Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 1,108

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The relationship between memory and judgment depends on whether the judgment task is memory-based or on-line.

Hastie, Reid, Park, Bernadette·1986·Psychological Review

Abstract

Five alternative information processing models that relate memory for evidence to judgments based on the evidence are identified in the current social cognition literature: independent processing, biased retrieval, biased encoding, and incongruity-biased encoding. A distinction between two types of judgment tasks, memory-based versus on-line, is introduced and is related to the five process models. In memory-based tasks where the availability model describes subjects' thinking, direct correlations between memory and judgment measures are obtained. In on-line tasks where any of the remaining four process models may apply, prediction of the memory-judgment relationship is equivocal but usually follows the independence model prediction of zero correlation. There ought to be a relationship between memory and judgment. Our intuition tells us that we should be able to generate more arguments and information in support of a favored position than against it, that evaluations of people should be related to the amounts of good and bad information we have about them. When a person is able to remember many arguments against a belief, or to cite many good characteristics of an acquaintance, we are surprised if they endorse the belief or dislike the person. In support of intuitions like these, names have been given to the idea that memory and judgment have a simple direct relationship, including availability, dominance of the given, salience effect, and so forth. However, empirical studies of the relationship between memory and judgment with subject matter as diverse as social impressions, personal attitudes, attributions of causes for behavior, evaluations of legal culpability, and a variety of probability and frequency estimates have not revealed simple relations between memory and judgment. Some relationships have been found, but strong empirical relations are rare and results are often contradictory. Some examples seem to support the expectation of a direct relationship between memory and judgment. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) demonstrated that many judgments of numerosity were directly correlated with the with which instances or associations could be brought to mind (p. 208). In an illustrative series of experiments, they showed that judgments of the frequency of words in English text were correlated with the ease of remembering the words. Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff(1977) provided more definite evidence on the strength of the mem

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/0033-295x.93.3.258

Cites

8 of 8 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 8 references

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Hastie, R., & Park, B.
Venue
Psychological Review
Published
1986-07
Volume
93
Issue
3
Pages
258-268
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
OpenAlex
W2084325639
Cited by
1,108
References
8
FWCI
12.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.