Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 235 of the 257 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 49 of the 119 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by ‘subjective valuation’—a deep inference about the precision or ‘predictability’ of the self-evidencing (‘fitness-promoting’) outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of ‘selflessness’; in particular the ‘totally selfless’ states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelics or meditative absorption. I argue that the present active inference account is uniquely positioned to address this worry, by demonstrating how phenomenal self-models can dissolve while phenomenal consciousness is preserved. This points towards a more general taxonomy of minds, artificial and biological, within the predictive processing paradigm.
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## TL;DR
The paper argues that phenomenal consciousness in active inference is grounded in “subjective valuation”: a deep inference about how well an organism is self-evidencing across multiple timescales. It also argues that psychedelic ego-dissolution does not refute this view, because even selfless states retain affective evaluation and precision-based control.
## Key findings
- The central claim is that consciousness is underpinned by hierarchically deep self-models, specifically “subjective valuation” or precision estimation on the action model across multiple levels of the generative model.
- Active inference is presented as a formalization of allostasis in which organisms minimize expected free energy; this is linked to prior preferences, epistemic value, and adaptive policy selection.
- The paper argues that psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution can be explained by the REBUS model as a relaxation of high-level priors and a failure of sensory attenuation, producing unpredictable action and thought outcomes and a reduced sense of agency.
- It claims ego-dissolution does not undermine an active inference theory of consciousness because affective experience and subjective valuation remain present even when ordinary self-consciousness is diminished or absent.
## Methods
- Conceptual/theoretical paper rather than an empirical study; it develops an argument within the active inference and predictive processing framework.
- Uses prior literature and illustrative examples from perception, action, affect, meditation, depersonalization, schizophrenia, and psychedelic experience; no new sample or original data are reported.
- Main analysis is philosophical-computational: it maps consciousness, selfhood, and ego-dissolution onto hierarchical generative models, precision weighting, sensory attenuation, and expected free energy.
## Limitations
- The paper does not present new empirical data or a formal model test; this is evident from the text.
- It explicitly describes some linked accounts as “preliminary” or under development, especially the REBUS account as applied to psychedelics.
- The paper notes terminological ambiguity around “self-consciousness” and acknowledges that whether ego-dissolution counts as “totally selfless” depends on how self-consciousness is defined.
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Claims the paper makes
37 Valid · 4 Not valid · 39 Not checked · 69 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“largely due to the fact that predictive processing is not exclusively concerned with conscious processing (But see: Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston 2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Clark 2019; Clark et al. 2019; Kirchhoff et al. 2019; Whyte 2019; Friston et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020; Ramstead et al. 2020b; Safron 2020; Solms 2019, 2021; Whyte and S”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Hohwy 2012 source
In the “Biased competition” section, Hohwy says predictive-coding-related precision processing and attention may occur outside consciousness. The Concluding Remarks likewise say that attention does not necessarily produce conscious perception. These passages support the claim that predictive processing is not exclusively concerned with conscious processing. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Not matchedcites Dolega and Dewhurst 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Friston 2018 source
The Conclusion says that predictive-coding formulations do not necessarily imply conscious processing. It adds that the same principles used to explain visual perception can model pattern formation in single cells, supporting the claim that predictive processing is not exclusively about consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The free energy principle (Friston et al. 2010; Badcock et al. 2019) thus casts control theoretic ‘essential variables’ in terms of high precision prior expectations.”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > The active inference framework
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Friston et al. 2010 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and §7.1 describe active inference as replacing control-theoretic optimal policies with prior expectations about state trajectories. Section 5.3 says greater relative precision makes those expectations more effective in generating action. The paper does not explicitly equate control-theoretic ‘essential variables’ with high-precision prior expectations; its stated comparison is with policies and state transitions. (LLM, conf=0.78)
- Partly supportedcites Badcock et al. 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “The variational free-energy formulation” (page unavailable), the paper describes maintaining functional states within physiological bounds as avoiding surprising states, and says inherited adaptive priors guide organisms toward unsurprising states. This supports the proposed link between homeostatic regulation and prior expectations, but the passage does not identify control-theoretic ‘essential variables’ as high-precision priors; its discussion of precision concerns prediction-error signals. (LLM, conf=0.79)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Action initiation involves ‘systematic misrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Consciousness in active inference > Active inference and the phenomenal self
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Wiese 2017 source
- Partly supportedcites Adams et al. 2013 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Active inference, predictive coding and reflexes” (page unavailable), the paper says a mismatch between predicted and actual proprioceptive input generates an error that activates motor neurons and produces movement. “Active inference and sensory reafference” (page unavailable) discusses attenuation of sensory reafference during movement, but does not say that evidence of the body’s initial stillness is attenuated to initiate movement. The phrase “systematic misrepresentation” is attributed to Wiese, not to Adams et al. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Supportedcites Brown et al. 2013 source
The Abstract says self-generated movement requires predictions to override sensory evidence that the body is not moving, and that attenuating the precision of sensory evidence resolves this conflict. The simulations section, “The permissive role of sensory attenuation in action,” shows that reducing attenuation suppresses movement. The phrase “systematic misrepresentation” is attributed to Wiese, not to Brown et al. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“by tracking regularities over time it can track its control of sensory outcomes more generally, where expectations of the downstream consequences of action inform policy selection (Friston 2018).”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Consciousness in active inference > Active inference and the phenomenal self
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Friston 2018 source
In “Thick and deep models” (page unavailable), Friston says a system changes the flow of sensations through action and, with a temporally extended model, can infer the consequences of its actions. The same section says such a system selects actions by their expected outcomes; “Phenomenal transparency and the counterfactual me” describes choosing among possible futures to determine a course of action. This supports the paraphrase as a claim about organisms capable of modeling consequences over time. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Recall that, under active inference, lower levels of the predictive hierarchy track regularities that are unfolding on shorter timescales and higher levels track regularities unfolding on longer timescales (Kiebel et al. 2008; Friston et al. 2017b).”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Consciousness in active inference > Active inference and the phenomenal self
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Kiebel et al. 2008 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Conclusion state that lower levels represent fast, short-lived environmental trajectories while higher levels represent slowly changing context. The Methods describe this as perceptual inference, however, rather than establishing the claim specifically under active inference. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not matchedcites Friston et al. 2017b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
88 more claims · 18 with their cited sources checked
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Cited works that were retracted
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A note, not an issue: for example, a cited work that was retracted only after this paper was published, which its authors could not have known.
In the paper
“Although a preliminary account, the REBUS model is growing in empirical support (Alamia et al. 2020; Dupuis 2020; Girn et al. 2020; Herzog et al. 2020).”
Cited work 10.1038/s41598-020-74060-6 · retracted 2022-09-15 · notice 10.1038/s41598-022-20093-y · this paper published 2021-01-01
Citations
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Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
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Self-citationExpecting some action: predictive processing and the construction of conscious experience
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“Efforts to understand the neuronal substrates of ego dissolution (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016; Stoliker et al., 2022), along with philosophical and phenomenological analyses (Letheby and Gerrans, 2017; Milliere, 2017; Deane, 2021), have been ongoing.”
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“…there would be no phenomenal experience (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 162; Goldman, 1970, p. 96; Sartre, 1956; Zahavi, 1999, 2005; Legrand, 2007a; Kriegel, 2009; Kiverstein, 2020; although see Letheby, 2020, Millière, 2020, Winter et al., 2020, Deane, 2021, Laukkonen and Slagter, 2021, Metzinger, 2024).”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Deane, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Deane, George
- ORCID
- Deane, George
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-01-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab024-niab024
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8408766
- OpenAlex
- W3196481983
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 257
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7
- FWCI
- 0.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- ERC XSPECT project (DLV-692739)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- active inference, predictive processing, phenomenal consciousness, self-model, subjective valuation, sensory attenuation, other minds, altruism, self-consciousness, computational psychiatry
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