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Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Open accessAbstract
People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person maximizes the other's material payoffs, and mutual-min when each person minimizes the other's payoffs. It is shown that every mutual-max or mutual-min Nash equilibrium is a fairness equilibrium. If payoffs are small, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of mutual-max and mutual-min outcomes; if payoffs are large, fairness equilibria are roughly the set of Nash equilibria. Several economic examples are considered and possible welfare implications of fairness are explored. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
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(1993)
Metadata
- Authors
- RABIN, M.
- Venue
- Advances in Behavioral Economics
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 2011-12-12
- Pages
- 297-325
- OpenAlex
- W1599656298
- Cited by
- 4,705
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 903.93
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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