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Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
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uno de los puntos centrales de las demandas de las minorías y que puede entrar en conflicto con la promoción de los valores propios de la ciudadanía democrática.Además, en un comentario a la obra de David Held 2 , aborda la relación entre ciudadanía y globalización.En concreto, se cuestiona si la ciudadanía seguirá vinculada a las instituciones nacionales y a los procesos políticos.Finalmente, expone su visión crítica del libro de Michael Sandel Democracy's discontent 3 y argumenta que el igualitarismo liberal es más adecuado que el republicanismo cívico para fortalecer la ciudadanía en las sociedades actuales.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Giné, V. L., & Tsebelis, G.
- Venue
- Reis
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2003
- Issue
- 103
- Pages
- 266
- ISSN
- 0210-5233 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1993132818
- Cited by
- 3,359
- References
- 155
- FWCI
- 815.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.