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The Political Economy of Dictatorship
Abstract
Acknowledgements Part I. Introduction: 1. The problem 2. The dictator's dilemma Part II. Equilibrium Political Repression: 3. The tinpot and the totalitarian 4. Tyranny and timocracy 5. A more general model Part III. Economics of Autocracy: 6. The economy of dictatorship 7. Redistribution and rent-seeking 8. Apartheid 9. The bureaucratic economy I: the model 10. The bureaucratic economy II: rise and fall Part IV. The Dynamics of Dictatorship: 11. Democracy in the inaction zone 12. Ethnic conflict and nationalism: from expressionism and futurism to kitsch 13. The simple economics of criminal bureaucratic responsibility Part V. Conclusion: 14. The machinery of dictatorship References Indexes.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Munger, M. C., & Wintrobe, R.
- Venue
- The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1998-10
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 992
- ISSN
- 0008-4085 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W110429153
- Cited by
- 780
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 48.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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