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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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Hirth, K. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108859707.010
The Role of Merchants and Trade in Ancient Society
Hirth, K. (2020) · The Organization of Ancient Economies · doi:10.1017/9781108859707.009
On First Principles of the Ancient Economy
Hirth, K. (2020) · The Organization of Ancient Economies · doi:10.1017/9781108859707.012
A CULTURAL EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO MODERNITY: WHAT MIGHT IT MEAN FOR CHRISTIAN FAITH?
Patterson, C. (2020) · Zygon® · doi:10.1111/zygo.12581
Fog, A. (2018) · Sweet Home Chicago? · doi:10.14361/9783839441312-010
Parallels and promising directions in the study of genetic, cultural, and moral evolutionPreprint
Maddamsetti, R., & Bower‐Bir, J. S. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.00501 · Cited by 1
“This is occasionally possible because both fields share a common toolkit in evolutionary game theory and dynamical systems, as well as a common interest in the evolution of cooperation and pro-social behavior [63-71].”
BackgroundMultilevel Selection Can Lead to Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
DeMartini, S., & Marriott, C. (2018) · Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE) · doi:10.1162/isal_a_00089
“Group-level selection can operate both biologically as well as culturally (Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016).”
BackgroundUnderstanding the Evolution of Religion: An Interdisciplinary Approach
Willard, A., & Baimel, A. (2018) · doi:10.1558/jcsr.35729
“The idea that selection can act on cultural groups has been well explored in the domain of religion (Atran and Henrich 2010; Henrich 2004; Norenzayan et al. 2016; Wilson 2002).”
BackgroundWhat drives afterlife variation?
Black, L. L. H. (2017) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2017.1302981
“Concurrently, individual versus group-level selection is an issue that has been controversial (Henrich, 2004; Williams, 1966).”
BackgroundIntroduction: The Evolutionary Way of Thinking in Economics
Witt, U. (2016) · doi:10.4337/9781785365072.00005
“See Sober and Wilson (1998), Field (2001), Henrich (2004), Wilson and Wilson (2007).”
BackgroundThe Interplay of Cultural Aversion and Assortativity for the Emergence of CooperationPreprint
Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., & Wu, J. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2773097
“1The importance of cultural factors for the evolution of cooperation has been studied, among others, by Henrich and Boyd (2001), Boyd et al. (2003), Henrich (2004), Boyd and Richerson (2009), and Boyd et al. (2011).”
[The evolution of human cultural behavior: notes on Darwinism and complexity].
Peric, M., & Murrieta, R. (2015) · História, Ciências, Saúde: Manguinhos · doi:10.1590/s0104-59702015000500010
“Na condução deste debate, a HD acaba provendo insights contrários ao paradigma do egoísmo, discutindo o altruísmo dentro de uma perspectiva de seleção de grupo (Henrich, 2004) tal qual o próprio Darwin teria sugerido (Richerson, Boyd, 2005, p.12).”
BackgroundGafton, F. (2015) · Diacronia · doi:10.17684/i2a17en
Are Cultural and Evolutionary Views of Human Warfare Converging
Fry, D. P., & Mathew, S. (2015) · doi:10.21237/c7clio6127980
Threats of Hellfire and Jumping for Heavenly Joy
Heimola, M. (2013) · Method & Theory in the Study of Religion · doi:10.1163/15700682-12341273
Strategic Implication of Logistics Systems Based on the Cooperation Theory of Evolutionary Biology
김세인 (2014) · The Journal of International Trade & Commerce · doi:10.16980/jitc.10.4.201408.999
Seemingly unrelated manuscripts: experiments on human behavior
Williams, T. (2014) · doi:10.5167/uzh-108743
“…or group selection remain popular but controversial; such models suggest that cooperative groups can develop resources to support increasing population faster than non-cooperative groups, and group-level selective pressure supports cooperation in the long-run (Henrich, 2004; Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialHawkish but helpful: When cultural group selection favors within-group aggressionPreprint
Hanowell, B. (2013) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/001487
“Combining these assumptions, researchers argue that conformist social learning maintained sufficient between-group variation to allow group selection (which favors altruism) to overpower individual selection (which favors selfishness), whereupon large-scale altruism could emerge (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundZefferman, M. R. (2013) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1101/001446
“This is because when a norm psychology induces humans to adopt their group’s traits, this further reinforces any existing equilibrium and drives down within-group variance relative to between-group variance Henrich (2004); Bell (2010).”
BackgroundSavage, D. A., & Torgler, B. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2274593
“Helping behavior is linked to altruism (Piliavin & Charng, 1990) as well as to reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Henrich, 2004; Oberholzer-Gee, Bohnet, & Frey, 1997).”
BackgroundBirch, J. C. P. (2011) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-011-9300-4
“The other is social evolution in human populations, where recent work has placed considerable emphasis on models of ‘‘cultural group selection’’ (see, e.g., Heinrich and Boyd 2001; Heinrich 2004; Boyd and Richerson 2010).”
BackgroundEvolutionary Frameworks for Language Change: The Price Equation Approach
Clark, B. (2010) · Language and Linguistics Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1749-818x.2010.00200.x
Learning From Early Attempts to Generalize Darwinian Principles to Social Evolution
Hodgson, G. (2010) · Journal of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1556/jep.8.2010.2.5
Genetic similarity promotes evolution of cooperation under lethal intergroup competitionPreprint
Smirnov, O., & Orbell, J. (2008) · Nature Precedings · doi:10.1038/npre.2008.1710.1
Differences in Social Preferences: Are They Profitable for the Firm?
Küpper, H., & Sandner, K. (2008) · Contributions to management science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_7
“33 See agent A’s reaction function in equation (15).”
InfluentialSmith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.012 · Cited by 2
Cultural Transmission in Humans
Aoki, K. (2002) · Journal of Geography (Chigaku Zasshi) · doi:10.5026/jgeography.111.6_849
Democratic Legitimation Without Inclusion: An Evolutionary Approach to Brazilian Societal Crisis
de Almeida, F. P. L. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-63501-5_6
Tutić, A., & Liebe, U. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-33536-6_11
Lents, N. H. (2021) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19650-3_3021
Nicholson, N. (2021) · Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19650-3_3083
Multinational Enterprise Adaptation Dynamics, Mathematical Modelling, and Empirical Analysis
Wang, G. (2020) · Advances in business strategy and competitive advantage book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-5225-8458-2.ch001
Conceptual challenges in cultural selection
Chellappoo, A. (2020) · doi:10.17863/cam.55167
Lents, N. H. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_3021-1
Do the ‘Co-Operative Principles’ Constitute Institutional Adaptations?Preprint
Waring, T. M., & Lange, T. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3322978 · Cited by 1
“As group-level traits, institutions 153 evolve among groups via a process called group-level cultural selection (Henrich, 2004; 154 Richerson et al., 2016), but not all group-traits that benefit groups are adaptations.”
The role of shared cultural knowledge in young children’s social categorization processes
Oláh, K. (2018) · Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem · doi:10.15476/elte.2017.204
“The peculiarity of human cooperation lies in our tendency and ability to engage in large-scale cooperative acts that do not (only) rely on interpersonal interactions but on institutionalized cultural norms (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundLawrence H. Keeley: Pre-state Societies in the Hobbesian Trap
Hertler, S. C., Figueredo, A. J., Peñaherrera‐Aguirre, M., Fernandes, H. B. F., & Menie, M. A. W. O. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-90125-1_12
Computational Structure of Evolved Forgiveness Systems.
McCauley, T. G. (2017) · doi:10.21220/s2g373
“, 2007), is key to human life, driving our evolutionary success across all spheres of social interaction, ranging from dyadic interaction to large-scale global coordination (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundLamba, A. (2017) · doi:10.21220/s2t95h
“Importantly cooperative interactions also occur at the group level and play an important role in the formation of social and cultural norms (Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2001).”
BackgroundRoots of an Alternative Management Paradigm
Douglas, N., & Wykowski, T. (2017) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-41902-2_4
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.06
8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.08
4. Different Kinds of War in Human History
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.04
7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.07
2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.02
5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.05
Crossing Paths: On Hayek’s Darwinian Evolutionism
Hodgson, G. (2017) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-61714-5_13
3. Contributions from Other Theories
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.03
Krings, T., Moriarty, E., Wickham, J., Bobek, A., & Salamońska, J. (2016) · doi:10.7765/9781526111579.00003
“While specific cultural processes may provide conditions for group-level adaptations (Henrich 2004), the focus on individual trade-offs in HBE forces attention to conflicts of interest among individuals and between individuals and groups, and to the implications of such conflicts for collective action, emergent social…”
BackgroundCulture and Cultural Evolution
Teraji, S. (2016) · Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks · doi:10.1057/978-1-137-50247-6_5
Effects of Evolutionary Rules on Cooperative Tendencies in Franchising Networks
Ehrmann, T., Meiseberg, B., & Kopel, M. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10184-2_5 · Cited by 1
“…to demonstrate that social learning (of the firm) and cultural transmission mechanisms (in the network) can support the evolution of cooperation, where strategies, beliefs, social norms, etc. are learned by observation and interaction in social groups (see Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2006).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Dynamics of the Distribution of co-authors
Wójtowicz, T., Rzecki, K., Plawiak, P., Niedźwiecki, M., Sośnicki, T., Wojton, T., Smelcerz, K., & Tabor, Z. (2015) · Repozytorium Politechniki Krakowskiej · doi:10.4467/2353737xct.15.116.4153
“Mechanisms that facilitate cooperation, include kin selection [5‒9], direct and indirect reciprocity [1, 10‒13], network reciprocity [14‒17], trust [18, 19], group selection [20, 21], cooperation in game theory [22, 23], and evolution of cooperation [24, 25].”
BackgroundComplexities of Natural Selection Dynamics
Rosser, J. B. (2012) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-29503-4_16 · Cited by 1
Manner mayks man: on manners and hygiene
Curtis, V. (2013) · Wageningen Academic Publishers eBooks · doi:10.3920/978-90-8686-775-2_5
“Whilst the origins of human cooperation and morality are possibly now the hottest topic in evolutionary biology (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Henrich, 2004; Joyce, 2006; Nowack & Highfield, 2011), I have argued that manners provide the basic everyday framework of rules for sociality, and so are a sort of mini-morality, a pr…”
BackgroundGervais, W. M. (2012) · cIRcle (University of British Columbia) · doi:10.14288/1.0072971
“However, mechanisms like kin selection and reciprocal altruism have difficulty explaining large scale, largely anonymous human cooperation under conditions in which cooperation is actually and routinely observed among humans (e.g., Henrich, 2004; Henrich, et al., 2005).”
BackgroundDisease prevalence and conformity
Murray, D. R. (2009) · cIRcle (University of British Columbia) · doi:10.14288/1.0067556
ORDER AND RATIONALITY IN METHOD AND MIND
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.018
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.005
Relating the Two Concepts of a Rational Order
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.007
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.002
Emergent Order without the Law
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.014
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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