The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Perseverance of social theories: The role of explanation in the persistence of discredited information.
Abstract
The perseverance of social theories was examined in two experiments within a debriefing paradigm. Subjects were initially given two case studies suggestive of either a positive or a negative relationship between risk taking and success as a firefighter. Some subjects were asked to provide a written explanation of the relationship; others were not. In addition, experimental subjects were thoroughly debriefed concerning the fictitious nature of the initial case studies. Subsequent assessments of subjects ' personal beliefs about the relationship indicated that even when initially based on weak data, social theories can survive the total discrediting of that initial evidential base. Both correlational and experimental results suggested that such unwarranted theory perseverance may be mediated, in part, by the cognitive process of formulating causal scenarios or explanations. Normative issues and the cognitive processes underlying perseverance were examined in detail, and possible techniques for overcoming unwarranted theory perseverance were discussed. All of us have tried to change a friend's view about some social, political or scientific issue-from the efficacy of capital punishment as a deterrent to crime to the validity of the IQ test-only to experience frustrating failure. We offer seemingly compelling evidence or thoroughly rebut opposing arguments but produce little if any change in our friend's beliefs. Indeed, we suspect that we ourselves frequently may be guilty of similar intransigence when our views come under attack. From such everyday observations, two obvious questions arise that form the focus of the present article: Are we, in fact, prone to persist in our beliefs and theories about the world to a degree that is normatively indefensible, and if so, why?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., & Ross, L.
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 1980-12
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1037-1049
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2106268407
- Cited by
- 719
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 37.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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