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2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research
Abstract
Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design issues.In this chapter I will look at one small but fundamental part of the rapidly expanding experimental research.In Section 1, I describe a very simple public good experiment -what it is, what some theories predict, what usually happens, and why we should care -and then provide a methodological and theoretical background for the rest of the chapter.In Section 2, I look at the fundamental question: are people selfish or cooperative in volunteering to contribute to public good production?We look at five important early experiments that have laid the foundations for much that has followed.In Section 3, I look at the range of experimental research which tries to identify and study those factors which increase cooperation.In order to help those new to experi mental work I have tried to focus on specific experimental designs in Section 2 and on general results and knowledge in Section 3. The reader will find that the public goods environment is a very sensitive one with much that can affect outcomes but are difficult to control.The many factors interact with each other in unknown ways.Nothing is known for sure.Environments with public goods present a serious challenge even to skilled experimentalists and many opportunities for imaginative work.
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“For these games it is well known that cooperation strongly deteriorates over time and reaches rather low levels in the final period (Dawes and Thaler 1988, Ledyard 1995).”
From Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000) · cites this paper as Ledyard 1995
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ledyard, J. O.
- Venue
- The Handbook of Experimental Economics
- Publisher
- Princeton University Press
- Published
- 1995-12-31
- Pages
- 111-194
- Cited by
- 1,033
- References
- 4
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