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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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Increasing returns to scale: The solution to the second-order social dilemma
Ye, H., Chen, S., Luo, J., Tan, F., Jia, Y.-M., & Chen, Y.-F. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep31927 · Cited by 11
Kim, J., Holman, D. J., & Goodreau, S. M. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0125333 · Cited by 11
“In order for altruism to evolve, additional constraints must be in place, such as assortative interaction among altruists [3, 4], cultural conformity [5, 6] and punishment of norm avoiders [6, 7].”
BackgroundHuman cooperation by lethal group competition
Egas, M., Kats, R., van der Sar, X., Reuben, E., & Sabelis, M. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01373 · Cited by 11
Identities in the Commons: The Dynamics of Norms and Social Capital
Bulte, E., & Horan, R. (2010) · doi:10.2202/1935-1682.2372 · Cited by 11
Hodgson, G. (2009) · doi:10.4337/9781784712839 · Cited by 11
“Joseph Henrich (2004), 'Cultural Group Selection, Revolutionary Processes and Large-scale Cooperation', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53, 3-35 156 12.”
BackgroundEvolutionary psychology and economic theory
Koppl, R. (2004) · Advances in Austrian economics · doi:10.1016/s1529-2134(2005)7 · Cited by 11
The hidden costs of human cooperation
Gross, J., Graf, C., & Rossetti, C. S. L. (2025) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.09.016 · Cited by 6
Exploring indicators for monitoring sociotechnical system transitions through portfolio networks
Penna, C., Romero‐Goyeneche, O. Y., & Matti, C. (2023) · Science and Public Policy · doi:10.1093/scipol/scad015 · Cited by 15
Early prosociality is conditional on opportunity cost and familiarity with the target
Lee, K. J. J., & Setoh, P. (2022) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.10.003 · Cited by 9
Is a non-evolutionary psychology possible?Preprint
Nettle, D., & Scott-Phillips, T. (2021) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/wky9h · Cited by 10
“…important claims of the approach, because it means that certain behaviours that are in fact not genetically adaptive (such as altruism) can ‘hitch-hike’, getting transmitted as a side-effect of the fitness benefits across other domains of learning socially (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundElsner, W. (2021) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2021.1873048 · Cited by 14
The Evolution of Social Contracts
Vlerick, M. (2019) · Journal of Social Ontology · doi:10.1515/jso-2019-0041 · Cited by 10
Tra i Leoni: Revealing the preferences behind a superstition
Invernizzi, G., Miller, J., Coen, T., Dufwenberg, M., & Oliveira, L. (2019) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.31219/osf.io/c5hxs · Cited by 10
“…the value of “experimentation” with new behaviors (Fudenberg & Levine, 2006, 2009).5 Another highlighted aspect concerns a superstition’s potential selective value as a group-level trait in the evolution of culture (Boyd & Richerson, 2002; Henrich, 2004; Nunn & Sanchez de la Sierra, 2017).”
BackgroundSimple moral code supports cooperation
Efferson, C., & Fehr, E. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/d41586-018-02621-x · Cited by 10
Re-examining balinese subaks through the lens of cultural multilevel selection
Brooks, J. S., Reyes‐García, V., & Burnside, W. R. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0453-1 · Cited by 12
“The CMLS framework derives from theories of cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985) and cultural group selection (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialHuman altruistic tendencies vary with both the costliness of selfless acts and socioeconomic status
Grueter, C. C., Ingram, J. A., Lewisson, J. W., Bradford, O. R., Taba, M., Coetzee, R. E., & Sherwood, M. A. (2016) · PeerJ · doi:10.7717/peerj.2610 · Cited by 9
“…scale cooperation can be maintained when behaviourally rather homogenous groups of 58 prosocial individuals gain a competitive edge against groups of less prosocially cohesive 59 individuals (cultural groups selection) (Henrich 2004; Richerson et al. 2016; but see 60 Yamagishi and Mifune 2015).”
BackgroundKrasnow, M. M., & Delton, A. W. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00799 · Cited by 10
“…theories of social evolution appear ruled out, but cooperative behavior remains, theorists from evolutionary anthropology, biology, and economics developed new theories of human evolution based on genetic or cultural group selection frameworks (Gintis, 2000; Fehr and Henrich, 2003; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundKamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2015) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.09.020 · Cited by 10
“1 Axelrod 1 On the reintroduction of group selection into the literature on evolutionary theory, see the discussion in Henrich (2004) and sources cited there including Sober and Wilson (1998).”
BackgroundJames Mark Baldwin and contemporary theories of culture and evolution
Morgan, T., & Harris, P. (2015) · European Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17405629.2015.1074068 · Cited by 10
“Reflections of Baldwin’s later thinking on the evolution of morality described in his book Darwin and the Humanities also be seen in contemporary cultural evolutionary theories of cultural group selection (Henrich, 2004).”
Punishment Mechanisms and Their Effect on Cooperation: A Simulation Study
Farjam, M., Faillo, M., Sprinkhuizen-Kuyper, I. G., & Haselager, P. (2015) · Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation · doi:10.18564/jasss.2647 · Cited by 13
“Henrich (2004) catches this in a formula in which the chance for altruistic behavior positively correlates with the chance of others being cooperative.”
BackgroundIs information a selectable trait?Preprint
Mirmomeni, M., Punch, W., & Adami, C. (2014) · arXiv.org · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1408.3651 · Cited by 10
“s equation has been used to address a vast array of topics ranging from the evolution of group selection, kin selection, and cooperation (Wade, 1985; Queller, 1992; Frank, 1995; Page and Nowak, 2002; Henrich, 2004; Fletcher and Zwick, 2006; Okasha, 2006) to ecology (Fox, 2006) and all the way to the selection of music…”
BackgroundMethodImpact of environmental dynamics on economic evolution: A stylized agent-based policy analysis
Nannen, V., van den Bergh, J., & Eiben, A. (2013) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2012.08.013 · Cited by 10
“…Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Departament d’Arquitectura i Tecnologia de Computadors, Universitat de Girona, Spain 2013 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43673/ MPRA Paper No. 43673, posted 09 Jan 2013 14:55 UTC Impact of environmental dynamics on economic evolution:”
BackgroundSix. The Evolution of Free Enterprise Values
Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. T. (2010) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400837366.107 · Cited by 6
Human artistic behaviour: adaptation, byproduct, or cultural group selection?
Smedt, J. D., & de Cruz, H. (2012) · Boston studies in the philosophy of science · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1951-4_8 · Cited by 10
“Group selectionist ideas are making a comeback, both in theories of altruism in the natural world (e.g., Wilson and Hölldobler, 2005 ) and in models of the cultural evolution of human altruistic behaviour (e.g., Henrich, 2004 ) .”
Toward agent-based models of the development and evolution of business relations and networks
Wilkinson, I., Marks, R., & Young, L. C. (2010) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-85081-6_51 · Cited by 10
Gervais, W. M., McKay, R., Brown-Iannuzzi, J. L., Ross, R. M., Pennycook, G., Jong, J., & Lanman, J. A. (2025) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2404720122 · Cited by 7
“Without consistent cues to believe in any given god, atheism may be a natural result ( 10 ).”
InfluentialMothers, Fathers, and Others: Competition and Cooperation in the Aftermath of Conflict
Cassar, A., Grosjean, P., Khan, F., & Lambert, M. (2023) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3877021 · Cited by 9
Li, Y., & Mifune, N. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1198797 · Cited by 9
“Therefore, there is a need for explanations of how individuals solve the dilemma and, correspondingly, successful punishment facilitates the evolution of cooperation (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundKovalenko, T., Vincent, S., Yukalov, V. I., & Sornette, D. (2023) · Journal of Physics Complexity · doi:10.1088/2632-072x/acbd7e · Cited by 11
“Similarly, traits such as ‘strong cooperation’ [120] and ‘altruistic punishment’ [121–123] are costly to the individual and do not seem to make sense from the perspective of a person’s utility maximization, but are selected in evolutionary agent-based models of competing groups in stochastic environments [124, 125].”
Institutional similarity drives cultural similarity among online communities
Zhong, Q., & Frey, S. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-23223-8 · Cited by 9
Banking on cooperation: an evolutionary analysis of microfinance loan repayment behaviour
Gehrig, S., Mesoudi, A., & Lamba, S. (2019) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2020.64 · Cited by 9
“Frameworks of ‘ linked games ’ (Spagnolo, 1999) and multilevel selection (J. Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016; Waring et al., 2015) which address interconnected and nested social dilemmas can potentially help to understand these phenomena.”
Cultural Evolution and Gene–Culture Coevolution
Richerson, P. J. (2017) · Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture · doi:10.26613/esic.1.1.17 · Cited by 11
The Fundamental Role of Large-Scale Trust Building in Natural Resource Management
Lotan, K. (2016) · Environmental Values · doi:10.3197/096327116x14598445991385 · Cited by 10
“Although Henrich (2004) offers some understanding of evolutionary processes, there is still no simple answer as to how trust can be established.”
BackgroundInfluentialNeuroeconomic Approaches to Mental Disorders
Kishida, K. T., King‐Casas, B., & Montague, P. R. (2010) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.07.021 · Cited by 124
Kock, N. (2009) · Electronic Markets · doi:10.1007/s12525-009-0024-0 · Cited by 9
“This type of knowledge communication likely required reciprocal altruism to have evolved before, which mathematical formalizations and empirical evidence strongly suggest was the case in the human species (Fletcher and Zwick 2007; Henrich 2004; McElreath and Boyd 2007; Trivers 2002).”
BackgroundWhy and How Identity Should Influence UtilityPreprint
Wichardt, P. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.878273 · Cited by 9
“However, as Henrich (2004) points out, there are a couple of deficiencies these approaches commonly suffer from.”
The Effect of Vertical and Horizontal Trust on Voluntary Tax Compliance (An Experimental Study)
Putong, I., Laksmana, A., & Narsa, I. M. (2017) · International Conference on Ethics in Governance (ICONEG) · doi:10.2991/iconeg-16.2017.4 · Cited by 9
“Henrich[18] provides an overview of other promising concept, that is, conformity.”
BackgroundBehavior Analysis, Darwinian Evolutionary Processes, and the Diversity of Human Behavior
Baum, W. M. (2016) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-420190-3.00024-7 · Cited by 11
Mchitarjan, I., & Reisenzein, R. (2014) · doi:10.1007/978-3-531-94126-4_8 · Cited by 9
Nieman, M. D. (2013) · doi:10.17077/etd.73jgwlpp
“Finally, Henrich (2004) extends this argument to the societal level, claiming that the human species’ evolved cultural learning capacities produce imitative abilities across complex social organizations.”
BackgroundBaschetti, R. (2007) · Medical Hypotheses · doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2007.03.020 · Cited by 8
Honest or Dishonest? Promoting Integrity in Loot Box Games Through Evolutionary Game Theory
Yin, H.-R., Sun, J.-X., & Cai, W. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems · doi:10.1109/tcss.2024.3376718 · Cited by 8
“In sociology, it analyzes social norms, cultural evolution, and social network dynamics [21], [22], [23].”
BackgroundHodgson, G. M. (2024) · Journal of evolutionary economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-024-00862-w · Cited by 8
“According to him, Social Darwinism could be found among libertarians such as Spencer and fascists such as Hitler.”
InfluentialA pull versus push framework for reputation
Jordan, J. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.06.005 · Cited by 14
“Norms that bene fi t groups, or that bene fi t individuals with coordinating power over groups, may be favored by equilibrium-selection processes [134,135]. not been well connected to the empirical reputation literature.”
Background“Doing what others do” does not stabilize continuous norms
Yan, M., Mathew, S., & Boyd, R. (2023) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgad054 · Cited by 8
Ebel, S. A., Burnham, M., & Reynolds, J. (2022) · Regional Environmental Change · doi:10.1007/s10113-022-01992-2 · Cited by 8
“2018; Safarzynska 2017) or defense against outsiders during times of colonization and neoliberal regimes (Boyd and Richerson 2002, 2009; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundCulture and group-functional punishment behaviour
Espín, A. M., Brañas‐Garza, P., Gamella, J. F., Herrmann, B., & Martín, J. (2022) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2022.32 · Cited by 9
“Decentralised (peer) punishment of free-riders has been shown to be a crucial element for understanding cooperation beyond kinship and small-scale groups (Gintis et al., 2003; Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004; Sigmund, 2007).”
BackgroundEntropy, directionality theory and the evolution of income inequality
Germano, F. (2022) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2022.03.017 · Cited by 8
The Evolution of Religion and Morality project: reflections and looking ahead
Purzycki, B. G., Lang, M., Henrich, J., & Norenzayan, A. (2022) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2021.2021546 · Cited by 14
“…ideas from the cognitive and evolutionary sciences (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Boyer, 2001; Bulbulia et al., 2008; Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Henrich, 2004; Johnson, 2005; McCauley, 2011; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Wilson, 2010), the project aimed to harness the world’s religious diversity to…”
BackgroundSelf-citationCultural Evolution Theory and Organizations
Brahm, F., & Poblete, J. (2022) · Organization Theory · doi:10.1177/26317877211069141 · Cited by 10
“…beliefs (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Wilson, 2010); in behavioral economics, it explains why we have prosocial preferences (Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2001); and in history, it has started to explain why major historical transitions occurred (Henrich 2020; Mokyr, 2016;…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe evolution of barriers to exploitation: Sometimes the Red Queen can take a break
Goodman, J., & Ewald, P. W. (2021) · Evolutionary Applications · doi:10.1111/eva.13280 · Cited by 11
“These findings have led to support for the cultural group selection hypothesis (see Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021), which emphasizes the importance of group cohesion, altruistic punishment, and social norms for survival in between- group competition and…”
BackgroundTwo of a kind: Are norms of honor a species of morality?
Handfield, T., & Thrasher, J. (2019) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-019-9693-z · Cited by 8
“Norms relating to fairness are important in building trust and reducing the risk of defection in cases of reciprocal exchange (McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith 2003; Henrich 2004; M. A. Nowak and Sigmund 2005).”
BackgroundSnowdon, M., & Cathcart, S. (2018) · Social Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17470919.2016.1273133 · Cited by 8
“That is, empathy (and by extension, prosocial behavior) is adaptive for “the good of the group” (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundCooperation Versus Competition in Works of Russian Evolutionists
Kirdina-Chandler, S., & Hall, J. (2017) · Journal of Institutional Studies · doi:10.17835/2076-6297.2017.9.1.006-026 · Cited by 8
Editorial: Prosocial and Antisocial Behavior in Economic Games
Brañas‐Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Herrmann, B., Kujal, P., & Nagel, R. (2016) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00243 · Cited by 8
“In particular, they confront the “mismatch” (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989) and the cultural group selection (Henrich, 2004) hypotheses.”
BackgroundKock, N., & Moqbel, M. A. (2016) · Journal of Systems and Information Technology · doi:10.1108/jsit-04-2015-0028 · Cited by 8
“The model highlights the interplay between individual and group effects that is characteristic of modern views of social evolution (Bergstrom, 2002; Fletcher & Zwick, 2007; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundWhy Sanction? Functional Causes of Punishment and Reward
Barclay, P., & Kiyonari, T. (2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199300730.003.0010 · Cited by 7
“Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. (1992).”
BackgroundInfluentialToward an Evolutionary and Moral Science
Hodgson, G. (2012) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.2753/jei0021-3624460202 · Cited by 8
Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply
Eide, E., von Simson, K., & Strøm, S. (2011) · FinanzArchiv Public Finance Analysis · doi:10.1628/001522111x600597 · Cited by 10
Honor among thieves: Cooperation as a strategic response to functional unpleasantness
Heller, W. B., & Sieberg, K. K. (2009) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.006 · Cited by 7
“3 See, e.g., Boyd et al. (2003), Boyd and Richerson (1992), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), Fehr et al. (2002), Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Fehr and Henrich (2003), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fowler (2005), Henrich (2004), Ostrom et al. (1992).”
BackgroundThe Role of “Instincts” in the Development of Corporate Cultures
Cordes, C. (2007) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2007.11507059 · Cited by 8
“Given multiple behavioral equilibria, cultural group selection represents a process that selects among alternative stable equilibria in favor of the ones most successful in competing with other groups, thereby generating a mechanism of equilibrium selection that favors prosociality (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialPaciotti, B. M., & Hadley, C. (2004) · Research in economic anthropology · doi:10.1016/s0190-1281(04)23005-0 · Cited by 6
“However, the most important question to MI researchers (Smith, 2003), as well as those working from a CIT perspective (Henrich, 2003), is to understand the origins of institutions; assuming social institutions resolve the cooperation problem only pushes the problem to a different level: what processes generated the so…”
BackgroundInfluentialDo you believe in atheists? Trust and anti-atheist prejudice
Gervais, W. M. (2008) · doi:10.14288/1.0066560 · Cited by 8
“But neither can completely explain the degree of large-scale cooperation observed cross culturally, even in anonymous one-shot games (Henrich, 2004; Henrich, et. al, 2005).”
BackgroundInfluentialCrowdsourcing of Inventive Activities, AI, and the NIH Syndrome
Burger-Helmchen, T. (2024) · Administrative Sciences · doi:10.3390/admsci14110300 · Cited by 7
“Cultural change can also be represented in terms of the degree of conformity of individuals (Henrich 2004).”
Conformity and adaptation in groups
Bose, G., Dechter, E. K., & Ivancic, L. (2023) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.006 · Cited by 11
The transition from animal to human culture—simulating the social protocell hypothesis
Andersson, C., & Czárán, T. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0416 · Cited by 8
Steps to individuality in biology and culture
Davison, D. R., & Michod, R. E. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0407 · Cited by 8
Arai, S., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2022) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.10.002 · Cited by 9
The influence of signs of social class on compassionate responses to people in need
Callaghan, B., Delgadillo, Q. M., & Kraus, M. W. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.936170 · Cited by 9
“These accounts of reciprocal altruism hinge on the assumption that altruists will choose to benefit those perceived as altruistic themselves (Trivers, 1971; Frank, 1988; Henrich, 2004), other kin (Hamilton, 1964), or others who are deemed trustworthy.”
BackgroundEmpathy and the Evolutionary Emergence of Guilt
Ramsey, G., & Deem, M. J. (2022) · Philosophia Scientiæ · doi:10.1017/psa.2021.36 · Cited by 7
Creating a Shared Representational SpacePreprint
Oláh, K., Elekes, F., & Király, I. (2019) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/g2z74 · Cited by 9
Hodgson, G. (2019) · Institutions and Evolution of Capitalism · doi:10.4337/9781781953518.00020 · Cited by 7
The Study of Culture and Evolution across DisciplinesPreprint
Mesoudi, A. (2018) · The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior · doi:10.31235/osf.io/epdfv · Cited by 7
A Trojan Horse for Sociology? Preferences versus Evolution and Morality
Hodgson, G. (2015) · Review of Behavioral Economics · doi:10.1561/105.00000021 · Cited by 7
“We now have rigorous accounts of possible mechanisms group selection mechanisms, including the important distinction between genetic and cultural group selection (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundChristiansen, M. H. (2013) · Studies in language companion series · doi:10.1075/slcs.144.18chr · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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