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Ceos On the Edge: Earnings Manipulation and Stock-Based Incentive Misalignment
Abstract
Synthesizing agency theory and prospect theory, we examined the effects of stock-based incentives on CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. In analyses of data compiled from the public companies listed in Compustat's Executive Compensation Database and a U.S. General Accounting Office restatements database, we found that CEOs were more likely to manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money options and lower stock ownership. Firm performance and CEO tenure interacted with out-of-the-money options and ownership to influence CEO earnings manipulation behaviors. Our findings inform agency-based views by providing evidence that, under certain conditions, stock-based managerial incentives lead to incentive misalignment.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, X., Bartol, K. M., Smith, K. G., Pfarrer, M. D., & Khanin, D. M.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2008-04
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 241-258
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2153683002
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 70
- FWCI
- 46.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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