The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies
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Metadata
- Authors
- Gehlbach, S., & Keefer, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Comparative Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 39
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 123-139
- ISSN
- 0147-5967 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124833360
- Cited by
- 429
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 88.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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