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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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“Second, competition between culturally organized groups facilitates the evolution of cooperation within groups [49,50] leading to the expansion of human cooperation and prosocial tendencies, often with a genetic basis [51].”
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Denton, K. K., Ram, Y., Liberman, U., & Feldman, M. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · doi:10.1073/pnas.2004102117 · Cited by 55
“Wi = 1 + s [ pi + pi(1− pi)(2pi − 1)H i n(pi) ] , [40]”
Hames, R. (2019) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-019-09340-w · Cited by 55
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“…researchers in this field also study how cultures evolve (through a process analogous to, but not necessarily driven by, genetic evolution (Mesoudi et al. 2004)), and some espouse the idea of selection at the level of the cultural group, not just the gene (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Henrich 2004).”
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“…selection can occur among human cultural groups (e.g., warfare, group extinction, imitation across groups, selective migration to higher-functioning groups), and formal models have demonstrated the plausibility of these mechanisms (Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016).”
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“This can only occur, however, if the between group selection pressures are greater than the individual benefits of not punishing, which may be unlikely PUNISH VERSUS COMPENSATE 53 (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 2001; Sober & Wilson, 1999).”
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“…(Henrich et al., 2001, 2005, 2006, 2010; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009; Gächter et al., 2010; House et al., 2013) has been touted as key evidence for the existence of between-group variation in cooperative norms that could be the basis for such selection (Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005).”
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“They can produce patterns that, at the population level, fit the description of what cultural evolution theorists call conformist bias, prestige bias and payoff bias [16,59,60].”
BackgroundAn experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas
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“However, if there are C-always types in the population, then the 1 See, for example, Henrich (2004). dynamics produce an endless cycle: as the Sophisticates begin to dominant, having driven the Dalways types to near extinction, the C-always types gain the advantage over the Sophisticates.”
BackgroundThe Nature and Replication of Routines
Hodgson, G. M. (2006) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781781007563.00019 · Cited by 8
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“…will sometimes choose social norms that they anticipate will lead to better equilibria (Levine et al. 2020; Redish 2022), and both cultural and biological evolutionary processes also tend to favor those equilibria that produce better (i.e., fitter) outcomes (Henrich 2004; Boyd & Richerson 1992).”
BackgroundCultural group selection and human cooperation: a conceptual and empirical review
Major‐Smith, D. (2020) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2020.2 · Cited by 56
Social learning and the demise of costly cooperation in humans
Burton-Chellew, M. N., Mouden, C. E., & West, S. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2017.0067 · Cited by 60
“More generally, our conclusion is consistent with the idea that natural selection will favour social learning mechanisms that are adaptive [5,10,20,71,72].”
BackgroundResultInfluentialInterorganizational imitation heuristics arising from cognitive frames
Nikolaeva, R. (2014) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.03.001 · Cited by 45
“On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that reliance on imitation increases with environmental uncertainty (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialMolleman, L., Quiñones, A. E., & Weissing, F. J. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.06.001 · Cited by 46
“…selection a potentially efficient force promoting the evolution of cooperation (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011; Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 2002; Guzmán, Rodríguez-Sickert, & Rowthorn, 2007; Henrich, 2004; Scheuring, 2009).”
BackgroundMatching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms
Mengel, F. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.01.001 · Cited by 45
“3 See Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Henrich and Boyd (2001), Henrich and Gil-White (2000), Boyd and Richerson (2005) or Henrich (2004) .”
BackgroundInfluentialKin terms and fitness interdependence
Cronk, L., Steklis, D., Steklis, N. G., van den Akker, O. R., & Aktipis, A. (2019) · Evolution and human behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.12.004 · Cited by 44
“When such culturally-defined groups meet the conditions for natural selection and compete with each other, cultural group selection can shape group-level norms and characteristics (Henrich, 2004; Soltis et al., 1995; Smaldino, 2014; Richerson et al., 2016).”
BackgroundPunitive sentiment among the Shuar and in industrialized societies: cross-cultural similarities
Price, M. E. (2005) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.08.009 · Cited by 44
“Explanations for behavior that require group selection to overcome individual fitness deficits, however, are more onerous than those invoking individual fitness advantages (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Williams, 1966), and cultural evolutionary and gene–culture coevolutionary theories have been proposed as alternative expl…”
BackgroundMalthusian Reinforcement Learning
Leibo, J., Pérolat, J., Hughes, E., Wheelwright, S., Marblestone, A., Duéñez-Guzmán, E. A., Sunehag, P., Dunning, I., & Graepel, T. (2018) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1812.07019 · Cited by 43
“occurs locally within each island [14, 39, 40].”
Neuroendocrine control in social relationships in non-human primates: Field based evidence
Ziegler, T. E., & Crockford, C. (2017) · Hormones and Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2017.03.004 · Cited by 58
“Humans alone express considerable within-species variance in tolerance and cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2004).”
New evolutionary foundations: Theoretical requirements for a science of sustainability
Waring, T. M. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.10.017 · Cited by 42
Tax morale and prosocial behaviour: evidence from a Palestinian survey
Andriani, L. (2016) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/bev019 · Cited by 42
Is a transdisciplinary perspective on economic complexity possible
Rosser, J. (2010) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2010.03.012 · Cited by 42
Leadership in Organizations: An Evolutionary Perspective
Spisak, B. R., Nicholson, N., & van Vugt, M. (2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-92784-6_7 · Cited by 42
Gerkey, D. (2013) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/669856 · Cited by 52
Multilevel processes and cultural adaptation: examples from past and present small-scale societies
Reyes‐García, V., Balbo, A. L., Gómez‐Baggethun, E., Guèze, M., Mesoudi, A., Richerson, P. J., Rubio‐Campillo, X., Ruíz-Mallén, I., & Shennan, S. J. (2016) · Ecology and Society · doi:10.5751/es-08561-210402 · Cited by 55
Compassion Development in Higher Education
Rashedi, R., Plante, T., & Callister, E. S. (2015) · Journal of Psychology and Theology · doi:10.1177/009164711504300205 · Cited by 40
“From an evolutionary perspective, compassion is not a selfless emotion, but rather one that is governed by cost-benefit evaluations (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundCan we see inside? Predicting strategic behavior given limited information
Vogt, S., Efferson, C., & Fehr, E. (2013) · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.03.003 · Cited by 40
“A conditionally cooperative individual needs to identify those who will cooperate and those who will not in order to reduce the risk of exploitation (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundAlvard, M. (2009) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-009-9074-4 · Cited by 47
“Chagnon’s argument describing the military advantages of large lineages to explain the cultural evolution of patrilineality versus matrilineality reads as a model for group selection (see Henrich 2004; Sahlins 1961).”
BackgroundFoundations of Human Sociality: A Review Essay
Samuelson, L. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051054661549 · Cited by 40
Richerson, P., & Boyd, R. (2010) · Biolinguistics · doi:10.5964/bioling.8793 · Cited by 39
“The reasons that culture is unusually susceptible to group selection on a much larger scale than genetic kin groups are outlined in Richerson & Boyd (2005: 203–213) and more formally by Henrich (2004).”
BackgroundConformity cannot be identified based on population-level signatures
Acerbi, A., van Leeuwen, E. J. C., Haun, D. B. M., & Tennie, C. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep36068 · Cited by 42
“Such an outcome has been a key feature of accounts of cultural group selection aimed at explaining the evolution and current existence of the extraordinary forms of cooperation and pro-sociality observed in the human species 53 .”
Is Cultural Fitness Hopelessly Confused?
Ramsey, G., & Block, A. D. (2015) · British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axv047 · Cited by 38
“Epigenetic transformations come the closest to this, but the analogy is imperfect (Jablonka and Lamb [2005]).”
BackgroundPolicing and punishment across the domains of social evolution
Singh, M., & Boomsma, J. (2015) · Oikos · doi:10.1111/oik.02064 · Cited by 38
“6C) (Fehr et al. 2002, Henrich 2004).”
Eye spots do not increase altruism in children
Vogt, S., Efferson, C. M., Berger, J. L., & Fehr, E. (2014) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.11.007 · Cited by 43
“The apparent alternative is group selection, especially selection between groups with different culturally transmitted social norms (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich, 2004; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Bowles and Gintis, 2011).”
BackgroundGroup Cooperation without Group Selection: Modest Punishment Can Recruit Much Cooperation
Krasnow, M. M., Delton, A. W., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124561 · Cited by 38
“Further processes of cultural selection are then required to explain why the cooperative equilibria predominate [10,35].”
BackgroundTakezawa, M., & Price, M. E. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.028 · Cited by 36
Spurious normativity enhances learning of compliance and enforcement behavior in artificial agents
Köster, R., Hadfield-Menell, D., Everett, R., Weidinger, L., Hadfield, G. K., & Leibo, J. Z. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2106028118 · Cited by 37
Interethnic Interaction, Strategic Bargaining Power, and the Dynamics of Cultural Norms
Bunce, J., & Mcelreath, R. (2017) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-017-9297-8 · Cited by 37
“, when group benefits depend, in a non-additive manner, on the frequency of the norm among its constituents), the selective imitation of successful groups can be operationalized as cultural group selection (Henrich 2004; Richerson et al. 2016).”
Gruber, T. (2016) · International Journal of Primatology · doi:10.1007/s10764-016-9902-4 · Cited by 49
“Similarly, claims that teaching is critically important in the spread of cultural knowledge has been questioned even in humans (Henrich 2004; cf. Morgan et al. 2015).”
BackgroundEvolution of conditional cooperation under multilevel selection
Zhang, H., & Perc, M. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep23006 · Cited by 37
The joint emergence of group competition and within-group cooperation
Puurtinen, M., Heap, S. M., & Mappes, T. (2014) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.11.005 · Cited by 38
“…that aggressive between-group competition is a critical component of human social organization that has been instrumental in shaping cooperative tendencies (Alexander, 1979, 1990, 2006; Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Darwin, 1871; Flinn, Geary, & Ward, 2005; Gat, 2006; Hamilton, 1975; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundA naturalistic theory of economic organization
Stoelhorst, J. W., & Richerson, P. J. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.012 · Cited by 52
Information, complexity and generative replication
Hodgson, G. M., & Knudsen, T. (2007) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-007-9073-y · Cited by 34
“It is only one further step to consider social groups, structures or institutions as plausible interactors (Nelson and Winter 1982; Henrich 2004; Hodgson and Knudsen 2004b).”
BackgroundTaxation and Conditional CooperationPreprint
Frey, B., & Torgler, B. (2004) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.662083 · Cited by 37
“Another promising concept is conformity (for an overview see Heinrich 2004).”
BackgroundTrust within human-machine collectives depends on the perceived consensus about cooperative norms
Makovi, K., Sargsyan, A., Li, W., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-38592-5 · Cited by 36
Evidence of cultural group selection in territorial lobstering in Maine
Waring, T. M., & Acheson, J. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0501-x · Cited by 41
Elsner, W., & Schwardt, H. (2013) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137413000179 · Cited by 27
A Matter of Distrust: Explaining the Persistence of Dysfunctional Beliefs in Regional Clusters
Staber, U. (2007) · Growth and Change · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2257.2007.00374.x · Cited by 34
Koch, A. S., Dorrough, A. R., Glöckner, A., & Imhoff, R. (2020) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2020.103996 · Cited by 49
“Given the central role of this cooperative success in the evolution of human societies (Hardin, 1968, Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016), researching explanations of co-operation in social dilemmas remains a topic of great scientific interest.”
Effects of Conformism on the Cultural Evolution of Social Behaviour
Molleman, L., Pen, I., & Weissing, F. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068153 · Cited by 35
Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection
Safarzyńska, K., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.04.003 · Cited by 50
Grass-roots justice in Tanzania
Paciotti, B., Hadley, C., Holmes, C., & Mulder, M. (2005) · American Scientist · doi:10.1511/2005.51.952 · Cited by 35
Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior
Efferson, C. M., Roca, C. P., Vogt, S., & Helbing, D. (2015) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.003 · Cited by 33
“Cultural transmission, in particular, has received considerable attention as a mechanism that can intensify the importance of selection at the group level (Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Bell et al., 2009; Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Boyd et al., 2011; Richerson et al., 2015).”
InfluentialMiao, S.-S., Heijman, W., Zhu, X.-Q., & Lu, Q. (2015) · China Agricultural Economic Review · doi:10.1108/caer-05-2014-0044 · Cited by 34
Knowledge production in consulting teams
Reihlen, M. R., & Nikolova, N. (2010) · Scandinavian Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/j.scaman.2010.05.004 · Cited by 33
“Social constructivists emphasize that knowledge evolves in complex ecologies of social interaction, in which the relation of the knowing individual and the sociocultural context is mutual, complementary, and co-evolving: the development of either part not only depends on the other but is made possible through the prod…”
BackgroundCultural group selection and the design of REDD+: insights from Pemba
Andrews, J., & Mulder, M. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0489-2 · Cited by 33
“Additionally, insofar as conformist transmission promotes within group-homogeneity and between group heterogeneity, it also ensures that the necessary conditions for cultural group selection are met (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundModelling a social dilemma of mode choice based on commuters' expectations and social learning
Sunitiyoso, Y., & Matsumoto, S. (2009) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2007.10.058 · Cited by 33
“For each traveller, there is a probability of using conformist transmission and (1 À a) probability of using payoff-biased transmission (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundNatural selection and social preferences.
Weibull, J., & Salomonsson, M. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.07.014 · Cited by 33
“Surveys of the group selection literature are given in Bergstrom(2002) and Wilson and Sober (1994), and recent contributions, with extensive discussions, are given in Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002) and Henrich (2003) .”
BackgroundMethodEfferson, C. M., Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2022) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-024-07077-w · Cited by 40
“The decoupled life cycle is unfavourable for cooperation because migration occurs after game play but before intergroup competition, which separates a group’s productivity from the group’s ability to win intergroup competitions.”
BackgroundInfluentialVocal signals facilitate cooperative hunting in wild chimpanzees
Mine, J., Slocombe, K., Willems, E., Gilby, I., Yu, M., Thompson, M., Muller, M., Wrangham, R., Townsend, S., & Machanda, Z. (2022) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abo5553 · Cited by 32
Designing cultural multilevel selection research for sustainability science
Kline, M. A., Waring, T. M., & Salerno, J. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0509-2 · Cited by 31
“The movement of ideas, beliefs, and behaviors can occur when people move, sometimes resulting in trait transmission in the emigrant’s new home, and changes in trait frequencies as well as trait outcomes in the group (Boyd and Richerson 2009; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundInstitutions and Cooperation in an Ecology of Games
Smaldino, P. E., & Lubell, M. N. (2014) · Artificial Life · doi:10.1162/artl_a_00126 · Cited by 37
The Ape that Understood the Universe
Stewart-Williams, S., & Shermer, M. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108348140 · Cited by 31
Waring, T. M., & Bell, A. V. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.07.003 · Cited by 29
“Theorists argue that cooperation within groups may evolve in response to competition between groups in both genetic (Choi & Bowles, 2007) and cultural terms (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundResultMore on how and why: a response to commentaries
Laland, K. N., Odling‐Smee, J., Hoppitt, W., & Uller, T. (2013) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-013-9380-4 · Cited by 61
“2011) critique of an account of the evolution of cooperation through social norms (e.g. Boyd and Richerson 1985; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis 2003; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundComputational and Dynamic Complexity in Economics
Rosser, J. (2009) · doi:10.4337/9781781952665.00008 · Cited by 31
Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition
Levine, S., Chater, N., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Cushman, F. A. (2024) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x24001067 · Cited by 43
“Similarly, there is considerable theorizing about how selection among candidate human norms might occur by “blind” biological or (more often) cultural evolutionary processes (Boyd and Richerson 1990; Binmore 2014; Henrich 2004).”
The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative NormsPreprint
Makowsky, M. D., & Smaldino, P. E. (2014) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/004416 · Cited by 4
“…literature regarding the mechanisms by which a group can mitigate the free-riding and parasitism that serve to undermine cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Henrich 2004; Nowak 2006; Dugatkin 1997; Santos & Pacheco 2011; Smaldino et al. 2013; Smaldino & Lubell 2014; Killingback et al. 2006; Aktipis 2004;…”
Evolutionary-economic policies for sustainable consumption
Safarzyńska, K. (2013) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.03.020 · Cited by 26
Greve, J. (2010) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393110381770 · Cited by 32
“However, on a now more common and presumably more adequate view, they should be considered complementing and enriching; that is, they are not reductionist in the sense of a reduction of social behavior to biological endowment (genes), they rather support the idea of interactions between genes, environment, and learnin…”
BackgroundSingh, M., Acerbi, A., Caldwell, C. A., Danchin, É., Isabel, G., Molleman, L., Scott‐Phillips, T., Tamariz, M., van den Berg, P., van Leeuwen, E. J. C., et al. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0050 · Cited by 40
Societal background influences social learning in cooperative decision making
Molleman, L., & Gächter, S. (2018) · Evolution and human behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.05.007 · Cited by 29
“…the question of whether groups from different populations may vary in their potential to bolster within-group cooperation through conformist social learning, which is thought to be a crucial prerequisite for the cultural evolution of large-scale cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 1998).”
InfluentialIberian Neolithic Networks: The Rise and Fall of the Cardial World
Aubán, J. B., Lozano, S., & Pardo-Gordó, S. (2017) · Frontiers in Digital Humanities · doi:10.3389/fdigh.2017.00007 · Cited by 29
Silva, A. S., & Mace, R. H. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01790 · Cited by 37
Social learning in cooperative dilemmas
Lamba, S. (2014) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.0417 · Cited by 35
“However, in cultural group selection models of cooperation [4,10,12,13,32] the use of conformity is not assumed to be flexible.”
BackgroundInfluentialKendal, J., Feldman, M., & Aoki, K. (2006) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2006.01.003 · Cited by 29
“…if there is between-group competition, cooperative norms that provide a fitness advantage to groups that adopt the norm over those that do not may evolve through cultural group selection (Henrich and Boyd 2001; Boyd and Richerson 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundParadox of diversity in the collective brain
Schimmelpfennig, R., Razek, L., Schnell, E., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0316 · Cited by 41
“These forces of culturalgroup selection [20,139,140] include:”
Misch, A., Fergusson, G., & Dunham, Y. C. (2018) · Self and Identity · doi:10.1080/15298868.2018.1430063 · Cited by 30
“When such cooperation occurs between biologically related others, evolutionary explanations are readily available (see Hamilton, 1964; Henrich, 2004; Nowak, 2006; Simpson & Beckes, 2010), but such cooperation also occurs between unrelated others and is even directed at extended groups in which the cooperating individu…”
BackgroundThe Recognition Signal Hypothesis for the Adaptive Evolution of Religion
Matthews, L. J. (2012) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-012-9138-8 · Cited by 32
“Several authors have presented verbal arguments for why greenbeardism does not work by pointing out that it would produce strong selection for nonaltruists who grow green beards (Dawkins 1982; Grafen 1990; McElreath et al. 2003; Henrich 2004), and there are some agent-based and analytical models showing the collapse o…”
BackgroundQuestioning the cultural evolution of altruism
André, J., & Morin, O. (2011) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2011.02398.x · Cited by 37
“…2005; Boyd et al., 2011; see also Allison, 1992a,b for similar ideas, Henrich & Boyd, 2001; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2007, for further applications of CGS; and Lehmann et al., 2007, 2008a for a population genetics formalization).”
Experimental Economics and Experimental Game Theory
Houser, D. E., & McCabe, K. (2013) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-416008-8.00002-4 · Cited by 39
Incentives, Information, and Emergent Collective Accuracy
Hong, L., Page, S., & Riolo, M. (2012) · Managerial and Decision Economics · doi:10.1002/mde.2560 · Cited by 27
“Henrich (Henrich, 2004) calls this cultural learning.”
The Best Way to Reduce Discards Is by Not Catching Them!
Reid, D., Calderwood, J., Afonso, P., Bourdaud, P., Fauconnet, L., González-Irusta, J., Mortensen, L. O., Ordines, F., Lehuta, S., Pawlowski, L., et al. (2018) · The European Landing Obligation · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_13 · Cited by 27
Mutation mitigates finite-size effects in spatial evolutionary games
Shen, C., He, Z., Ши, Л., & Tanimoto, J. (2025) · Communications Physics · doi:10.1038/s42005-025-02120-2 · Cited by 26
“In contrast, evolutionary game theory investigates how cooperation can emerge and stabilize as an evolutionary equilibrium through mechanisms such as kin selection 8 , direct reciprocity 9 , indirect reciprocity based on reputation 10,11 , network reciprocity 12 – 14 , and group selection 15 .”
Scaling up and scaling out: Consilience and the evolution of more nurturing societies
Biglan, A., Johansson, M., Ryzin, M. J. V., & Embry, D. D. (2020) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2020.101893 · Cited by 37
“At the same time, selection can occur at multiple levels (Henrich, 2004; Turchin, 2015; Wilson & Wilson, 2007).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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