Cited by 231Feminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesDisability Rights and RepresentationEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 95 of the 96 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 10 of the 91 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, and the good human life

Open access
Chapman, Robert, Carel, Havi·2022·Journal of Social Philosophy

Abstract

Epistemic injustice refers to harms that relate specifically to our status as epistemic agents, whereby our status as knowers, interpreters, and providers of information, is unduly diminished or stifled in a way that undermines the agent's agency and dignity.The concept was defined by Miranda Fricker (2007), who identifies two key forms of epistemic injustice.The first is testimonial injustice, which refers to cases where testimony is unduly dismissed because of prejudiced beliefs regarding minority groups.Hermeneutical injustice refers to cases where a community's shared vocabularies have been structured in a way that unfairly distorts or stifles understanding for, and of, a minority group.In each case, there is an instance of people being harmed specifically in their capacity as knowers: individuals capable of knowing or providing knowledge.Much work on epistemic injustice has identified the operation of negative stereotypes relating to gender and race; for instance, when someone's testimony is dismissed, doubted, or accorded low credibility due to racist or sexist prejudices on the part of the listener (Dotson, 2011;Fricker, 2007; Kidd et al., 2017;Medina, 2013).But in recent years research has drawn attention to epistemic injustice in healthcare generally, and more specifically within psychiatry, pediatrics, and among people with disabilities (Blease et al., 2016;Carel & Kidd, 2014;Crichton et al., 2016; Kidd & Carel, 2016, 2019;Potter, 2015).What has been revealed is the systematic stifling of the voices and interpretive tools available to both ill and disabled persons: in particular, their information providing, testimonies, and interpretations.These types of epistemic injustice have been associated with the medical deficit model that dominates much of medical and psychiatric discourse (Kidd & Carel, 2018, 2019).Moreover, physically disabled persons' claims that they are happy and living good lives have also been dismissed due to prejudices about the possibility of living well whilst disabled (Blease et al., 2016;

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper argues that autistic people face interlocking testimonial and hermeneutical epistemic injustices that make it difficult or impossible to recognize them as both autistic and living a good life. It proposes neurodiversity-informed reforms to conceptions of flourishing and to clinical and everyday epistemic practice.

Key findings

  • Autistic testimony about happiness and wellbeing is subject to pathocentric testimonial injustice: credibility is dismissed through stereotypes such as “mindblindness,” limited social understanding, and the assumption that autism and happiness are inherently at odds. The paper cites Dinah Murray’s claim that autism disclosure is “likely to precipitate a negative judgment of capacity involving permanent loss of credibility” and discusses accusations that Naoki Higashida’s articulate voice could not be “genuine.”
  • Hermeneutical injustice operates through species-norm conceptions of flourishing: neo-Aristotelian and objective-list views, including Nussbaum, Furman and Tuminello, and Barnbaum, treat autistic cognition as not “truly human” or as at odds with flourishing unless therapy erases defining autistic traits. This excludes neurodivergent modes of flourishing from shared interpretive resources.
  • These injustices combine into “autism’s catch-22”: if an autistic person is living a good life, they are denied recognition of their autism; if they are not living a good life, their autism is recognized and their suffering is presumed to be caused by autism. The paper states that “I am autistic and I am flourishing” is not intelligible under this framing.
  • The paper proposes four ameliorative approaches: dismantling the medical deficit approach to autism; relativizing value judgments about the good life; cultivating autistic self-understanding and autistic epistemic communities; and fostering neurotypical epistemic humility and cross-cultural communication.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis in philosophy of disability and philosophy of medicine; no empirical study, sample, or original quantitative data are reported.
  • The argument draws on Miranda Fricker’s testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, the neurodiversity paradigm, social and relational models of disability, and critiques of species-norm accounts of flourishing.
  • Evidence used includes cited empirical literature and first-person autistic accounts; the paper’s main analysis is normative and theoretical, culminating in proposed ameliorative strategies.

Limitations

  • Stated: the paper brackets debates about how far the neurodiversity paradigm applies across the autism spectrum, supposing it applies “to some extent at least”; it does not commit to a single alternative model of disability; and it says its arguments do not automatically apply to other groups.
  • Evident: there is no new empirical data, systematic review, or tested intervention; the argument relies on selected cited studies and testimony.
  • Evident: the focus is autism, with extension to other neurocognitive disabilities presented as a question for future research rather than a demonstrated conclusion.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/josp.12456

Cites

95 of 96 references verified1 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

10 of 91 cited sources checked · 5 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

Show all 69 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 30
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 44
63 of 63
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The neurodiversity framing can be applied to the autism spectrum to some extent at least.

    “For the purposes of this article, we will suppose that the neurodiversity framing can be applied to the autism spectrum to some extent at least, as even critics of the broader application of the neurodiversity framing admit (e.g., Jaarsma & Welin, 2012;Wakefield et al., 2020).”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are many different, yet equally legitimate, ways of functioning within humanity.

    “and that there are many different, yet equally legitimate, ways of functioning”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Autistic individuals can live good lives and flourish.

    “if a person who identifies as autistic and who fulfills the diagnostic criteria is living a good life”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Autistic individuals' declarations about their own quality of life should not be overridden by the presumption that autism causes their low quality of life.

    “even if they declare otherwise”
4 of 4

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 82 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Gilbert D., 2006, Stumbling on Happiness
  2. Gross Z., 2012, Loud Hands: Autistic People, Speaking
  3. Heller J., 2011, Catch 22
  4. Higashida N., 2017, Fall Down Seven Times: Get Up Eight. A Young Man’s Voice From the Silence of Autism
  5. McCafferty K. R., 2018, My Son With Autism's Joyous Moments Help Us Get Through the Tougher Ones
  6. Mitchell D., 2017, Almost Everything I'd Been Told About My Son's Autism Was Wrong, Newstatesman (July 5)
  7. Montgomery C., 2012, Critic of the Dawn. Loud Hands: Autistic People, Speaking
  8. Singer J., 1999, Disability Discourse
  9. Solomon M., 2017, Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry IV: Classification of Psychiatric Illness
  10. Sontag S., 1978, Illness as Metaphor
  11. Walker N., 2012, Throw Away the Master's Tools: Liberating Ourselves from the Pathology Paradigm
  12. Walker N., 2015, The Real Experts: Readings for Parents of Autistic Children, 1

Cited by

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Items 201–229 of 229

Metadata

Authors
Chapman, R., & Carel, H.
Affiliations
  • Sheffield Hallam University (GB)
  • University of Bristol (GB)
Corresponding author
Chapman, Robert
Venue
Journal of Social Philosophy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2022-03
Volume
53
Issue
4
Pages
614-631
ISSN
  • 0047-2786 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-9833
OpenAlex
W4214900417
Cited by
231
References
82
Citations by year
2026: 65 · 2025: 80 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 8
FWCI
58.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Social Philosophy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Explore Bristol Research (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • SHURA (Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive) (Sheffield Hallam University) (acceptedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Disability Rights and Representation
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, disability, good human life, epistemic agency

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