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In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning

Evans, Jonathan St.B.T.·2003·Trends in Cognitive Sciences
DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012
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Abstract

Researchers in thinking and reasoning have proposed recently that there are two distinct cognitive systems underlying reasoning. System 1 is old in evolutionary terms and shared with other animals: it comprises a set of autonomous subsystems that include both innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired by a domain-general learning mechanism. System 2 is evolutionarily recent and distinctively human: it permits abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, but is constrained by working memory capacity and correlated with measures of general intelligence. These theories essentially posit two minds in one brain with a range of experimental psychological evidence showing that the two systems compete for control of our inferences and actions.

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Research works printed but not linked: 36

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Metadata

Authors
Evans, J. S. B. T.
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-10
Volume
7
Issue
10
Pages
454-459
ISSN
1364-6613
DOI
10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012
Cited by
1,569
References
6
Language
en
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)

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