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Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory
Open accessAbstract
What explains variability in norms of cooperation across organizations and cultures? One answer comes from the tendency of individuals to internalize typically successful behaviors as norms. Different institutional structures can cause different behavioral norms to be internalized. These norms are then carried over into atypical situations beyond the reach of the institution. Here, we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic prosociality in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial, more likely to punish selfishness, and more trusting in general. Furthermore, these effects are most pronounced among subjects who use heuristics, suggesting that intuitive processes play a key role in the spillovers we observe. Our findings help to explain variation in one-shot anonymous cooperation, linking this intrinsically motivated prosociality to the externally imposed institutional rules experienced in other settings. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
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Jordan, J. J., Hoffman, M., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature16981 · Cited by 508
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Peysakhovich, A., & Rand, D. G.
- Venue
- Management Science
- Published
- 2016-03
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 631-647
- ISSN
- 0025-1909 (ISSN-L)
- 1526-5501
- OpenAlex
- W3125169308
- Cited by
- 303
- References
- 118
- FWCI
- 67.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.