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Actions, Reasons, and Causes
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Citations
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“First, philosophers have pointed out that reasons are themselves " causes " if we define causes broadly as factors that generate an event such as a behavior (Davidson, 1963; cf. Locke & Pennington, 1982).”
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“If , just as Donald Davidson (1980), you think of the relata of causation as events and think of events in turn as basic particulars, then the argument concludes only that mental and physical descriptions pick out the same events , not that there is any constitutive relationship between mental and…”
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“Here is where reference to evaluative standards, in the sense of Davidson (1980) and Taylor (1989), comes to the fore.”
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“One way to make this distinction more tangible is to resort to a coarse-grained view of actions according to which one action can be picked out under a range of different descriptions (Anscombe, 1962; Davidson, 1963).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Davidson, D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 1963-11-07
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 23
- Pages
- 685
- ISSN
- 0022-362X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1504553351
- Cited by
- 2,938
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 9.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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