Cited by 301Multisensory perception and integrationVirtual Reality Applications and ImpactsTactile and Sensory Interactions

From part- to whole-body ownership in the multisensory brain

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Petkova, Valeria I., Björnsdotter, Malin, Gentile, Giovanni, Jonsson, Tomas, Li, Tie-Qiang, Ehrsson, H. Henrik·2011·Current Biology

Abstract

The question of how we experience ownership of an entire body distinct from the external world is a fundamental problem in psychology and neuroscience [1-6]. Earlier studies suggest that integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information in multisensory areas [7-11] mediates self-attribution of single limbs. However, it is still unknown how ownership of individual body parts translates into the unitary experience of owning a whole body. Here, we used a "body-swap" illusion [12], in which people experienced an artificial body to be their own, in combination with functional magnetic resonance imaging to reveal a coupling between the experience of full-body ownership and neural responses in bilateral ventral premotor and left intraparietal cortices, and left putamen. Importantly, activity in the ventral premotor cortex reflected the construction of ownership of a whole body from the parts, because it was stronger when the stimulated body part was attached to a body, was present irrespective of whether the illusion was triggered by stimulation of the hand or the abdomen, and displayed multivoxel patterns carrying information about full-body ownership. These findings suggest that the unitary experience of owning an entire body is produced by neuronal populations that integrate multisensory information across body segments.

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.cub.2011.05.022

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  • Body ownership and self-location are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located respectively in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction.

    “Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction.”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Petkova et al., 2011

  • The two neuroimaging studies by Ionta et al. (2011) and Petkova et al. (2011) provide evidence that body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.

    “Taken together, these two neuroimaging studies seem to provide a case for validating the assumption that there are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness, i.e., self-location and body ownership, that are distinct from one another.”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Petkova et al., 2011

  • In Petkova et al. (2011), participants experienced ownership for a virtual body but did not modify their perceived self-location.

    “Petkova's manipulation resulted in a sense of ownership for the virtual body, but did not modify the perceived location of the self in space.”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Petkova et al., 2011

  • While it is possible to alter the experience of owning a body without any shift in experienced self-location, it has not been shown experimentally that one can experience a change in self-location without a change in body ownership.

    “Therefore, while it is possible to alter the experience of owning a body without any shift in experienced self-location (Petkova et al., 2011), it has not been shown experimentally that one can experience a change in self-location without a change in body ownership.”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Petkova et al., 2011

  • Visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc is critical for the experience of owning a body.

    “Taken together, they provide evidence that visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc appears critical for the experience of owning a body, whereas the integration of visual, tactile and vestibular signals at the TPJ reflects selflocation and visuo-spatial perspective.”

    From Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness (2013) · cites this paper as Petkova et al., 2011

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Authors
Petkova, V. I., Björnsdotter, M., Gentile, G., Jonsson, T., Li, T.-Q., & Ehrsson, H. H.
Affiliations
  • Karolinska Institutet (SE)
  • Karolinska University Hospital (SE)
Corresponding author
Petkova, Valeria I.
Venue
Current Biology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-07
Volume
21
Issue
13
Pages
1118-1122
ISSN
0960-9822 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2079763587
Cited by
301
References
64
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 20 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 30 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 15
FWCI
25.53
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Current Biology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • European Research Council
  • Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning
  • James S. McDonnell Foundation
  • Human Frontier Science Program
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Multisensory perception and integration
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Tactile and Sensory Interactions
Keywords
body ownership, multisensory integration, ventral premotor cortex, intraparietal cortex, putamen, self-attribution
MeSH terms
Body Image, Brain, Brain Mapping, Humans, Illusions, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Motor Cortex, Neurons, Ownership, Proprioception, Touch, Visual Perception, Touch Perception

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