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Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution

Open access
Deane, George · 2021 · Neuroscience of Consciousness

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 235 of the 257 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 49 of the 119 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by ‘subjective valuation’—a deep inference about the precision or ‘predictability’ of the self-evidencing (‘fitness-promoting’) outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of ‘selflessness’; in particular the ‘totally selfless’ states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelics or meditative absorption. I argue that the present active inference account is uniquely positioned to address this worry, by demonstrating how phenomenal self-models can dissolve while phenomenal consciousness is preserved. This points towards a more general taxonomy of minds, artificial and biological, within the predictive processing paradigm.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

The paper argues that phenomenal consciousness in active inference is grounded in “subjective valuation”: a deep inference about how well an organism is self-evidencing across multiple timescales. It also argues that psychedelic ego-dissolution does not refute this view, because even selfless states retain affective evaluation and precision-based control.

## Key findings

  • The central claim is that consciousness is underpinned by hierarchically deep self-models, specifically “subjective valuation” or precision estimation on the action model across multiple levels of the generative model.
  • Active inference is presented as a formalization of allostasis in which organisms minimize expected free energy; this is linked to prior preferences, epistemic value, and adaptive policy selection.
  • The paper argues that psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution can be explained by the REBUS model as a relaxation of high-level priors and a failure of sensory attenuation, producing unpredictable action and thought outcomes and a reduced sense of agency.
  • It claims ego-dissolution does not undermine an active inference theory of consciousness because affective experience and subjective valuation remain present even when ordinary self-consciousness is diminished or absent.

## Methods

  • Conceptual/theoretical paper rather than an empirical study; it develops an argument within the active inference and predictive processing framework.
  • Uses prior literature and illustrative examples from perception, action, affect, meditation, depersonalization, schizophrenia, and psychedelic experience; no new sample or original data are reported.
  • Main analysis is philosophical-computational: it maps consciousness, selfhood, and ego-dissolution onto hierarchical generative models, precision weighting, sensory attenuation, and expected free energy.

## Limitations

  • The paper does not present new empirical data or a formal model test; this is evident from the text.
  • It explicitly describes some linked accounts as “preliminary” or under development, especially the REBUS account as applied to psychedelics.
  • The paper notes terminological ambiguity around “self-consciousness” and acknowledges that whether ego-dissolution counts as “totally selfless” depends on how self-consciousness is defined.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/nc/niab024

Cites

235 of 235 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims the paper makes

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Cited works that were retracted

Works this paper cites that were later retracted, from the retraction notices publishers deposit. Major when the notice came out before this paper was published.

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Citations

Cites

1 retracted

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Girn, 2020, LSD flattens the functional hierarchy of the human brain, BioRxiv
  2. Hohwy, 2017, The Subject’s Matter

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Deane, G.
Affiliations
University of Edinburgh (GB)
Corresponding author
Deane, George
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2021-01-01
Volume
2021
Issue
2
Pages
niab024-niab024
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3196481983
Cited by
38
References
257
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7
FWCI
0.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
ERC XSPECT project (DLV-692739)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
active inference, predictive processing, phenomenal consciousness, self-model, subjective valuation, sensory attenuation, other minds, altruism, self-consciousness, computational psychiatry

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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