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Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Mollerstrom, J., & Munkhammar, S.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-09
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 117-130
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2113525887
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 86
- FWCI
- 40.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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