Cited by 372Electronic Health Records SystemsInformation Systems Theories and ImplementationTechnology and Human Factors in Education and Health

Health information technology: fallacies and sober realities

Open access
Karsh, Ben-Tzion, Weinger, Matthew B, Abbott, Patricia A, Wears, Robert L·2010·Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association

Abstract

Current research suggests that the rate of adoption of health information technology (HIT) is low, and that HIT may not have the touted beneficial effects on quality of care or costs. The twin issues of the failure of HIT adoption and of HIT efficacy stem primarily from a series of fallacies about HIT. We discuss 12 HIT fallacies and their implications for design and implementation. These fallacies must be understood and addressed for HIT to yield better results. Foundational cognitive and human factors engineering research and development are essential to better inform HIT development, deployment, and use.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1136/jamia.2010.005637

Cites

112 of 112 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 54 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Premisecitation
    § THE 'RISK FREE HIT' FALLACY · p. 1

    Current HIT may have programming errors and bugs.

    “Have programming errors and bugs;”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 16 18 28 35 e 39

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Premisecitation
    § THE 'RISK FREE HIT' FALLACY · p. 1

    Current HIT may depend on unreliable hardware or software platforms.

    “Be dependent on unreliable hardware or software platforms;”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 16 18 28 35 e 39

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Premisecitation
    § INTRODUCTION · p. 1

    HIT can improve patient safety and healthcare quality in certain circumstances.

    “Current research demonstrates that health information technology (HIT) can improve patient safety and healthcare quality, in certain circumstances. 1 e 6”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 1 e 6

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Premisecitation
    § THE 'BAD APPLE' FALLACY · p. 2

    The systems view of error is supported by strong theory and evidence from safety science, industrial and systems engineering, and social psychology.

    “which is supported by strong theory and evidence from safety science, industrial and systems engineering, and social psychology. 62 64 65”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 62 64 65

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Interpretationreasoning
    § INTRODUCTION · p. 1

    The twin problems of HIT adoption failure and HIT efficacy failure are primarily explained by a set of mistaken beliefs about HIT.

    “we argue that the twin issues of the failure of HIT adoption and of HIT efficacy can be understood by examining a series of misguided beliefs about HIT.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The fallacies described in the paper are widely held by HIT designers and policymakers.
  • May combine two claims. 28
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 21
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § THE 'USE EQUALS SUCCESS' FALLACY · p. 2

    Equating HIT usage with design success can be misleading and may lead to inappropriate policies to improve use.

    “Equating HIT usage with design success can be misleading and may promulgate inappropriate policies to improve ' use ' . 67”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [67] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § INTRODUCTION · p. 1

    Nationwide deployment of health care IT as currently pursued will not achieve the vision of 21st-century health care and may set it back unless changed.

    “current efforts aimed at the nationwide deployment of health care ITwill not be sufficient to achieve the vision of 21st-century health care, and may even set back the cause if these efforts continue wholly without change from their present course.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [14] Stead WW Lin HS , eds. Computational Technology for Effective Health Care: Immediate Steps and Strategic Directions. Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2009.

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'RISK FREE HIT' FALLACY · p. 1

    HIT systems are known to directly affect patient care in both positive and negative ways.

    “Currently, there are no regulatory requirements to evaluate HIT system safety even though these systems are known to directly affect patient care in both positive and negative ways. 2 17 18 27 e 34”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 2 17 18 27 e 34

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § THE 'LEARNED INTERMEDIARY' FALLACY · p. 2

    Changing the order of medication options on a drop down pick list will influence clinicians' ordering behavior.

    “changing the order of medication options on a drop down pick list will influence clinicians ' ordering behavior.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation
    § THE 'HIT IS NOT A DEVICE' FALLACY · p. 2

    A passive monitoring approach, as currently suggested by the Office of the National Coordinator, seems likely to be expensive and ultimately ineffective.

    “A passive monitoring approach, as currently suggested by the Office of the National Coordinator, 49 seems likely to be both expensive and ultimately ineffective.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [49] Egerman P Probst M . Memorandum to David Blumenthal: Adoption-Certification Workgroup HIT Safety Recommendations. http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_11673_911847_0_0_18/AdoptionCertificationLetterHITSafetyFINAL508.pdf (accessed 17 Aug 2010).

      Not checked in the free run.

    • Rests on an assumption: The current passive monitoring approach suggested by the Office of the National Coordinator is likely to be expensive and ineffective.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'RISK FREE HIT' FALLACY · p. 1

    Current HIT may change how clinicians do their daily work, introducing new potential failure modes.

    “Change how clinicians do their daily work, thus introducing new potential failure modes. 16 18 28 35 e 39”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 16 18 28 35 e 39

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation
    § INTRODUCTION · p. 1

    HIT may not reduce costs.

    “or reduce costs. 13”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [13] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'BAD APPLE' FALLACY · p. 2

    Human factors engineers, social psychologists, and patient safety researchers have debunked the bad apple theory of human error and replaced it with the systems view of error.

    “human factors engineers, social psychologists, and patient safety researchers long ago debunked the bad apple theory of human error, replacing it with the more accurate and useful systems view of error, 21 62 63”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 21 62 63

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'HIT IS NOT A DEVICE' FALLACY · p. 2

    HIT systems are complex and pose a significant risk of potentiating serious error.

    “The complexity of HIT systems and the risk of potentiating serious error is sufficiently significant to demand effective regulatory oversight. 46”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [46] Hoffman S Podgurski A . Finding a cure: the case for regulation and oversight of electronic health record systems. Harv J Law Technol 2008;22:104–65.

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'FATHER KNOWS BEST' FALLACY · p. 3

    The mismatch between who benefits and who pays leads to incomplete or inaccurate data entry, inefficiency, workarounds, and poor adoption.

    “This mismatch between who benefits and who pays leads to incomplete or inaccurate data entry ( ' garbage in d garbage out ' ), inefficiency, workarounds, and poor adoption. 74”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [74] Abbott P Coenan A . Globalization and advances in information and communication technologies: The impact on nursing and health. Nurs Outlook 2008;58:238–46. source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    Many catastrophes in complex sociotechnical systems occur in novel and complex situations, particularly when the technology does not communicate effectively with its human users.

    “Many catastrophes in complex sociotechnical systems (eg, Three Mile Island) occur in such situations, particularly when the technology does not communicate effectively with its human users.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    Computers are very good at repeatedly doing whatever they were told to do, with a degree of consistency much higher than human workers.

    “computers are very good at repeatedly doing whatever they were told to do, just like a well-trained animal (ie, ' sitstay ' ). Computers implement human-derived rules and with a degree of consistency much higher than human workers.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'FATHER KNOWS BEST' FALLACY · p. 3

    Unintended consequences, such as physicians and hospitals investing in HIT to the exclusion of more effective local strategies, may occur if definitions of meaningful use and certified systems are not considered carefully.

    “Otherwise, unintended consequences, such as physicians and hospitals investing in HIT to the exclusion of what might actually be more effective local strategies (eg, use of nurse case managers or process redesign), may occur.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § THE 'USE EQUALS SUCCESS' FALLACY · p. 2

    Healthcare is a complex sociotechnical system where simple metrics can mislead because they do not adequately consider the context of human decisions.

    “Healthcare is a complex sociotechnical system where simple metrics can mislead because they do not adequately consider the context of human decisions at the time they are made.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    Computers are much more likely than humans to perform their clever and complex tricks at inappropriate times.

    “computers are much more likely than humans to perform their clever and complex tricks at inappropriate times.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    Computers cannot be described as inherently 'smart'.

    “Computers cannot be described as being inherently ' smart ' .”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'NO ONE ELSE UNDERSTANDS HEALTHCARE' FALLACY · p. 4

    Problems have been framed too narrowly, leading to impoverished designs and disappointing solutions.

    “As a result, problems have been framed too narrowly, leading to impoverished designs and disappointing ' solutions ' . 85”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [85] source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'WE COMPUTERIZED THE PAPER, SO WE CAN GO PAPERLESS' FALLACY · p. 4

    Computer displays are not yet as portable, flexible, or well-designed as paper.

    “computer displays are not yet as portable, flexible, or well-designed as paper. 83”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [83] Sellen AJ Harper RHR . The Myth of the Paperless Office. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    People are smart, creative, and context sensitive.

    “People, on the other hand, are smart, creative, and context sensitive. 79”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [79] Norman DA . Things That Make Us Smart: Defending Human Attributes In The Age Of The Machine. New York: Basic Books, 1994.

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'USE EQUALS SUCCESS' FALLACY · p. 2

    The promulgation of 'meaningful use' may lead to undesirable consequences if such use is not contextually grounded and tied to improved efficiency, learning, ease of use, task and information flow, cognitive load, situation awareness, clinician and patient satisfaction, reduced errors, and faster error recovery.

    “the promulgation of ' meaningful use ' may lead to undesirable consequences if such use is not contextually grounded and tied to improved efficiency, learning, ease of use, task and information flow, cognitive load, situation awareness, clinician and patient satisfaction, reduced errors, and faster error recovery.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    The 'field of dreams' fallacy is well-known in other domains where it is also referred to as the 'designer fallacy' or 'designer-centered design'.

    “The 'fi eld of dreams ' fallacy is well-known in other domains where it is also referred to as the ' designer fallacy ' or ' designercentered design ' . 77”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [77] Hoffman RR Militello LG . Perspectives on Cognitive Task Analysis. New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009. source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'WE COMPUTERIZED THE PAPER, SO WE CAN GO PAPERLESS' FALLACY · p. 4

    User-created paper artifacts typically support patient-specific cognition, situational awareness, task and information communication, and coordination, all essential to safe quality patient care.

    “User-created paper artifacts typically support patientspecific cognition, situational awareness, task and information communication, and coordination, all essential to safe quality patient care.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § THE 'NO ONE ELSE UNDERSTANDS HEALTHCARE' FALLACY · p. 4

    Most clinicians are not experts in device design, user interface design, or the relationship between HIT design and performance.

    “most clinicians are not experts in device design, user interface design, or the relationship between HIT design and performance.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning
    § THE 'WE COMPUTERIZED THE PAPER, SO WE CAN GO PAPERLESS' FALLACY · p. 4

    Paper forms are not simple data repositories that could be eliminated once computerized; they are sophisticated cognitive artifacts that support memory, forecasting, planning, communication, coordination, and education.

    “The paper forms are not simple data repositories that, once computerized, could be eliminated. Rather such ' scraps ' of paper are sophisticated cognitive artifacts that support memory, forecasting and planning, communication, coordination, and education.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'WE COMPUTERIZED THE PAPER, SO WE CAN GO PAPERLESS' FALLACY · p. 4

    Paper will persist, and should persist, if HIT is not able to provide similar support.

    “Paper will persist, and should persist, if HIT is not able to provide similar support.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'NO ONE ELSE UNDERSTANDS HEALTHCARE' FALLACY · p. 4

    By seeing only what they know, such teams do not understand how clinical work is really carried out, what clinicians' real needs are, and where the potential hazards and leverage points lie.

    “By seeing only what they know, such teams do not understand how clinical work is really carried out, what clinicians ' real needs are, and where the potential hazards and leverage points lie.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § THE 'MESSY DESK' FALLACY · p. 3

    Some clinical decision support rules force clinicians to stop and respond, interrupting their work and substituting the designer's judgment for that of the clinician.

    “some clinical decision support (CDS) rules force clinicians to stop and respond to the CDS, interrupting their work, substituting the designer ' s judgment for that of the clinician. 71”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [71] Bisantz AM Wears RL . Forcing functions: the need for restraint. Ann Emerg Med 2008;53:477–9. source

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'NO ONE ELSE UNDERSTANDS HEALTHCARE' FALLACY · p. 4

    It is misguided to believe that healthcare is unique or that no one outside of the domain could possibly understand it.

    “it is misguided to believe that healthcare is unique or that no one outside of the domain could possibly understand it.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § THE 'NO ONE ELSE UNDERSTANDS HEALTHCARE' FALLACY · p. 4

    It takes special training and skills to evaluate a human-computer interface, assess the usability of a system, or predict the changes in communication patterns and social structures that a design might induce.

    “it takes special training and skills to evaluate a human e computer interface, assess the usability of a system, or predict the changes in communication patterns and social structures that a design might induce.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'USE EQUALS SUCCESS' FALLACY · p. 2

    A lack of use is not evidence of a flawed system; clinicians may ignore features like reminders for legitimate reasons.

    “a lack of use is not evidence of a flawed system d clinicians may ignore features like reminders for legitimate reasons.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § THE 'FIELD OF DREAMS' FALLACY AND THE 'SIT-STAY' FALLACY · p. 3

    Technology can be at its worst, and humans at their best, when novel and complex situations arise.

    “Technology can be at its worst, and humans at their best, when novel and complex situations arise.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    Validation of HIT cannot rely on clinician preference; it requires experimental testing against defined performance criteria.

    “Validation of HITcannot be achieved by asking a clinician if they like the design. Validation requires thorough experimental testing of the design based on well-defined performance criteria.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    Use of HIT may not be clinically meaningful until the technology genuinely supports users' needs.

    “However, use may not truly be meaningful in a clinical sense until HIT truly supports users ' needs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    If current course is not changed, HIT will never become as safe as commercial aviation.

    “While it may not take 60 years for HIT to become as safe, if we do not change from our current course, it never will be.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Commercial aviation has become very safe in the more than 60 years since Fitts' publication.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    HIT would benefit from substantive collaboration with experts such as human factors engineers, applied psychologists, medical sociologists, communication scientists, cognitive scientists, and interaction designers, as aviation and nuclear power did.

    “These challenges will only be overcome by collaborating substantively with those who can contribute unique and important expertise such as human factors engineers, applied psychologists, medical sociologists, communication scientists, cognitive scientists, and interaction designers.”
    • Also stated in: § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5 · plain
      “HIT stands to benefit in the same way.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Pilots and nuclear power operators did not improve safety on their own; they worked closely with experts in cognitive, social, and physical performance and safety.
  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 4

    Research on relevant topics has been conducted for decades, but commercial HIT has not adequately incorporated its findings.

    “Exemplary research on relevant topics has been carried out for several decades, 89 e 98 but it does not seem that commercial HIT has benefited adequately from these findings.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites 89 e 98

      Not checked in the free run.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    HIT offers genuine opportunities to improve quality and safety, but it also creates substantial challenges, particularly in everyday clinical work.

    “HITaffords real opportunities for improving quality and safety. However, at the same time, it creates substantial challenges, especially during everyday clinical work.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    Implementing these steps will require substantial investment from vendors, healthcare organizations, and government funders.

    “These steps alone will require a significant investment by vendors, healthcare organizations, and government funders.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given
    § WHAT SHOULD WE DO NOW? · p. 5

    Current meaningful use rules and deadlines allow little time for HIT product improvement and testing, encouraging rapid implementation of whatever is available.

    “Current meaningful use rules and deadlines leave little time for HIT product improvement and testing, incentivizing rapid implementation of whatever is available”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
39 of 39
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The fallacies described in the paper are widely held by HIT designers and policymakers.

    “Many designers and policymakers believe that the risks of HIT are minor and easily manageable.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    No other hazardous industry deploys safety critical IT without some form of independent hazard analysis.

    “No other hazardous industry deploys safety critical IT without some form of independent hazard analysis (eg, a ' safety case ' ); it is unwise for healthcare to continue to do so.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The current passive monitoring approach suggested by the Office of the National Coordinator is likely to be expensive and ineffective.

    “A passive monitoring approach, as currently suggested by the Office of the National Coordinator, 49 seems likely to be both expensive and ultimately ineffective.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are fundamental gaps in awareness, recognition, and application of existing scientific knowledge, especially in human factors, systems engineering, and cognitive engineering, that could help solve some of HIT's biggest problems.

    “There are fundamental gaps in the awareness, recognition, and application of existing scientific knowledge bases, especially related to human factors, and systems and cognitive engineering, that could help address some of HIT ' s biggest problems.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Pilots and nuclear power operators did not improve safety on their own; they worked closely with experts in cognitive, social, and physical performance and safety.

    “Pilots did not improve aviation safety nor did nuclear power operators improve nuclear safety . by themselves. Rather they worked closely with experts in cognitive, social, and physical performance and safety to improve safety.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People have very limited insight into their own performance and even less ability to explain what might improve it.

    “Humans have very limited insight into their own performance, and even more limited ability to articulate what might improve it.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Commercial aviation has become very safe in the more than 60 years since Fitts' publication.

    “In the more than 60 years since that publication, commercial aviation has become very safe.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Throughout human history, major innovations have always brought new perils.

    “Throughout human history, significant innovations have always been associated with new perils.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    HIT works best and is safest when customized to local circumstances and workflows.

    “Despite compelling evidence that HITworks best (and is safest) when it is customized to local circumstances and workflows”
9 of 9

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Emerging evidence suggests that health information technology may cause new patient safety concerns and other unintended consequences due to usability issues, disruptions of clinical processes, and unsafe workarounds.

    “However, emerging evidence suggests that HIT may cause new patient safety concerns and other unintended consequences due to usability issues, disruptions of clinical processes, and unsafe workarounds to circumvent technology-related constraints.2–16”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

4 of the 116 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Sauer C . Deciding the future for IS failures: not the choice you might think. In: Currie W Galliers R , eds. Rethinking Management Information Systems. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999:279–309.
  2. Hoffman S Podgurski A . Finding a cure: the case for regulation and oversight of electronic health record systems. Harv J Law Technol 2008;22:104–65.
  3. Berg M . Rationalizing Medical Work. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
  4. Rubin JR . Handbook of Usability Testing. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1994.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Karsh, B.-T., Weinger, M. B., Abbott, P. A., & Wears, R. L.
Affiliations
  • University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
  • Vanderbilt University (US)
  • Johns Hopkins University (US)
  • University of Florida (US)
Corresponding author
Karsh, Ben-Tzion
Venue
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Published
2010-11
Volume
17
Issue
6
Pages
617-623
ISSN
  • 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-974X
OpenAlex
W2115602750
Cited by
365
References
116
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 25 · 2017: 21 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 36 · 2014: 28 · 2013: 48 · 2012: 34
FWCI
62.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (R18SH017899)
  • Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (R18HS017902, HS016651, U18HS016651)
  • U.S. National Library of Medicine (R01LM008923)
Topics
  • Health Sciences › Health Professions › Health Information Management › Electronic Health Records Systems
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Information Systems Theories and Implementation
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Technology and Human Factors in Education and Health
Keywords
health information technology, quality of care, health care costs, human factors engineering, cognitive engineering
MeSH terms
Attitude to Health, Diffusion of Innovation, Health Policy, Humans, Medical Informatics, Technology Assessment, Biomedical, United States

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