Self-specific processing in the meditating brain: a MEG neurophenomenology study
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Self-specific processes (SSPs) specify the self as an embodied subject and agent, implementing a functional self/nonself distinction in perception, cognition, and action. Despite recent interest, it is still undetermined whether SSPs are all-or-nothing or graded phenomena; whether they can be identified in neuroimaging data; and whether they can be altered through attentional training. These issues are approached through a neurophenomenological exploration of the sense-of-boundaries (SB), the fundamental experience of being an 'I' (self) separated from the 'world' (nonself). The SB experience was explored in collaboration with a uniquely qualified meditation practitioner, who volitionally produced, while being scanned by magnetoencephalogram (MEG), three mental states characterized by a graded SB experience. The results were then partly validated in an independent group of 10 long-term meditators. Implicated neural mechanisms include right-lateralized beta oscillations in the temporo-parietal junction, a region known to mediate the experiential unity of self and body; and in the medial parietal cortex, a central node of the self's representational system. The graded nature as well as the trainable flexibility and neural plasticity of SSPs may hold clinical implications for populations with a disturbed SB.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Dor-Ziderman, Y., Ataria, Y., Fulder, S., Goldstein, A., & Berkovich-Ohana, A.
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2016-01-01
- Volume
- 2016
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niw019-niw019
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2531482843
- Cited by
- 96
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 5.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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