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Cited by 515Free Will and AgencyAction Observation and SynchronizationEmbodied and Extended Cognition

The mechanism of self-recognition in humans.

Jeannerod, Marc·2003·Behavioural Brain Research
DOI 10.1016/s0166-4328(02)00384-4
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Abstract

Recognizing oneself as the owner of a body and the agent of actions requires specific mechanisms which have been elucidated only recently. One of these mechanisms is the monitoring of signals arising from bodily movements, i.e. the central signals which contribute to the generation of the movements and the sensory signals which arise from their execution. The congruence between these two sets of signals is a strong index for determining the experiences of ownership and agency, which are the main constituents of the experience of being an independent self. This mechanism, however, does not account from the frequent cases where an intention is generated but the corresponding action is not executed. In this paper, it is postulated that such covert actions are internally simulated by activating specific cortical networks or representations of the intended actions. This process of action simulation is also extended to the observation and the recognition of actions performed or intended by other agents. The problem of disentangling representations that pertain to self-intended actions from those that pertain to actions executed or intended by others, is a critical one for attributing actions to their respective agents. Failure to recognize one's own actions and misattribution of actions may result from pathological conditions which alter the readability of these representations.

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  • The minimal contribution of the specific type of agency investigated (MS′ compared to MS) seems to be in conflict with previous studies that suggested the importance of motor cues for the sense of self.

    “The minimal contribution of the specific type of agency that we investigated (MS′ compared to MS) seems to be in conflict with previous studies that suggested the importance of motor cues for the sense of self [19], [20].”

    From First person experience of body transfer in virtual reality (2010) · cites this paper as [20]

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. [22][22] Blakemore SJ, Wolpert D, Frith CD. Central cancellation of selfproduced tickle sensation. Nat Neurosci 1998;1:635-40. -
  2. [27][27] Farrer C, Franck N, Georgieff N, Frith CD, Decety J, Jeannerod M. Modulating the experience of agency: a PET study. Neuroimage 2003, in press. -
  3. [48][48] Jeannerod M, Frak VG. Mental simulation of action in human subjects. Curr Opin Neurobiol 1999;9:735-9. -
  4. [59][59] Schneider K. Klinische Psychopathologie. Stuttgart, Thieme: Verlag; 1955. -

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Authors
Jeannerod, M.
Affiliations
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
Corresponding author
Jeannerod, Marc
Venue
Behavioural Brain Research
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-06
Volume
142
Issue
1-2
Pages
1-15
ISSN
0166-4328 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/s0166-4328(02)00384-4
OpenAlex
W2105441954
Cited by
515
References
72
Citations by year
2026: 30 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 16 · 2013: 35 · 2012: 20
FWCI
1.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Behavioural Brain Research (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
self-recognition, body ownership, agency, covert operations, action simulation, motor signals, sensory cues, action observation, misattribution, cortical networks, self-other distinction, self-consciousness
MeSH terms
Feedback, Humans, Mental Processes, Nerve Net, Proprioception, Psychomotor Performance, Self Concept, Recognition, Psychology, Intention

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