Cited by 1,200Visual perception and processing mechanismsPhilosophy and Theoretical ScienceFace Recognition and Perception

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 309 of the 309 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 225 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects

Open access
Firestone, Chaz, Scholl, Brian J.·2016·Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level cognition, a tidal wave of recent research alleges that states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, motivations, intentions, and linguistic representations exert direct, top-down influences on what we see. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and that the distinction between perception and cognition may itself be unsustainable. We argue otherwise: None of these hundreds of studies – either individually or collectively – provides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception, or “cognitive penetrability.” In particular, and despite their variety, we suggest that these studies all fall prey to only a handful of pitfalls. And whereas abstract theoretical challenges have failed to resolve this debate in the past, our presentation of these pitfalls is empirically anchored: In each case, we show not only how certain studies could be susceptible to the pitfall (in principle), but also how several alleged top-down effects actually are explained by the pitfall (in practice). Moreover, these pitfalls are perfectly general, with each applying to dozens of other top-down effects. We conclude by extracting the lessons provided by these pitfalls into a checklist that future work could use to convincingly demonstrate top-down effects on visual perception. The discovery of substantive top-down effects of cognition on perception would revolutionize our understanding of how the mind is organized; but without addressing these pitfalls, no such empirical report will license such exciting conclusions.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from a shortened version of the paper’s full text (it is longer than we read).

TL;DR

Firestone and Scholl argue that none of the hundreds of reported "top-down" effects of cognition on visual perception provides compelling evidence for genuine cognitive penetrability, because the studies collectively fall prey to a small set of methodological pitfalls. They present six such pitfalls, each anchored in empirical case studies, and offer a checklist for future work.

Key findings

  • The authors count "more than 175 papers published since 1995" reporting top-down effects on perception, with a median publication year of 2010 for the empirical papers cited in their review of contemporary effects.
  • They identify six pitfalls: (1) an overly confirmatory research strategy (the "El Greco fallacy"), (2) conflating perception with judgment, (3) demand and response bias, (4) low-level stimulus differences, (5) peripheral attentional effects, and (6) memory and recognition.
  • In their own replications, effects survived when they should have canceled out if truly perceptual: subjects still picked a darker grayscale patch to match a room after reflecting on an unethical action (Firestone & Scholl 2014b, Experiment 5), and still reported narrower apertures when responding with an aperture (Experiment 2).
  • The "moral pop-out effect" replicated with trivial categories: fashion-related words (e.g., "robe," "slippers") and transportation-related words (e.g., "car," "passenger") were more accurately identified than unrelated words, suggesting semantic relatedness/memory rather than morality drives the effect.
  • Blurring race-diagnostic information from face stimuli (Firestone & Scholl 2015a) left the lightness difference intact even among observers who judged the faces to be the same race, implicating low-level visual features.

Methods

  • Design: a theoretical review and critique, combining conceptual argument with "empirically anchored" case studies that re-test prominent alleged top-down effects.
  • Data/sample: the published literature on top-down effects (New Look era through recent work), plus the authors' own replication experiments (e.g., Firestone & Scholl 2014b, 2015a, 2015b).
  • Analysis: for each pitfall, the authors show in principle how studies could be susceptible and in practice how specific reported effects are explained by the pitfall, then extract lessons for future research into a six-item checklist.

Limitations

  • The authors state that Pitfall 5 (peripheral attentional effects) "is not on the sort of firm empirical footing enjoyed by the other pitfalls," having fewer case studies.
  • They acknowledge their claim is "ambitious" given hundreds of reported effects, and note that their presentation covers only effects they "had space to discuss, out of a much larger pool."
  • They concede that not all attentional effects need be peripheral, and that attention may interact with perception in "rich and nuanced ways" — a caveat the accompanying commentaries (e.g., Clark, de Haas et al., Lupyan) argue undermines the breadth of the thesis.
  • Evident from the text: the paper is a critique rather than new primary data across the full literature, and several of its deflationary explanations rest on the authors' own replication studies rather than independent replication.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/s0140525x15000965

Cites

309 of 309 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

171 Not checked yet · 130 Own interpretation · 48 No basis given · 11 Own result · 1 Own method

Verify all 225 references — free account

Show all 207 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 95
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 81
154 of 154
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The set of studies reporting top-down effects that the authors review is representative of all such studies.

    “we count more than 175 papers published since 1995 reporting such effects”
    “None of these hundreds of studieseither individually or collectivelyprovides compelling evidence for true top-down effects on perception”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The six pitfalls reviewed are the primary alternative explanations for reported top-down effects, and the literature review is comprehensive enough to support the claim that no alleged top-down effect has met these challenges.

    “It is our view that no alleged top-down effect of cognition on perception has so far successfully met the challenges collectively embodied by the pitfalls we have reviewed.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The studies cited as evidence for the pitfalls are methodologically sound and their findings are reliable.

    “for each alternative explanation we have offered here, we reviewed multiple case studies suggesting not only that it could matter (in principle), but also that it actually does matter (in practice)”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The hippocampus is one of the few regions of the brain that has not been found to subserve multiple functions, despite intense study for decades.

    “The hippocampus is one of the few regions of the brain that has not been found to subserve multiple”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Category priming is more likely when terms are explicitly identifiable as being in the same category or at least as having multiple overlapping semantic features.

    “Category priming is more likely when the terms are explicitly identifiable as being in the same category or at least as having multiple overlapping semantic features (e.g., pilot, airport).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Any observed behavior can be explained by multiple processes intervening between perceptual input and motor response.

    “Any observed behavior can be explained by multiple processes intervening between perceptual input and motor response.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A single process rarely explains any behavior, and possible explanations are not always mutually exclusive.

    “A single process rarely explains any behavior, and possible explanations are not always mutually exclusive.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The visual system consists of a proprietary set of mechanisms specialized for the analysis of signals originating from the retina.

    “One can characterize the visual system as the set of brain mechanisms specialized for the analysis of signals originating from the retina.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Late vision is the stage in which the percept is constructed.

    “late vision, the latter being the stage in which the percept is constructed.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the attended stimuli.

    “Attention is thought to enhance the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the attended stimuli.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The N2 is elicited about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset in monkeys and humans, in the area V4 and in the inferotemporal cortex.

    “The N2 is elicited about 200-300 ms after stimulus onset in monkeys and humans, in the area V4 and in the inferotemporal cortex.”
11 of 11

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Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

1 retracted

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Gibson, 1979, The ecological approach to perception and action
  2. Machery, 2015, The cognitive penetrability of perception: New philosophical perspectives
  3. Adelson, 2000, Lightness perception and lightness illusions, The new cognitive neurosciences, second edition, 339
  4. Blake, 2005, Perception, fifth edition
  5. Howard, 2002, Seeing in depth, vol. 2: Depth perception

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J.
Affiliations
Yale University (US)
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
2015-07-20
Volume
39
Pages
e229-e229
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2129245434
Cited by
1,200
References
309
Citations by year
2026: 68 · 2025: 65 · 2024: 92 · 2023: 147 · 2022: 107 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 167 · 2019: 200 · 2018: 92 · 2017: 91 · 2016: 69 · 2015: 7
FWCI
51.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Taipei Medical University
  • Taipei Medical University-Shuang Ho Hospital, Ministry of Health and Welfare
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
Keywords
top-down effects, visual perception, methodological pitfalls, linguistic representation
MeSH terms
Cognition, Emotions, Humans, Visual Perception, Intention

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