Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 235 of the 257 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 49 of the 119 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by ‘subjective valuation’—a deep inference about the precision or ‘predictability’ of the self-evidencing (‘fitness-promoting’) outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of ‘selflessness’; in particular the ‘totally selfless’ states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelics or meditative absorption. I argue that the present active inference account is uniquely positioned to address this worry, by demonstrating how phenomenal self-models can dissolve while phenomenal consciousness is preserved. This points towards a more general taxonomy of minds, artificial and biological, within the predictive processing paradigm.
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## TL;DR
The paper argues that phenomenal consciousness in active inference is grounded in “subjective valuation”: a deep inference about how well an organism is self-evidencing across multiple timescales. It also argues that psychedelic ego-dissolution does not refute this view, because even selfless states retain affective evaluation and precision-based control.
## Key findings
- The central claim is that consciousness is underpinned by hierarchically deep self-models, specifically “subjective valuation” or precision estimation on the action model across multiple levels of the generative model.
- Active inference is presented as a formalization of allostasis in which organisms minimize expected free energy; this is linked to prior preferences, epistemic value, and adaptive policy selection.
- The paper argues that psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution can be explained by the REBUS model as a relaxation of high-level priors and a failure of sensory attenuation, producing unpredictable action and thought outcomes and a reduced sense of agency.
- It claims ego-dissolution does not undermine an active inference theory of consciousness because affective experience and subjective valuation remain present even when ordinary self-consciousness is diminished or absent.
## Methods
- Conceptual/theoretical paper rather than an empirical study; it develops an argument within the active inference and predictive processing framework.
- Uses prior literature and illustrative examples from perception, action, affect, meditation, depersonalization, schizophrenia, and psychedelic experience; no new sample or original data are reported.
- Main analysis is philosophical-computational: it maps consciousness, selfhood, and ego-dissolution onto hierarchical generative models, precision weighting, sensory attenuation, and expected free energy.
## Limitations
- The paper does not present new empirical data or a formal model test; this is evident from the text.
- It explicitly describes some linked accounts as “preliminary” or under development, especially the REBUS account as applied to psychedelics.
- The paper notes terminological ambiguity around “self-consciousness” and acknowledges that whether ego-dissolution counts as “totally selfless” depends on how self-consciousness is defined.
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37 Valid · 4 Not valid · 39 Not checked · 69 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“largely due to the fact that predictive processing is not exclusively concerned with conscious processing (But see: Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston 2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Clark 2019; Clark et al. 2019; Kirchhoff et al. 2019; Whyte 2019; Friston et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020; Ramstead et al. 2020b; Safron 2020; Solms 2019, 2021; Whyte and S”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Introduction
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Hohwy 2012 source
In the “Biased competition” section, Hohwy says predictive-coding-related precision processing and attention may occur outside consciousness. The Concluding Remarks likewise say that attention does not necessarily produce conscious perception. These passages support the claim that predictive processing is not exclusively concerned with conscious processing. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Not matchedcites Dolega and Dewhurst 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Supportedcites Friston 2018 source
The Conclusion says that predictive-coding formulations do not necessarily imply conscious processing. It adds that the same principles used to explain visual perception can model pattern formation in single cells, supporting the claim that predictive processing is not exclusively about consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The free energy principle (Friston et al. 2010; Badcock et al. 2019) thus casts control theoretic ‘essential variables’ in terms of high precision prior expectations.”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > The active inference framework
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Friston et al. 2010 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and §7.1 describe active inference as replacing control-theoretic optimal policies with prior expectations about state trajectories. Section 5.3 says greater relative precision makes those expectations more effective in generating action. The paper does not explicitly equate control-theoretic ‘essential variables’ with high-precision prior expectations; its stated comparison is with policies and state transitions. (LLM, conf=0.78)
- Partly supportedcites Badcock et al. 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “The variational free-energy formulation” (page unavailable), the paper describes maintaining functional states within physiological bounds as avoiding surprising states, and says inherited adaptive priors guide organisms toward unsurprising states. This supports the proposed link between homeostatic regulation and prior expectations, but the passage does not identify control-theoretic ‘essential variables’ as high-precision priors; its discussion of precision concerns prediction-error signals. (LLM, conf=0.79)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Action initiation involves ‘systematic misrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Consciousness in active inference > Active inference and the phenomenal self
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Wiese 2017 source
- Partly supportedcites Adams et al. 2013 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Active inference, predictive coding and reflexes” (page unavailable), the paper says a mismatch between predicted and actual proprioceptive input generates an error that activates motor neurons and produces movement. “Active inference and sensory reafference” (page unavailable) discusses attenuation of sensory reafference during movement, but does not say that evidence of the body’s initial stillness is attenuated to initiate movement. The phrase “systematic misrepresentation” is attributed to Wiese, not to Adams et al. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Supportedcites Brown et al. 2013 source
The Abstract says self-generated movement requires predictions to override sensory evidence that the body is not moving, and that attenuating the precision of sensory evidence resolves this conflict. The simulations section, “The permissive role of sensory attenuation in action,” shows that reducing attenuation suppresses movement. The phrase “systematic misrepresentation” is attributed to Wiese, not to Brown et al. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“by tracking regularities over time it can track its control of sensory outcomes more generally, where expectations of the downstream consequences of action inform policy selection (Friston 2018).”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Consciousness in active inference > Active inference and the phenomenal self
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Friston 2018 source
In “Thick and deep models” (page unavailable), Friston says a system changes the flow of sensations through action and, with a temporally extended model, can infer the consequences of its actions. The same section says such a system selects actions by their expected outcomes; “Phenomenal transparency and the counterfactual me” describes choosing among possible futures to determine a course of action. This supports the paraphrase as a claim about organisms capable of modeling consequences over time. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Recall that, under active inference, lower levels of the predictive hierarchy track regularities that are unfolding on shorter timescales and higher levels track regularities unfolding on longer timescales (Kiebel et al. 2008; Friston et al. 2017b).”
§ Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution > Consciousness in active inference > Active inference and the phenomenal self
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Kiebel et al. 2008 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Conclusion state that lower levels represent fast, short-lived environmental trajectories while higher levels represent slowly changing context. The Methods describe this as perceptual inference, however, rather than establishing the claim specifically under active inference. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not matchedcites Friston et al. 2017b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
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In the paper
“Although a preliminary account, the REBUS model is growing in empirical support (Alamia et al. 2020; Dupuis 2020; Girn et al. 2020; Herzog et al. 2020).”
Cited work 10.1038/s41598-020-74060-6 · retracted 2022-09-15 · notice 10.1038/s41598-022-20093-y · this paper published 2021-01-01
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“Subsequently, the comparator model has been used to account for the sense of agency (Feinberg 1978; Frith 2005; David et al. 2008), where inference about endogenous control over the causes of sensory signals is thought to underpin the sense that an action is agentive or self-generated.”
MethodReduced Self-Control after 3 Months of Imprisonment; A Pilot Study
Meijers, J., Harte, J. M., Meynen, G., Cuijpers, P., & Scherder, E. J. A. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00069 · Cited by 489
Active inference, sensory attenuation and illusions
Brown, H., Adams, R. A., Parees, I., Edwards, M., & Friston, K. (2013) · Cognitive Processing · doi:10.1007/s10339-013-0571-3 · Cited by 488 · cited 2×
“Action initiation involves ‘systematicmisrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
BackgroundNeural substrates of vocalization feedback monitoring in primate auditory cortex
Eliades, S. J., & Wang, X. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06910 · Cited by 479 · cited 1×
“Sensory neurons are able to respond with high sensitivity to exafferent inputs despite disruptive self-generated inputs (Bell 1981; Poulet and Hedwig 2002; Eliades and Wang 2008; Keller and Hahnloser 2009; Ahrens et al. 2012).”
BackgroundUncertainty in perception and the Hierarchical Gaussian Filter
Mathys, C. D., Lomakina, E. I., Daunizeau, J., Iglesias, S., Brodersen, K. H., Friston, K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2014) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00825 · Cited by 465
Self and other: exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame
(2015) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.191808 · Cited by 464
Atlas, L. Y., & Wager, T. D. (2012) · Neuroscience Letters · doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2012.03.039 · Cited by 463
Allostatic Self-efficacy: A Metacognitive Theory of Dyshomeostasis-Induced Fatigue and Depression
Stephan, K. E., Manjaly, Z. M., Mathys, C. D., Weber, L. A. E., Paliwal, S., Gard, T., Tittgemeyer, M., Fleming, S. M., Haker, H., Seth, A. K., et al. (2016) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2016.00550 · Cited by 437 · cited 1×
“In other words, they regulate the internal milieu by anticipating physiological needs and acting to meet them before they arise (Sterling 2012; Pezzulo et al. 2015; Stephan et al. 2016; Schulkin and Sterling 2019; Corcoran et al. 2020).”
BackgroundMentalizing homeostasis: the social origins of interoceptive inference
Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2017) · Neuropsychoanalysis · doi:10.1080/15294145.2017.1294031 · Cited by 428
Navigating the Affordance Landscape: Feedback Control as a Process Model of Behavior and Cognition
Pezzulo, G., & Cisek, P. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.013 · Cited by 419 · cited 3×
“Importantly, precision is thought to mediate engagement with affordances—latent possibilities for action (Cisek 2011; Pezzulo and Cisek 2019) and sensory attenuation—the top-down filtering out of afferent (incoming) information, both from the body (interoception) and the senses (exteroception).”
BackgroundHuxley, A. (1954) · Cited by 415
Attention and conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain
Hohwy, J. (2012) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00096 · Cited by 396 · cited 2×
“Predictive processing delivers a compelling story about the contents of perception, where ‘conscious perception is determined by the prediction or hypothesis with the highest overall posterior probability—which is overall best at minimizing prediction error’ (Hohwy 2012, 4).”
BackgroundPsychedelics, meditation, and self-consciousness
Millière, R., Carhart-Harris, R. L., Roseman, L., Trautwein, F.-M., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01475 · Cited by 390 · cited 1×
“While there is empirical evidence that some advanced forms of meditation practice can also occasion ‘totally’ selfless states (Millière et al. 2018; Winter et al. 2020; Laukkonen and Slagter 2021), here I will focus on psychedelics as the most robust catalysts of selfless states.”
BackgroundMood as representation of momentum
Eldar, E., Rutledge, R. B., Dolan, R. J., & Niv, Y. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.07.010 · Cited by 383 · cited 1×
“While in typical experience, subjective valuation functions to fine-tune learning (Eldar et al. 2016) and regulate behaviour, we can see the same mechanisms in place in atypical experience such as the psychedelic state.”
BackgroundA free energy principle for biological systems
Karl, F. (2012) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e14112100 · Cited by 377 · cited 2×
“Deep temporal models encode expectations about the evolution of states of affairs over time contingent on action policies, such that the system can infer actions that result in sensory states conducive to continued existence—sometimes called the ‘attracting set’ (Friston 2012).”
BackgroundThe Evolution of the Sensitive Soul: Learning and the Origins of Consciousness
Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2019) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/11006.001.0001 · Cited by 372
Being a Beast Machine: The Somatic Basis of Selfhood
Seth, A. K., & Tsakiris, M. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.08.008 · Cited by 371 · cited 3×
“Prior preferences are phenotype-specific states that the organism expects itself to be in—connecting control to states of the body and views of selfhood based in interoceptive inference (Seth and Friston 2016; Barrett 2017; Seth and Tsakiris 2018).”
BackgroundThinking through other minds: A variational approach to cognition and culture
Veissière, S. P. L., Constant, A., Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19001213 · Cited by 348
Finding the self by losing the self: neural correlates of ego-dissolution under psilocybin
Lebedev, A. V., Lövdén, M., Rosenthal, G., Feilding, A., Nutt, D. J., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2015) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.22833 · Cited by 339 · cited 1×
“Most notably for present purposes, psychedelic experiences, especially at high doses, are characterized by profound alterations in selfconsciousness (Huxley 1952; Leary et al. 1964; Lebedev et al. 2015).”
BackgroundHierarchical active inference: A theory of motivated control
Pezzulo, G., Rigoli, F., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.01.009 · Cited by 334
(1998) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 332
Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle
Joffily, M., & Coricelli, G. (2013) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094 · Cited by 322
The self in action: lessons from delusions of control
Frith, C. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.002 · Cited by 315 · cited 4×
“For instance, the symptomatology of schizophrenia—such as thought insertion, where patients report feeling that their thoughts are not their own—have been understood in terms of a failure of these sensory attenuation mechanisms (Ford and Mathalon 2005; Frith 2005; Rösler et al. 2015; Thakkar et al. 2021).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialAuditory feedback in learning and maintenance of vocal behaviour
Brainard, M. S., & Doupe, A. J. (2000) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35036205 · Cited by 314
The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory.
Morsella, E. (2005) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.112.4.1000 · Cited by 312 · cited 2×
“Conceiving of valence as a ‘common currency’ to arbitrate between action plans in this way connects this proposal to numerous accounts of phenomenal consciousness in the literature (Cabanac 1992; Morsella 2005; Merker 2007).”
With or without you: predictive coding and Bayesian inference in the brain
Aitchison, L., & Lengyel, M. (2017) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2017.08.010 · Cited by 308
The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based on the Tibetan Book of the Dead
(1965) · Medical Journal of Australia · doi:10.5694/j.1326-5377.1965.tb71965.x · Cited by 304 · cited 1×
“Most notably for present purposes, psychedelic experiences, especially at high doses, are characterized by profound alterations in selfconsciousness (Huxley 1952; Leary et al. 1964; Lebedev et al. 2015).”
BackgroundThe Hidden Spring, a Journey to the Source of Consciousness
Yeo, W. G. (2022) · Psychoanalysis · doi:10.18529/psychoanal.2022.33.4.63 · Cited by 301
Botvinick, M., & Toussaint, M. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.006 · Cited by 292 · cited 1×
“For clarity about how different contents of consciousness map to the generative model, I sequentially unpack the inferential architecture of the hierarchical generative model and how this architecture relates to conscious contents in the following four subsections: ‘Perception’ covers basic models of perception as (hi…”
Background‘Bodily precision’: A predictive coding account of individual differences in interoceptive accuracy
Ainley, V., Apps, M. A. J., Fotopoulou, A., & Tsakiris, M. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0003 · Cited by 285
Phenomenology, Structure, and Dynamic of Psychedelic States
Preller, K. H., & Vollenweider, F. X. (2016) · Current Topics in Behavioral Neurosciences · doi:10.1007/7854_2016_459 · Cited by 282
Corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia: Can it explain auditory hallucinations?
Ford, J. M., & Mathalon, D. H. (2005) · International Journal of Psychophysiology · doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2005.01.014 · Cited by 267
Perception of self-generated movement following left parietal lesion
Sirigu, A. (1999) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/122.10.1867 · Cited by 267 · cited 1×
“The mismatch between the expected and actual consequences of a given action justifies the attribution of sensory outcomes to exogenous (external) rather than endogenous (internal) causes, such that attribution of sensory outcomes to exogenous causes results in a reduced or absent sense of agency (Sirigu et al. 1999).”
BackgroundAllostasis: A brain-centered, predictive mode of physiological regulation
Schulkin, J., & Sterling, P. (2019) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2019.07.010 · Cited by 265
Minimal self-models and the free energy principle.
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547 · Cited by 263 · cited 1×
“Increasingly, the formal principles of self-modelling implied by active inference are thought to underpin phenomenal self-modelling (Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013; Hohwy and Michael 2017; Friston 2018; Limanowski and Friston 2018, 2020; Deane 2020; Deane et al. 2020).”
BackgroundDeeply Felt Affect: The Emergence of Valence in Deep Active Inference
Hesp, C., Smith, R., Parr, T., Allen, M., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2021) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01341 · Cited by 246 · cited 3×
“Inference about endogenous control of self-evidencing outcomes can thus be understood as an inference about ‘subjective fitness’—the expected precision of the organism’s phenotypecongruent action model (Hesp et al. 2021).”
BackgroundAn Efference Copy Which Is Modified by Reafferent Input
Bell, C. C. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7291985 · Cited by 244 · cited 1×
“Sensory neurons are able to respond with high sensitivity to exafferent inputs despite disruptive self-generated inputs (Bell 1981; Poulet and Hedwig 2002; Eliades and Wang 2008; Keller and Hahnloser 2009; Ahrens et al. 2012).”
BackgroundNeural processing of auditory feedback during vocal practice in a songbird
Keller, G. B., & Hahnloser, R. H. R. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07467 · Cited by 243
Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: a neurophenomenological critique
Gallagher, S. (2004) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000077014 · Cited by 243 · cited 1×
“Here, the system fails to attribute self-generated outcomes to endogenous rather than exogenous causes, with the phenomenological manifestation to the agent being a perceived loss of agency over their thoughts (Stephens and Graham 1994; O’Brien and Opie 2003; Gallagher 2004).”
BackgroundThe Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle
Solms, M. (2019) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02714 · Cited by 239 · cited 2×
“(Solms 2019, 12) Moreover, this view seems aligned with a view of egodissolution as only partially selfless states and with the view proposed here that higher layers of the phenomenal self-model structure consciousness ‘Affect just is a self-state (and through feeling—i.e., precision…”
BackgroundThe cybernetic Bayesian brain : from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies
Seth, A. K. (2015) · MIND Group · doi:10.25358/openscience-84 · Cited by 239
Deep temporal models and active inference
Friston, K. J., Rosch, R., Parr, T., Price, C., & Bowman, H. (2017) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.04.009 · Cited by 237
Wei, C., Sun, X., Liu, J., Zhou, C., & Xue, G. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02066 · Cited by 234
Working memory, attention, and salience in active inference
Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2017) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-017-15249-0 · Cited by 227
Benedetti, F., Maggi, G., Lopiano, L., Lanotte, M., Rainero, I., Vighetti, S., & Pollo, A. (2003) · Prevention & Treatment · doi:10.1037/1522-3736.6.1.61a · Cited by 222
A free energy principle for a particular physics
Friston, K. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1906.10184 · Cited by 222 · cited 3×
“Carhart-Harris and Friston (2020) distinguish between ‘complete ego-dissolution’—a state of ‘complete surrender, associated bliss, and union with all things’ (Carhart-Harris and Friston 2019, 321); and ‘incomplete’ ego-dissolution—a state characterized by intense fear, anxiety and distress.”
BackgroundA tale of two densities: active inference is enactive inference
Ramstead, M. J., Kirchhoff, M. D., & Friston, K. J. (2020) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319862774 · Cited by 220 · cited 5×
“Hierarchically deep inference means that experience of the world is suffused with our ‘cares and concerns’ (Ramstead et al. 2020b) across multiple levels and accords with the view that visual perceptual experience is determined by the agent’s ‘poise’ over the ‘action space’, where we encounter the…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe hierarchically mechanistic mind: A free-energy formulation of the human psyche
Badcock, P. B., Friston, K. J., & Ramstead, M. J. D. (2019) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2018.10.002 · Cited by 217
Seth, A. K. (2015) · Figshare · doi:10.15502/9783958570108 · Cited by 211 · cited 3×
“Notice that this means that even state estimation associated with perceptual inference is determined by the overarching inference about control of self-evidencing outcomes—both in terms of the predictive models encoding sensorimotor relations (‘counterfactual richness’) grounding the subjective reality of perceptual c…”
BackgroundSymptom perception, placebo effects, and the Bayesian brain
Ongaro, G., & Kaptchuk, T. J. (2019) · Pain · doi:10.1097/j.pain.0000000000001367 · Cited by 208
Mental evolution in man: Origin of human faculty.
Romanes, G. J. (1888) · doi:10.1037/13468-000 · Cited by 208
Is atypical rhythm a risk factor for developmental speech and language disorders?
Ladányi, E., Persici, V., Fiveash, A., Tillmann, B., & Gordon, R. L. (2020) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1528 · Cited by 207
Millière, R. (2017) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245 · Cited by 206 · cited 3×
“…self-modelling aligns the current account with many other approaches across psychology, neuroscience and philosophy that cast self-consciousness as necessary or constitutive of consciousness itself (Damasio 1999; Metzinger 2003; Gallagher 2010, 2013; Zahavi 2014; Lou et al. 2017; Millière 2017).”
BackgroundWhat is mood? A computational perspective
Clark, J. E., Watson, S., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291718000430 · Cited by 204 · cited 1×
“High-level priors constraining more domain-general affective states such as mood (Clark et al. 2018) would also be relaxed under the REBUS model.”
BackgroundPlanning by Probabilistic Inference.
Attias, H. T. (2003) · Cited by 204
Planning and navigation as active inference
Kaplan, R., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Biological Cybernetics · doi:10.1007/s00422-018-0753-2 · Cited by 203
Am i self-conscious? (or does self-organization entail self-consciousness?)
Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00579 · Cited by 197 · cited 11×
“The planning and execution of action or a sequence of actions (a ‘policy’)—under this scheme—becomes a problem of inference where the action with the highest prior probability is that which minimizes ‘expected’ free energy—the expected dyshomeostatic consequences of an action policy (Kaplan and Friston 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialOlfaction Modulates Visual Perception in Binocular Rivalry
Zhou, W., Jiang, Y., He, S., & Chen, D. (2010) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2010.05.059 · Cited by 195
Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194 · cited 1×
“Doerig et al. (2021) emphasize that predictive processing, as it stands, is insufficiently constrained to provide a theory of consciousness due to being vulnerable to what they call the ‘other systems argument’.”
BackgroundDissecting corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia
Ford, J. M., Gray, M., Faustman, W. O., Roach, B. J., & Mathalon, D. H. (2007) · Psychophysiology · doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00533.x · Cited by 192 · cited 1×
“In the case of voice hearing this can result in attribution of inner speech to an external source such as another agent (Ford and Mathalon 2005; Ford et al. 2007).”
BackgroundFrom many to (n)one: Meditation and the plasticity of the predictive mind
Laukkonen, R. E., & Slagter, H. A. (2021) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.06.021 · Cited by 187
Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism
Friston, K. J., Wiese, W., & Hobson, J. A. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22050516 · Cited by 186 · cited 2×
“…Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston 2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Clark 2019; Clark et al. 2019; Kirchhoff et al. 2019; Whyte 2019; Friston et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020; Ramstead et al. 2020b; Safron 2020; Solms 2019, 2021; Whyte and Smith 2020).”
BackgroundThe Insula Mediates Access to Awareness of Visual Stimuli Presented Synchronously to the Heartbeat
Salomon, R., Ronchi, R., Dönz, J., Bello-Ruiz, J., Herbelin, B., Martet, R., Faivre, N., Schaller, K., & Blanke, O. (2016) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.4262-15.2016 · Cited by 178 · cited 1×
“Interoceptive (Salomon et al. 2016) and proprioceptive (Salomon et al.”
Phosphorylation of Pex11p does not regulate peroxisomal fission in the yeast Hansenula polymorpha
Thomas, A. S., Krikken, A. M., van der Klei, I. J., & Williams, C. P. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep11493 · Cited by 173
Homeostasis and soft robotics in the design of feeling machines
Man, K., & Damasio, A. (2019) · Nature Machine Intelligence · doi:10.1038/s42256-019-0103-7 · Cited by 172
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
Computational Neuropsychology and Bayesian Inference
Parr, T., Rees, G. E., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2018.00061 · Cited by 169 · cited 1×
“Prediction error is then suppressed by making the prediction come true, through reflex arcs at the lowest level of the hierarchy (Parr et al. 2018).”
BackgroundThe development of food search behavior by rats: The effects of hippocampal damage and haloperidol
Oades, R. D., & Isaacson, R. L. (1978) · Behavioral Biology · doi:10.1016/s0091-6773(79)90184-6 · Cited by 165
Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain, behaviour and disorder
O’Callaghan, C., Kveraga, K., Shine, J. M., Adams, R. B., & Bar, M. (2017) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.003 · Cited by 164 · cited 1×
“‘Predictive penetration’—social, cognitive and emotional— have all been demonstrated (O’Callaghan et al. 2016).”
BackgroundA corollary discharge maintains auditory sensitivity during sound production
Poulet, J. F. A., & Hedwig, B. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature00919 · Cited by 162
Corcoran, A. W., Pezzulo, G., & Hohwy, J. (2020) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09746-2 · Cited by 161 · cited 2×
“In other words, they regulate the internal milieu by anticipating physiological needs and acting to meet them before they arise (Sterling 2012; Pezzulo et al. 2015; Stephan et al. 2016; Schulkin and Sterling 2019; Corcoran et al. 2020).”
BackgroundLimanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643 · Cited by 154
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2013) · doi:10.4324/9780203126752 · Cited by 153
Unlimited Associative Learning and the origins of consciousness: a primer and some predictions
Birch, J., Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2020) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-020-09772-0 · Cited by 149 · cited 1×
“The current account may also provide a fuller picture of why ‘unlimited associative learning’—due to facilitating the complex reafferent processes associated with a deep self-model—may be a marker of the evolutionary transition tominimal consciousness (Bronfman et al. 2016; Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019; Birch et al. 202…”
BackgroundHohwy, J. (2016) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.09.004 · Cited by 148 · cited 2×
“This is because ‘the better the precision on the prediction error, the higher the learning rate; that is, the more we trust the quality of the evidence the more we should learn from it’ (Hohwy 2017, 76).”
BackgroundCorollary discharge circuits in the primate brain
Crapse, T. B., & Sommer, M. A. (2008) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2008.09.017 · Cited by 147
Consciousness: The last 50 years (and the next)
Seth, A. K. (2018) · Brain and Neuroscience Advances · doi:10.1177/2398212818816019 · Cited by 147 · cited 1×
“Phenomenal consciousness—the ‘what-it-is-like’ (Nagel 1974) to experience—has now been an area of serious scientific study for at least 30 years (Seth 2018).”
Background(2018) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 145
The feeling of grip: novelty, error dynamics, and the predictive brain
Kiverstein, J., Miller, M., & Rietveld, E. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1583-9 · Cited by 143 · cited 2×
“Promoting self-evidencing outcomes on longer timescales requires organisms to be sensitive not only to prediction error reduction in the present, but the rate of prediction error reduction over time (Joffily and Coricelli 2013; Kiverstein et al. 2019; Van de Cruys 2017).”
BackgroundBayesian inferences about the self (and others): a review.
Moutoussis, M., Fearon, P., El-Deredy, W., Dolan, R. J., & Friston, K. J. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.009 · Cited by 141
Universal darwinism as a process of bayesian inference
Campbell, J. O. (2016) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2016.00049 · Cited by 140 · cited 1×
“…behaviour of bacteria (Tschantz et al. 2020) and plants (Calvo and Friston 2017), all theway up to social and cultural dynamics (Veissière et al. 2019) and natural selection (Campbell 2016)—brings the need to identify the particular processes associated with consciousness itself into sharp relief.”
Background(2019) · Cited by 140
The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning
Bronfman, Z. Z., Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01954 · Cited by 133 · cited 1×
“The current account may also provide a fuller picture of why ‘unlimited associative learning’—due to facilitating the complex reafferent processes associated with a deep self-model—may be a marker of the evolutionary transition tominimal consciousness (Bronfman et al. 2016; Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019; Birch et al. 202…”
BackgroundCarbonaro, T. M., Johnson, M. W., Hurwitz, E., & Griffiths, R. R. (2018) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-017-4769-4 · Cited by 133
Safron, A. (2020) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2020.00030 · Cited by 133 · cited 2×
“…Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston 2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Clark 2019; Clark et al. 2019; Kirchhoff et al. 2019; Whyte 2019; Friston et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020; Ramstead et al. 2020b; Safron 2020; Solms 2019, 2021; Whyte and Smith 2020).”
BackgroundAbove and beyond the concrete: The diverse representational substrates of the predictive brain
Gilead, M., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2020) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x19002000 · Cited by 133
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of self-awareness
Lou, H. C., Changeux, J. P., & Rosenstand, A. (2017) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.04.004 · Cited by 131
Brain mediators of the effects of noxious heat on pain
Atlas, L. Y., Lindquist, M. A., Bolger, N. P., & Wager, T. D. (2014) · Pain · doi:10.1016/j.pain.2014.05.015 · Cited by 128 · cited 1×
“The felt intensity of pain can be adjusted according to the context and the survival needs of the animal, modulated by attention, expectation, conditioned pain modulation and placebo responses (Atlas and Wager 2012; Atlas et al. 2014; Kirsch et al. 2014; Kong and Benedetti 2014).”
BackgroundExtended Consciousness and Predictive Processing: A Third-Wave View
Kirchhoff, M. D., & Kiverstein, J. (2019) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315150420 · Cited by 122 · cited 1×
“However, a theory of consciousness within predictive processing remains elusive, largely due to the fact that predictive processing is not exclusively concerned with conscious processing (But see: Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston 2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Clark 2019;…”
BackgroundPrécis of The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness
Solms, M. (2021) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.28.11.153 · Cited by 122
Predicting green: really radical (plant) predictive processing
Calvo, P., & Friston, K. (2017) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2017.0096 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“2020) and plants (Calvo and Friston 2017), all theway up to social and cultural dynamics (Veissière et al.”
BackgroundLearning action-oriented models through active inference
Tschantz, A., Seth, A. K., & Buckley, C. L. (2020) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007805 · Cited by 121 · cited 1×
“The breadth of explanations within this approach—from microscale explanations applied to understand the adaptive behaviour of bacteria (Tschantz et al. 2020) and plants (Calvo and Friston 2017), all theway up to social and cultural dynamics (Veissière et al.”
BackgroundReafference and the origin of the self in early nervous system evolution
Jékely, G., Godfrey-Smith, P., & Keijzer, F. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2019.0764 · Cited by 119
I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience
Guillot, M. (2017) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-016-0313-4 · Cited by 115 · cited 1×
“Millière (2017, 2020) notes that the disagreements about the necessity claim and the typicality claim may hinge on terminological variation (Guillot 2017), due to the polysemy of ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘sense of self’.”
BackgroundDeep active inference as variational policy gradients
Millidge, B. (2020) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102348 · Cited by 115 · cited 4×
“Active inference formalizes allostasis (and action) as an inference problem, ‘planning as inference’ (Kaplan and Friston 2018) under the free energy principle (Friston 2019).”
BackgroundInfluentialOn markov blankets and hierarchical self-organisation
Palacios, E. R., Razi, A., Parr, T., Kirchhoff, M., & Friston, K. (2020) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.110089 · Cited by 115 · cited 1×
“This means that minimizing the free energy just is maximizing model evidence—hence the notion of self-evidencing (Hohwy 2016; Palacios et al. 2020).”
BackgroundHappily entangled: prediction, emotion, and the embodied mind
Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1399-7 · Cited by 114 · cited 1×
“Higher levels provide deep contextualization (interoceptive inference) of afferent signals from the body (Miller and Clark 2017), tuning the organism to adaptive opportunities for action.”
BackgroundHidden Administration of Drugs
Benedetti, F., Carlino, E., & Pollo, A. (2011) · Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics · doi:10.1038/clpt.2011.206 · Cited by 114 · cited 1×
“For example, studies show that patients who receive treatment in a medical context experience considerably higher pain relief than those who receive analgesic drug treatment covertly (Benedetti et al. 2003, 2011).”
BackgroundFranse, R. K., Van Schijndel, T. J. P., & Raijmakers, M. E. J. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01047 · Cited by 111
Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2020) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1542 · Cited by 110 · cited 1×
“The basic predictive processing story so far casts the brain as a hierarchical prediction machine using belief updating schemes to approximate Bayesian inference by utilizing ‘priors’ (probability distributions about hidden states of the world) and incoming sensory data (‘prediction errors’) to arrive at a posterior e…”
MethodSelf-citationAffective Value in the Predictive Mind
Van De Cruys, S. (2017) · Theoretical Philosophy/MIND Group – JGU Mainz · doi:10.15502/9783958573253 · Cited by 100 · cited 1×
“Promoting self-evidencing outcomes on longer timescales requires organisms to be sensitive not only to prediction error reduction in the present, but the rate of prediction error reduction over time (Joffily and Coricelli 2013; Kiverstein et al. 2019; Van de Cruys 2017).”
BackgroundDupuis, D. (2022) · Transcultural Psychiatry · doi:10.1177/13634615211036388 · Cited by 99
The epistemic and pragmatic value of non-action: a predictive coding perspective on meditation
Lutz, A., Mattout, J., & Pagnoni, G. (2019) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.12.019 · Cited by 97 · cited 1×
“The idea here is that ‘focused attention meditation’ (Lutz et al. 2019) can be understood as the endogenous withdrawal of precision from prior preferences, due to the practice of repeatedly bringing attention back to the attentional object, such as the breath.”
BackgroundDMT alters cortical travelling waves
Alamia, A., Timmermann, C., Nutt, D. J., VanRullen, R., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2020) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.59784 · Cited by 97
Palmer, C. E., Davare, M., & Kilner, J. M. (2016) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1694-16.2016 · Cited by 96 · cited 2×
“The first to consider is ‘physiological sensory attenuation’ (Palmer et al. 2016), which is critical for movement initiation in active inference (Brown et al.”
BackgroundAnderson, E., Siegel, E., White, D., & Barrett, L. F. (2012) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/a0027514 · Cited by 93
Beyond conformity: Social influences on pain reports and physiology.
Koban, L., & Wager, T. D. (2016) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/emo0000087 · Cited by 92
Smith, R., Lane, R. D., Parr, T., & Friston, K. J. (2019) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.09.002 · Cited by 89
Human visual exploration reduces uncertainty about the sensed world
Mirza, M. B., Adams, R. A., Mathys, C. D., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0190429 · Cited by 87 · cited 1×
“Curiosity and novelty-seeking behaviour are accounted for within this formulation of epistemic action (Friston et al. 2015; Kiverstein et al. 2017; Mirza et al. 2018; Pezzulo and Nolfi 2019).”
BackgroundLosing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation
Deane, G., Miller, M., & Wilkinson, S. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2020.539726 · Cited by 87 · cited 11×
“This phenomenology is contrasted with a perceived gain in allostatic control in meditation practitioners, as precision (on prior preferences, for instance) becomes increasingly under endogenous control (Deane et al. 2020).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationBayesing qualia: consciousness as inference, not raw datum
Clark, A., Friston, K. J., & Wilkinson, S. (2019) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · Cited by 86
Emotional memory in depersonalization disorder: a functional MRI study.
Medford, N., Brierley, B., Brammer, M., Bullmore, E. T., David, A. S., & Phillips, M. L. (2006) · Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2006.05.007 · Cited by 84 · cited 1×
“Depersonalization is understood as occurring due to a global loss of precision on action policies and as such the world loses ‘phenomenal depth’— as described by sufferers of depersonalization—in that it ceases to solicit engagement and is perceived as flat or two-dimensional (Medford et al. 2006; Ciaunica et al. 2021…”
BackgroundThe predictive global neuronal workspace: a formal active inference model of visual consciousness
Whyte, C. J., & Smith, R. (2021) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2020.101918 · Cited by 84
A Bayesian Perspective on Sensory and Cognitive Integration in Pain Perception and Placebo Analgesia
Anchisi, D., & Zanon, M. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117270 · Cited by 84
Active Inference, epistemic value, and vicarious trial and error
Pezzulo, G., Cartoni, E., Rigoli, F., Pio‐Lopez, L., & Friston, K. J. (2016) · Learning & Memory · doi:10.1101/lm.041780.116 · Cited by 82 · cited 3×
“Prior preferences are phenotype-specific states that the organism expects itself to be in—connecting control to states of the body and views of selfhood based in interoceptive inference (Seth and Friston 2016; Barrett 2017; Seth and Tsakiris 2018).”
BackgroundSalomon, R., Lim, M., Herbelin, B., Hesselmann, G., & Blanke, O. (2013) · Journal of Vision · doi:10.1167/13.7.2 · Cited by 79 · cited 1×
“Interoceptive (Salomon et al. 2016) and proprioceptive (Salomon et al. 2013) information have been shown to affect visual experience using a continuous flash suppression paradigm.”
BackgroundThe Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood
Williford, K., Bennequin, D., Friston, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02571 · Cited by 78
When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation
Ciaunica, A., Charlton, J., & Farmer, H. (2021) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-020-09677-z · Cited by 78 · cited 1×
“Depersonalization is understood as occurring due to a global loss of precision on action policies and as such the world loses ‘phenomenal depth’— as described by sufferers of depersonalization—in that it ceases to solicit engagement and is perceived as flat or two-dimensional (Medford et al. 2006; Ciaunica et al. 2021…”
Background(1994) · Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) · Cited by 77
Millière, R. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.48 · Cited by 77 · cited 8×
“Consider these phenomenological reports of the 5-MeO-DMT experience retrieved from the database of drug experiences erowid.org, cited in Millière (2020) as evidence of ‘totally selfless’ states:”
BackgroundInfluentialExpectancy and conditioning in placebo analgesia: Separate or connected processes?
Kirsch, I., Kong, J., Sadler, P., Spaeth, R., Cook, A., Kaptchuk, T. J., & Gollub, R. (2014) · Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000007 · Cited by 77 · cited 1×
“The felt intensity of pain can be adjusted according to the context and the survival needs of the animal, modulated by attention, expectation, conditioned pain modulation and placebo responses (Atlas and Wager 2012; Atlas et al. 2014; Kirsch et al. 2014; Kong and Benedetti 2014).”
BackgroundHechler, T., Endres, D., & Thorwart, A. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01638 · Cited by 76 · cited 1×
“Precision on unfulfilled prior preferences can be a persistent source of suffering to the system—one such example being chronic pain, where chronic pain is underpinned by high precision on a prior preference that is unable to be fulfilled through action (Hechler et al. 2016).”
BackgroundAuditory and Tactile Signals Combine to Influence Vision during Binocular Rivalry
Lunghi, C., Morrone, M. C., & Alais, D. (2014) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2732-13.2014 · Cited by 75 · cited 1×
“Perceptual inference involves integrating information from across modalities to infer the hidden causes of sensation— for instance, during binocular rivalry, auditory (Lunghi et al. 2014), olfactory (Zhou et al.”
BackgroundJaspers’ Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness
Billon, A., & Kriegel, U. (2015) · Disturbed Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0002 · Cited by 70
The affective brain and core consciousness: How does neural activity generate emotional feelings?
Panksepp, J. (2008) · Cited by 68
The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body
(2017) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/10462.001.0001 · Cited by 67
Content-free awareness: EEG-fcMRI correlates of consciousness as such in an expert meditator
Winter, U., LeVan, P., Borghardt, T. L., Akin, B., Wittmann, M., Leyens, Y., & Schmidt, S. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.03064 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“While there is empirical evidence that some advanced forms of meditation practice can also occasion ‘totally’ selfless states (Millière et al. 2018; Winter et al. 2020; Laukkonen and Slagter 2021), here I will focus on psychedelics as the most robust catalysts of selfless states.”
BackgroundKiverstein, J. D., Miller, M., & Rietveld, E. (2020) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niaa003 · Cited by 62
Evolutionary systems theory: a unifying meta-theory of psychological science
Badcock, P. B. (2012) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0026381 · Cited by 61 · cited 1×
“The active inference framework formalizes allostasis in terms of a single imperative—to minimize the divergence between expected and observed outcomes under a generative model that is fine-tuned over the course of phylogeny and ontogeny (Badcock 2012).”
BackgroundAction is enabled by systematic misrepresentations
Wiese, W. (2017) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-016-9867-x · Cited by 60 · cited 2×
“Action initiation involves ‘systematicmisrepresentation’ (Wiese 2017)—whereby proprioceptive evidence that, for instance, my arm is not moving, is attenuated to allow the system to bring about the desired movement (Adams et al. 2013; Brown et al. 2013).”
BackgroundEvaluating theories of bird song learning: implications for future directions
D., M. (2002) · Journal of Comparative Physiology A: Sensory, Neural, and Behavioral Physiology · doi:10.1007/s00359-002-0351-5 · Cited by 59 · cited 1×
“Complex reafferent processing is also shown in juvenile songbirds as they imitate the song of tutor (Brainard and Doupe 2000; Margoliash 2002).”
BackgroundEvolving across the explanatory gap.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2019) · Philosophy Theory and Practice in Biology · doi:10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0011.001 · Cited by 55 · cited 2×
“(Godfrey-Smith 2019, 13; Jékely et al. 2021).”
BackgroundPlacebo analgesia as a case of a cognitive style driven by prior expectation
Morton, D. L., El‐Deredy, W., Watson, A., & Jones, A. K. P. (2010) · Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2010.08.046 · Cited by 53 · cited 1×
“In particular, Bayesian models of pain perception provide evidence that affectively charged percepts are inferential in nature (Morton et al. 2010; Anchisi and Zanon 2015).”
BackgroundConsciousness as Generative Entanglement
Clark, A., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2019) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil20191161241 · Cited by 50 · cited 3×
“…with conscious processing (But see: Hohwy 2012; Dolega and Dewhurst 2015; Friston 2018; Solms and Friston 2018; Wiese 2018; Williford et al. 2018; Clark 2019; Clark et al. 2019; Kirchhoff et al. 2019; Whyte 2019; Friston et al. 2020; Hohwy and Seth 2020; Ramstead et al. 2020b; Safron 2020; Solms…”
BackgroundMethodHill, D., O’Connor, P. M., Altermann, E., Day, L., Hill, C., Stanton, C., & Ross, R. P. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-70328-z · Cited by 47
Flexible Working Memory Through Selective Gating and Attentional Tagging
Kruijne, W., Bohté, S. M., Roelfsema, P. R., & Olivers, C. N. L. (2020) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_01339 · Cited by 46
Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution
Deane, G. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.39 · Cited by 46
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Girn, 2020, LSD flattens the functional hierarchy of the human brain, BioRxiv
- Hohwy, 2017, The Subject’s Matter
Cited by
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Self-citationExpecting some action: predictive processing and the construction of conscious experience
Nave, K., Deane, G., Miller, M., & Clark, A. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-022-00644-y · Cited by 50
Self-citationMetzinger, T. K. (2024) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/15196.001.0001 · Cited by 101
Buchborn, T., Kettner, H., Kärtner, L., & Meinhardt, M. W. (2023) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2023.1232459 · Cited by 34
“Efforts to understand the neuronal substrates of ego dissolution (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016; Stoliker et al., 2022), along with philosophical and phenomenological analyses (Letheby and Gerrans, 2017; Milliere, 2017; Deane, 2021), have been ongoing.”
BackgroundParvizi-Wayne, D., Sandved-Smith, L., Pitliya, R. J., Limanowski, J., Tufft, M. R. A., & Friston, K. J. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719 · Cited by 44
“…there would be no phenomenal experience (Frankfurt, 1988, p. 162; Goldman, 1970, p. 96; Sartre, 1956; Zahavi, 1999, 2005; Legrand, 2007a; Kriegel, 2009; Kiverstein, 2020; although see Letheby, 2020, Millière, 2020, Winter et al., 2020, Deane, 2021, Laukkonen and Slagter, 2021, Metzinger, 2024).”
BackgroundResultInfluential
Metadata
- Authors
- Deane, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Deane, George
- ORCID
- Deane, George
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2021-01-01
- Volume
- 2021
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- niab024-niab024
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8408766
- OpenAlex
- W3196481983
- Cited by
- 38
- References
- 257
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 7
- FWCI
- 0.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Edinburgh Research Explorer (University of Edinburgh) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- ERC XSPECT project (DLV-692739)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- active inference, predictive processing, phenomenal consciousness, self-model, subjective valuation, sensory attenuation, other minds, altruism, self-consciousness, computational psychiatry
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-11, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-11 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.