Cited by 390Virtual Reality Applications and ImpactsTactile and Sensory InteractionsPsychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 49 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 49 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Threatening a rubber hand that you feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response.

Open access
Ehrsson, H. Henrik, Wiech, Katja, Weiskopf, Nikolaus, Dolan, Raymond J., Passingham, Richard E.·2007·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

The feeling of body ownership is a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness. The underlying neural mechanisms can be studied by using the illusion where a person is made to feel that a rubber hand is his or her own hand by brushing the person's hidden real hand and synchronously brushing the artificial hand that is in full view. Here we show that threat to the rubber hand can induce a similar level of activity in the brain areas associated with anxiety and interoceptive awareness (insula and anterior cingulate cortex) as when the person's real hand is threatened. We further show that the stronger the feeling of ownership of the artificial hand, the stronger the threat-evoked neuronal responses in the areas reflecting anxiety. Furthermore, across subjects, activity in multisensory areas reflecting ownership predicted the activity in the interoceptive system when the hand was under threat. Finally, we show that there is activity in medial wall motor areas, reflecting an urge to withdraw the artificial hand when it is under threat. These findings suggest that artificial limbs can evoke the same feelings as real limbs and provide objective neurophysiological evidence that the rubber hand is fully incorporated into the body. These findings are of fundamental importance because they suggest that the feeling of body ownership is associated with changes in the interoceptive systems.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Threatening a rubber hand that participants felt was their own evoked fMRI activity in anxiety/interoceptive areas similar to threatening their real hand. The strength of the rubber-hand ownership illusion predicted threat-evoked activity in insula and anterior cingulate cortex.

Key findings

  • Subjective ownership was stronger during synchronous than asynchronous brushing (P < 0.001), and anxiety when the rubber hand was threatened was greater during ownership than no-ownership (P < 0.001); anxiety during rubber-hand ownership threat was similar to real-hand threat (P > 0.05).
  • Threat during ownership vs no-ownership produced a significant peak at the pre-SMA/SMA border (x = −4, y = 2, z = 74; t = 5.13; P < 0.05 corrected), with additional SMA/pre-SMA peaks not surviving correction.
  • Across subjects, stronger ownership vividness correlated with greater threat-evoked BOLD responses in left anterior insula (t = 3.63, R² = 0.44), right anterior insula (t = 3.78, R² = 0.46), and bilateral ACC (t = 5.65, R² = 0.65; t = 4.48, R² = 0.54), all P < 0.05 corrected.
  • Activity in bilateral anterior insula, ACC, and pre-SMA was similar when the real hand was threatened and when the rubber hand was threatened during ownership (P > 0.05 uncorrected).

Methods

  • Nineteen right-handed healthy participants (11 males; aged 19–33) were scanned; participation was limited to those who felt the rubber-hand illusion in preliminary testing, and 9 other subjects were not scanned because they did not experience the illusion.
  • Participants viewed a rubber right hand while their real right hand was hidden; synchronous brushing of both hands induced ownership, asynchronous brushing served as no-ownership control, and a needle made brisk stabbing movements toward the rubber hand without touching it. Separate runs threatened the real hand.
  • fMRI data were acquired on a 1.5-T scanner and analyzed with SPM2 using random-effects group analyses, with small-volume correction in a priori pain/anxiety regions.

Limitations

  • The paper states substantial intersubject variability in the strength of the rubber-hand illusion and in needle-evoked anxiety, which likely explains why the simple subtraction showed only trends for insula and ACC and why some SMA/pre-SMA peaks did not survive correction.
  • The paper notes that some ACC/insula activity just reflected seeing the needle, and that the key anxiety-related effects were over and above this basic activity.
  • Evident from the text: the sample was small (19 scanned), anxiety and ownership were subjective ratings, the needle did not touch the hand, and the design cannot establish whether interoceptive engagement is a cause or consequence of ownership.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.0610011104

Cites

49 of 49 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

22 Not checked yet · 21 Own interpretation · 14 Own result · 8 Own method

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Show all 35 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 9
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 25
30 of 30
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Asynchronous brush-strokes do not elicit the illusion of ownership.

    “As a control, we used asynchronous brush-strokes, which do not elicit the illusion.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It has not been established whether the feeling of ownership generalizes to domains beyond visual and tactile perception.

    “However, the imaging experiment of the rubber-hand illusion has hitherto depended on subjective report, and it has not been established whether the feeling of ownership generalizes to domains beyond visual and tactile perception.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The imaging experiment of the rubber-hand illusion has hitherto depended on subjective report.

    “However, the imaging experiment of the rubber-hand illusion has hitherto depended on subjective report”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The subjective ratings of ownership and anxiety are valid measures of the corresponding subjective experiences.

    “The participants reported that the illusion of ownership was significantly stronger during the synchronous brushing (“ownership” condition) than during the asynchronous stimulation (“no-ownership” condition) [P < 0.001, paired two-tailed t test; see supporting information (SI) Fig. 4a].”
    “They also rated greater anxiety when the rubber hand was threatened during the ownership condition, as compared with no-ownership condition (P < 0.001, paired two-tailed t test; SI Fig. 4b).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Phenomenologically, we do not experience tools as part of our own body.

    “However, phenomenologically, we do not experience tools as part of our own body.”
5 of 5

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. 10.1523/jneurosci.0800-05.2005 · DOI · Paper page

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Metadata

Authors
Ehrsson, H. H., Wiech, K., Weiskopf, N., Dolan, R. J., & Passingham, R. E.
Affiliations
  • National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery (GB)
  • University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Ehrsson, H. Henrik
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2007-06-05
Volume
104
Issue
23
Pages
9828-9833
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2150667231
Cited by
390
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 28 · 2020: 32 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 35 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 20
FWCI
22.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion)
  • Max Planck Digital Library (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Wellcome Trust
  • European Commission (27731)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
Keywords
body ownership, rubber hand illusion, threats, anxiety, interoception, insula, anterior cingulate cortex, multisensory integration, self-consciousness, artificial limbs, withdrawal response
MeSH terms
Adult, Anxiety, Body Image, Brain, Brain Mapping, Consciousness, Discrimination, Psychological, Efferent Pathways, Hand, Humans, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male

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