still reduced it by 8%.
- The psychological literature on crowding out of intrinsic motivation is large—Deci, Koestner and Ryan's meta-study covers 128 experiments—but the paper argues its economic relevance has yet to be established. Deci (1971) found treatment subjects spent 50 seconds less on puzzles in phase 3 than phase 1, while control subjects spent 28 seconds more, but the paper notes alternative explanations such as satiation, disappointment, and signaling.
Methods
- Design: This is a Schumpeter Lecture/review, not a new primary experiment; it synthesizes experimental and field evidence on how reciprocity, social approval, and task-specific intrinsic motivation interact with economic incentives.
- Data or sample: It draws on prior laboratory experiments (gift exchange, public goods, trust games), field experiments (physicians, kindergarten parents, Israeli high-school volunteers), and a meta-analysis of 128 experiments; populations include students, Costa Rican CEOs, and other subject pools.
- Main analysis: Narrative and theoretical synthesis comparing treatment effects across studies, with figures reproduced from cited experiments; no new statistical model or original dataset is reported.
Limitations
- Stated: The arguments about social approval are described as "quite preliminary and speculative," with little known in the area.
- Stated: The case for the economic relevance of crowding out of intrinsic motivation "has yet to be established"; ambiguities remain about disappointment versus crowding out, signaling effects, satiation, efficiency consequences, and interactions with implicit incentives.
- Evident from the text: The paper is a lecture/review rather than a systematic meta-analysis for most claims, and it relies on heterogeneous experiments with different designs, populations, and settings; external validity is only partially addressed, for example through the CEO replication.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
137 Own interpretation · 97 Not checked yet · 10 No basis given · 3 Own result · 2 Partly supported · 1 Sources not found · accuracy not yet measured
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The authors also find that verbal reinforcements like, e.g., telling subjects that they did well on the task, have a strong positive effect on both the behavioural and the self-report measures of intrinsic motivation.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results (around pp. 638–639) report that verbal rewards enhanced both free-choice behavior and self-reported interest. But the paper describes the average effects as small to moderate, not strong, and finds no enhancement of children's free-choice behavior. (LLM, conf=0.90)
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Their results indicate that if subjects expect a monetary reward intrinsic motivation (measured by the time spent on the task) is undermined irrespective of whether the reward is engagement contingent, completion contingent or performance contingent.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Tangible Rewards discussion (p. 656) says rewards offered for engaging in, completing, or doing well at a task were detrimental to intrinsic motivation, particularly on the free-choice measure. The Method section (p. 636) says that measure was time spent on the task in more than 90% of studies. The finding concerns expected tangible rewards, including nonmonetary rewards; our copy does not establish the claim specifically for monetary rewards across all three contingencies. (LLM, conf=0.84)
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Partly supported
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“while if workers have the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily with their employer, wages remain far above the competitive level.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and Falk (1999)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“First, there is still a lot of shirking as indicated by the difference between the desired effort and the actual effort.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger 1997
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“If the experimenter rules out voluntary cooperation by fixing the effort level exogenously, wages converge to the competitive level,”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and Falk (1999)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“These experiments explicitly show that reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation causes downward wage rigidity because lower wages are associated with lower effort and lower profits.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993)
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and Falk (1999)
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“The experimental evidence indicates that a substantial fraction of the people exhibits social preferences.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and Schmidt (2001)
- Not checked yetcites Sobel (2001)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Second, in addition to the reciprocal workers there is also a substantial fraction of selfish workers who always choose the minimal effort or who rarely respond in a reciprocal manner.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger 1997
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“In this section we provide evidence indicating that reciprocity induces agents to cooperate voluntarily with the principal if the principal treats them kindly.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997)
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation also plays an important role in the context of the provision of public goods.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Croson (2000)
- Not checked yetcites Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) source
- Not checked yetcites Falk and Fischbacher (2001)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 61
- Probably not a substantial claim. 29
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“It is shown by Croson (2000), Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), and Falk and Fischbacher (2001) that many people increase their contribution to a public good if others also increase their contributions, although, in material terms, each individual has a strict incentive to contribute nothing.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Croson (2000)
- Not checked yetcites Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) source
- Not checked yetcites Falk and Fischbacher (2001)
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“It is also worth emphasizing that similar results were obtained in the studies of Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001), Benz, Fehr and Frey (2001), Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001) and Schulze and Frank (2001).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bohnet, Frey and Huck (2001) source
- Not checked yetcites Benz, Fehr and Frey (2001)
- Not checked yetcites Evans, Hannan, Krishnan and Moser (2001)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“In 98.5 percent of all the cases the employers stipulated a fine in this treatment and only in 1.5 percent of the cases they set f = 0.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and Gächter (2000b)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The total surplus and the investors' average payoffs are highest when the incentive is available but not used.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Section 2 provides experimental evidence indicating that reciprocity may severely weaken certain economic incentives while at the same time strengthening other kinds of economic incentives.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Contract theory and principal-agent theory, for example, typically restrict their attention to the motives to achieve income through effort and to avoid risks.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We argue that, although the results and the claims of this literature are intriguing and interesting, the economic relevance of this literature has yet to be shown.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We will provide evidence suggesting that powerful non-pecuniary motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval, also shape human behaviour.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Bewley reports that 'managers claim that workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators' (Bewley 1995, p. 252).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bewley 1995, p. 252
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The existence of conditional cooperation renders the management of the workers' beliefs about the other workers' effort important because if a conditional cooperator believes that the others shirk he will also tend to shirk.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Yet, despite this their whole book is then based on the assumption that people behave as if they 'were entirely motivated by narrow, selfish concerns'.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Milgrom and Roberts (1992)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The notion of reciprocity provides a natural interpretation of the evidence in Figure 2.”
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“For this reason employers have a strong interest in recruiting employees who have favourable preferences and whose preferences can be affected in favourable ways.”
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Milgrom and Roberts (1992) acknowledge this point when they write that 'important features of many organisations can best be understood in terms of deliberate attempts to change preferences of individual participants'.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Milgrom and Roberts (1992)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The very fact that employees have so many opportunities to take advantage of their employer renders loyal workers very valuable for the employer.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If it is true that some people are more self-interested than others then choosing the 'right' people is one way of affecting the preferences of a firm's workforce.”
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Bewley (1999), for example, reports that personnel managers use the possibility of firing workers mainly as a means to remove 'bad characters and incompetents' from the group and not as a threat to discipline the workers.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bewley (1999)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“The reason is that explicit threats create a hostile atmosphere and may even reduce the workers' general willingness to cooperate with the firm.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bewley (1999)
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Therefore, the firing of lazy workers is mainly used to establish internal equity, and to prevent the unravelling of cooperation.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bewley (1999)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A marriage thus has to be based on mutual trust because otherwise it will not function well.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Including contingencies about what will happen if one party fails to abide by the contract is likely to be taken as an indication of distrust and perhaps even hostility, which in turn may trigger what the prenuptial agreement attempted to avoid - a lack of mutual trust and cooperation.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, it also seems likely that being trusted is in itself valuable for the trustee.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the positive frame the base wage is the natural reference point and the bonus focuses attention on the fact that something will be given if the desired effort is provided.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: In the positive frame, the base wage is the natural reference point.
In the paper
“However, the differences across the treatments with and without incentives were qualitatively similar and quantitatively even larger than in the study by Fehr and Rockenbach.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and List 2002
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“It turns out that in case of underprovision workers expect to be punished in 54 percent of the cases and the expected average investment into punishment is 4 MUs.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The presence of this opportunity decreases shirking from 83 percent to 26 percent of the trades, increases exact provision of ê from 14 to 36 percent and increases overprovision from 3 to 38 percent of the trades.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“If workers exactly meet the desired effort employers still reward in 41 percent of the cases and the average investment into rewarding is 4.5 MUs.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“If there is underprovision of effort employers punish in 68 percent of the cases and the average investment in punishment is 7 MUs.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“If there is overprovision employers reward in 70 percent of these cases and the average investment in rewarding is also 7 MUs.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Since it is impossible to specify all aspects of a marriage in a comprehensive contract, a marriage is always based on implicit agreements and voluntary cooperation.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In the negative frame the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point and the fine focuses attention on the fact that something will be taken away in case of shirking.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: In the negative frame, the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In section 2.1 we mentioned that, although a substantial fraction of experimental subjects exhibits reciprocal behaviour, there is also a large fraction of subjects who behave in a purely selfish manner.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In case of overprovision they expect to receive a reward in 98 percent of the cases with an expected average investment of 6.5 MUs.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The average effort level is increased from e = 0.37 to e = 0.65 so that the gap between desired and actual effort levels almost vanishes.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Holmström and Milgrom show that if the task, where pay cannot explicitly be made contingent on performance, is sufficiently important it may even be better to provide no explicit incentives for any task.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Holmström and Milgrom 1991 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“Third, and most importantly for our present purposes, the repeated interaction condition causes a huge increase in the effort level because it causes the modal effort to shift to the maximal level.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Brown, Falk and Fehr 2001
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This has been shown theoretically (Kreps et al. 1982) and experimentally (Gächter and Falk, forthcoming).”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Kreps et al. 1982 source
- Not checked yetcites Gächter and Falk forthcoming
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The material incentives that are created through reciprocal responses are implicit because they are not based on contractual commitments.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“In particular, the maximal effort is achieved in less than 5 percent of the cases while the minimal effort level still occurs in 16 percent of the cases.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Gächter and Falk forthcoming
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Yet, this solution presupposes a high degree of voluntary cooperation so that employees are willing to perform in the absence of any incentives.”
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“It turns out that the average bonus is strongly increasing in total effort and decreasing in effort differences across tasks.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Second, however, the majority of effort levels are above the minimal level, which is consistent with the existence of a substantial fraction of reciprocal workers.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Brown, Falk and Fehr 2001
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our interpretation is that this disciplined the potential shirkers without offending the cooperators.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In the piece rate contract the average effort is always high in the rewarded task while in the non-rewarded task average effort converges to rather low levels.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We believe that reciprocity-based incentives based on the opportunity of punishing the agent ex-post exactly achieve this. These incentives discipline the potential shirkers because they know that a certain fraction of the principals is going to punish them in case of shirking without offending those who cooperate voluntarily because there are no explicit threats.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Most subjects consider shirking unfair if the contract offered the agent a generous share of the surplus.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Approval, therefore, makes us proud and happy while disapproval causes embarrassment and shame and makes us unhappy.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While social approval may be valued positively because it sometimes generates material benefits, we believe that most of us also value social approval positively (and disapproval negatively) for its own sake.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, in the presence of only selfish subjects the piece rate contract is more profitable and more efficient than the bonus contract although the effort allocation across tasks will be inefficient in the piece rate contract.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Circumstantial evidence and introspection suggests that many people like to receive social approval and try to avoid social disapproval.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In contrast, in the bonus contracts the average effort is almost identical in both tasks and fluctuates around e 1 = e 2 = 6.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“When the children are promised that they can keep 1 percent of the money collected the amount collected is reduced by 36 percent and when they are promised that they can keep 10 percent of the money collected the reduction in the amount collected is still 8 percent.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Social norms also pervade the employment relationship. There are, in particular, effortenhancing norms and effort-decreasing norms.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Homans 1951
- Not checked yetcites Kandel and Lazear 1992
- Not checked yetcites Rehder 1990
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Since moral behaviour typically is associated with social approval, paying for moral behaviour means that approval incentives will be reduced.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The quote only partly states this claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A plausible interpretation of this is that in the approval condition subjects feared the disapproval of the other group members.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“In the baseline condition subjects contributed 34 percent of their endowment to the public good while in the approval condition the contributions were twice as high.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Rege and Telle 2001
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the introduction of the fine may be interpreted as a downward shift in individuals' reaction functions which caused the break down of the highcompliance equilibrium C and a gradual shift to the low-compliance equilibrium A'.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Fehr and Gächter (2000a) as well as Carpenter (2001) show that this opportunity to punish has a dramatic impact on cooperation. While cooperation unravels to extremely low levels in the absence of a punishment opportunity, almost full cooperation can be established in the presence of a punishment opportunity.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Fehr and Gächter (2000a)
- Not checked yetcites Carpenter (2001)
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“approval incentives are likely to cause strategic complementarity among the agents' actions, i.e., the strength of approval incentives depends on other people's behaviour.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“it may be unwise for a society to replace imprisonment by monetary fines to enforce important norms.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Paying the children money for their activity removes, therefore, the basis for social approval. Or put differently: The monetary reward reduces the approval reward.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Demanding a price for being late decreased the disapproval costs for the parents so that the total costs of being late may have been reduced.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Social (dis)approval is a key element in the enforcement of social norms.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“rewarding people monetarily for obeying social norms may weaken norm enforcement and may, hence, lead to a gradual erosion of normguided behaviour.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The emotions data in Gächter and Fehr (1999) suggest that free-riding causes a lot of anger among the cooperators and that this anger is anticipated by the potential free-riders.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Gächter and Fehr (1999)
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“imprisonment and fining may convey very different moral messages. While imprisonment unambiguously conveys the message that the norm violator conducted morally wrongful acts, fining people may transform norm violations into a kind of market transaction.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“from week 7 onwards, there is a steep increase in the number of late comers until their number is roughly twice as high as in the baseline condition. Moreover, when the fine is removed at the end of week 16 the number of tardy parents remains roughly twice as high as in the baseline condition.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This literature claims that the introduction of monetary rewards decreases task-specific intrinsic motivation under identifiable conditions.”
What the sources say
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If this result holds more generally then the crowding out of intrinsic task motivation is largely irrelevant for economic contexts because, as a rule, individuals expect some form of monetary compensation in economic interactions.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: In economic contexts, individuals typically expect some form of monetary compensation, and monetary rewards are the norm.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Some of our concerns have to do with the fact that the changes in the time spent on working on an interesting task can be interpreted in different ways, and to our knowledge not all of the ambiguities have been removed in this regard.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Unfortunately, the evidence on crowding out of intrinsic motivation is not very informative in this regard because there seem to be no studies that examine the impact of variations in the payment scheme on intrinsic motivation.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“In the survey the support of the voters dropped from 51% to 25% when monetary compensation was offered.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, Eichenberger (1996)
- Not checked yetcites Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997)
plaindirectSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, by paying the boy for mowing the lawn the father has revealed that he is willing to pay the boy for the activity, which improves the bargaining position of the boy.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“While in the treatment condition the subjects spent 50 seconds less on puzzle solving in phase 3 compared to phase 1, in the control condition the subjects spent 28 seconds more in phase 3.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Deci 1971 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2001) show that the size of the externality also affects the effort norm. In particular, by increasing the team bonus the principal can increase the effort norm. For this reason the optimal bonus is higher in the presence of an effort norm. Moreover, by choosing a sufficiently high bonus the principal can induce the agents to coordinate on Pareto-better equilibria.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2001)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In fact, implicit incentives based on reciprocity or on repeated interactions are frequently among the most relevant and most powerful incentives in economic contexts.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“in both treatment conditions and in all phases the self-report measure of intrinsic motivation was very similar so that there was a discrepancy between the behavioural measure and the self-report measure of intrinsic motivation.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Deci 1971 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Unfortunately, the psychological literature does not address this question because neither the costs nor the full returns of the subjects' performance are controlled in these experiments.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“by rendering effort a positive externality, a principal can generate effort-enhancing norms while if effort is a negative externality for other workers effortwithholding norms are likely to arise.”
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Likewise, we do not know of convincing studies showing that the reduction in the behavioural measure of intrinsic motivation is not due to a signalling effect.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The disappointment effect is in our view a potentially quite powerful effect because the self-serving biases of the people quickly make them think that they are entitled to a previously paid reward and, if the reward is withdrawn loss aversion and negative reciprocity come to play a role.”
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Experience with children shows that they quickly feel entitled to rewards, even if given rarely, and become frustrated if they do not receive expected rewards.
In the paper
“For the behavioural measures this is only true for college students but not for children. Verbal reinforcement has no effect on the intrinsic motivation of children.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“There is, e.g., evidence suggesting that loss aversion affects inter-temporal labour supply behaviour (Camerer et al. 1997)”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Camerer et al. 1997
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“There are, in our view, still some important ambiguities in the correct interpretation of the data and it is not clear whether crowding out of task-specific intrinsic motivation prevails in contexts usually associated with monetary compensation.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While it is certainly true that the desires to avoid risk and to achieve income through effort are important it is equally true that there are powerful non-pecuniary motives that shape human behaviour.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Yet, the effects we have discussed in sections 2 and 3 are not related to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation: While intrinsic motivation refers to task-specific phenomena, reciprocity and social approval incentives refer to interpersonal relations.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Falk and Fehr (2001) have shown that loss aversion lowers the effectiveness of tournament incentives which, in turn, induces firms to compress wages.”
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Falk and Fehr (2001)
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“At the same time our experience tells us that one can rarely import a psychological insight into economics without modification.”
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The authors state this as an assumption.
Reciprocity is frequently quantitatively more important than other types of social preferences and has particularly important consequences in strategic interactions.
“This does not mean that we believe that other types of social preferences like, e.g., altruism or spitefulness, are unimportant. It reflects, however, our belief that reciprocity is frequently quantitatively more important than other types of social preferences and that it has particularly important consequences in strategic interactions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The kindness or hostility of an action depends on a reference point.
“The notion of a kind or a hostile action inevitably depends on a reference point”
The paper relies on this without support.
In the negative frame, the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point.
“In the negative frame the total compensation in case of nonshirking is the natural reference point”
The paper relies on this without support.
In the positive frame, the base wage is the natural reference point.
“In the positive frame the base wage is the natural reference point”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most subjects consider shirking unfair if the contract offered the agent a generous share of the surplus.
“most subjects are likely to consider shirking as unfair if the contract offered the agent a generous share of the surplus”
The paper relies on this without support.
In most employment relations, employees have to perform several tasks and it is often not possible to target explicit incentives to all tasks because of measurement and verifiability problems.
“In most employment relations the employees typically have to perform several tasks and because of measurement and verifiability problems it is often not possible to target explicit incentives to all tasks.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many contracts are deliberately left vague and incomplete, specifying important obligations in vague terms and not tying monetary payoffs to performance measures.
“In reality many contracts frequently specify important obligations of the contracting parties in fairly vague terms, and they do not tie the parties' monetary payoffs to measures of performance that would be available at a relatively small cost.”
The paper relies on this without support.
People engage in many tasks and activities because they enjoy them.
“There is no doubt that people engage in many tasks and activities because they enjoy them.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many economic activities are intrinsically rewarding; people derive pleasure from the activity, and over some range pleasure increases with activity level.
“many economic activities are, i.e., people directly derive pleasure from the activity and, over some range, the pleasure increases with increases in the activity level.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Parents picking up children late violates a legitimate rule and faces disapproval, which is a nonpecuniary cost.
“if the parents pick up their children too late they violate a legitimate rule. As a consequence, the parents face the disapproval of the principal and of the employees of the Kindergarten, which can be thought of as the nonpecuniary cost for being late.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Individuals do not have perfect knowledge about the reasons for performing a task.
“A crucial assumption of self-perception theory is that individuals do not have perfect knowledge about the reasons for performing a task.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
People have a psychological need for self-determination and competence.
“Cognitive evaluation theory, on the other hand, assumes that people have a psychological need for self-determination and competence.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Individual i's level of compliance with a morally legitimate rule is higher the higher the average compliance of others.
“In Figure 6 we assume for simplicity that individual i 's level of compliance with a morally legitimate rule (i.e., the relative frequency of obeying the rule in a given time interval) is the higher the higher the average compliance of the others.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In economic contexts, individuals typically expect some form of monetary compensation, and monetary rewards are the norm.
“as a rule, individuals expect some form of monetary compensation in economic interactions.”
“since in most cases some form of monetary reward prevails in economic contexts”
The paper relies on this without support.
Experience with children shows that they quickly feel entitled to rewards, even if given rarely, and become frustrated if they do not receive expected rewards.
“Experience with children shows that they quickly feel entitled to rewards, even if they are given them very rarely, and if they don't receive expected rewards they are frustrated.”
The paper relies on this without support.
There are many social interactions for which monetary compensation is deemed inappropriate.
“there are many social interactions for which monetary compensation is deemed inappropriate (e.g. in schools and families).”
The paper relies on this without support.
From an economic viewpoint, it is the total sum of incentive effects that matters.
“from an economic viewpoint, it is the total sum of incentive effects that matters.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment45–47.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [46]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS · p. 47
“For a discussion of this point see also Tirole (2002).”
§ REFERENCES · p. 54
“Tirole, J., 2001. Rational Irrationality: Some Economics of Self-Management.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 2.2 Explicit incentives and voluntary cooperation · p. 16
“A similar effect has been observed in a field experiment conducted by Berry and Kanouse (1987).”
§ REFERENCES · p. 49
“Berry, S. H. and Kanouse, D. E., 1897. Physician Response to a Mailed Survey: An Experiment in Timing of Payment.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 3.2 Social approval and material incentives · p. 30
“the recent study of Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2000).”
§ REFERENCES · p. 53
“Masclet, D., Noussair, Ch., Tucker, St., and Villeval, M., 2001. Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism.”
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Cited by
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Exercise of Human Agency Through Collective Efficacy
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“Additionally, altruistic behavior of sharing expertise with others has also been shown to motivate positive WOM (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Richins, 1984).”
BackgroundNormative, Gain and Hedonic Goal Frames Guiding Environmental Behavior
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“Also, financial incentives may give people the impression that they have a right to pollute, since they have paid for it (Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002; see also Fehr & Falk, 2002).”
BackgroundBlockchain technology: implications for operations and supply chain management
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Falk, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 46
- Issue
- 4-5
- Pages
- 687-724
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2551486737
- Semantic Scholar
- 6d63c53094810d377841d540b836105c0b0f97b4
- Cited by
- 1,240
- References
- 94
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 67 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 53 · 2016: 60 · 2015: 68 · 2014: 69 · 2013: 70 · 2012: 88
- FWCI
- 184.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.zora.uzh.ch
- Licence
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- OpenGrey (Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique) (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- PsyDok Dokumentenserver für die Psychologie (Leibniz-Zentrum für Psychologische Information und Dokumentation) (submittedVersion)
- Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Psychology Archives
- ETH Zürich Research Collection
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- incentives, motives, reciprocity, social disapproval, financial incentives, backfire effect, compliance, contracts, organizations, behavioral economics
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-08, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-08 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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