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Cited by 167Philosophy and Theoretical SciencePhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyMental Health and Psychiatry

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference

Metzinger, Thomas·2003·Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
DOI 10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb
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Crossref · 10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb

Cites

64 of 64 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The capacity for opacity developed quite late phylo- and ontogenetically.

    “and that this remarkable capacity has developed quite late (phylo- and ontogenetically, Metzinger, 2003, 2008).”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003

  • Phenomenal transparency-opacity is cognitively impenetrable.

    “which implies that phenomenal transparency-opacity is ‘cognitively impenetrable’”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003

  • Inference about precision may itself be compromised and produce abnormal experiences in derealization or depersonalization or altered states of consciousness.

    “In more dramatic cases, inference about precision may itself be compromised and produce abnormal experiences; e.g., in derealization or depersonalization (cf. Metzinger, 2003; Seth et al., 2012) or altered states of consciousness (Millière, 2017).”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003

  • A phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation.

    “a phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation [6,7,9,21,22]”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]

  • Because the conscious body model is phenomenally transparent, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves.

    “Because this conscious body model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24].”

    From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

13 of the 77 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 15

  1. Ahleid, A. 1968. Considerazioni sull'esperienza nichilistica e sulla syndrome die Cotard nelle psicosi organiche e sintomatiche. Il Lavoro neuropsichiatrico 43: 927–945.
  2. Anderson, E. W. 1964. Psychiatry. London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox Ltd.
  3. Anton, G. 1898. Ueber die Herderkrankungen des Gehirns, welche vom Patienten selbst nicht wahrgenommen werden. Wiener klinische Wochenschrift 11 (March 10): 227–229.
  4. Castañeda, H.N. 1966. “He”: A study on the logic of self-consciousness. Ratio 8: 130–157.
  5. Cotard, J. 1880. Du délire hypocondriaque dans une form grave de la mélancolie anxieuse. Annales Médico-Psychologiques 38: 168–170.
  6. Cotard, J. 1882. Du délire des négations. Archives de Neurologie 4: 152–170/282–295.
  7. Güzeldere, G. 1995. Is consciousness the perception of what passes on one's own mind? In: T. Metzinger (ed), Conscious Experience. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic & Paderborn: mentis.
  8. Newen, A. 1997. The logic of indexical thoughts and the metaphysics of the “self”. In: W. Künne, A. Newen, and M. Anduschus (eds), Direct Reference, Indexicality and Propositional Attitudes. Stanford: CSLI.
  9. Posner, M. I. 1995. Attention in cognitive neuroscience: An overview. In: M. Gazzaniga (ed), The Cognitive Neurosciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  10. Raffman, D. 1995. On the persistence of phenomenology. In: T. Metzinger (ed), Conscious Experience. Thorverton, UK: Imprint Academic & Paderborn: mentis.
  11. Séglas, J. 1897. Le Délire des Négations: Séméiologie et Diagnostic. Paris: Masson, Gauthier-Villars.
  12. Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. London: Macmillan.
  13. Wittgenstein, L. 1953; 1982. Philosophische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
  14. Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. The English Text of the Third Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
  15. Young, A. W. and Leafhead, K. M. 1996. Betwixt of life and death: Case studies of the Cotard delusion. In: P. W. Halligan and J. C. Marshall (eds), Method in Madness: Case Studies in Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.

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Metadata

Authors
Metzinger, T.
Affiliations
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
Corresponding author
Metzinger, Thomas
ORCID
Metzinger, Thomas
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Published
2003-12
Volume
2
Issue
4
Pages
353-393
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
DOI
10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb
OpenAlex
W2142672241
Semantic Scholar
64df353577b671dc812baa22548d381888587871
Cited by
162
References
77
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
FWCI
3.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
phenomenal transparency, self-reflection, representationalism, first-person perspective, self-model, naturalism

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