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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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Bergmüller, R., Schürch, R., & Hamilton, I. M. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0124 · Cited by 127
“Hence, cooperative personalities or individual differences in cooperative type have been almost entirely neglected in research on the evolution and stability of cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Trivers 1985; Alexander 1987; Dugatkin 1997; Hammerstein 2003; Henrich 2004; van Schaik & Kappeler 2006; Henrich & Henrich 2007), t…”
Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture?
Bednar, J., & Page, S. (2007) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463107075108 · Cited by 129
Shennan, S. J. (2008) · Annual Review of Anthropology · doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.37.081407.085153 · Cited by 172
“Some (e.g., Henrich 2004) depend on cultural group selection.”
BackgroundManaging complex adaptive systems — A co-evolutionary perspective on natural resource management
Rammel, C., Stagl, S., & Wilfing, H. (2007) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2006.12.014 · Cited by 405
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Self-citationThe Evolution of Tag-Based Cooperation in Humans
Cohen, E. E. A. (2012) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/667654 · Cited by 152
“Henrich (2004) directly challenged the assumption commonly built into these models of an a priori bias in favor of tag-marked cooperators and against defectors.”
BackgroundTHE FALSE ALLURE OF GROUP SELECTION
Pinker, S. (2015) · doi:10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych236 · Cited by 122
An Evolutionary Perspective on the Economics of Energy Consumption: The Crucial Role of Habits
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“As it has extensively been shown to be the case of some socially-acquired characteristics of human beings that are better explained by group level analysis (Henrich 2004), the sole selection operating at the individual level can not serve to explain what exists and happens today.”
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Schloss, J. P., & Murray, M. J. (2011) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2011.558707 · Cited by 115
“However, though often conflated with its genetic cousin, the cultural group selection argument requires fewer and less strenuous situational preconditions and provides a very plausible mechanism for the selection and transmission of cooperative norms (Henrich, 2004).”
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“Cooperation is a skill necessary to maintaining the group, both for food sharing and fostering more general social relationships with family and friends (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundRicherson, P., & Henrich, J. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1368756 · Cited by 118
“In humans, competition between groups can take the form of warfare, demographic production, or more subtle forms in which individuals learn decisions and strategies by observing higher-payoff individuals—some of whom are from groups with more group beneficial institutions (Henrich 2004).”
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Natural selection. VII. History and interpretation of kin selection theory
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“…does fall within my scope (Wade, 1978; Uyenoyama & Feldman, 1980; Wilson, 1983; Grafen, 1984; Nunney, 1985; Wade, 1985; Heisler & Damuth, 1987; Queller, 1992a; Dugatkin & Reeve, 1994; Soltis et al., 1995; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Henrich, 2004; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006; West et al., 2008; Leigh, 2010).”
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Outsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment.
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“…explored at greater length elsewhere (Andersen 2004; Frank 1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Pepper and Knudsen 2001; Price 1995; Knudsen 2002, 2004; Henrich 2004) and summarized in the Appendix below. when information is transferred, in processes where an entity develops, or as a result of…”
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“The fact that participants tend to offer some amount, when the offering of nothing unambiguously maximizes their returns, has been presented as evidence that humans do not behave in ways that maximize wealth and have the capacity to act altruistically (Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al., 2004).”
BackgroundAdaptive Social Learning Strategies in Temporally and Spatially Varying Environments
Nakahashi, W., Wakano, J. Y., & Henrich, J. (2012) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-012-9151-y · Cited by 104
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“…to align with each other have evolved (and developed), group-level alignment (e.g., parochialism, common values and ways of doing things) can evolve, potentially as a result of pressures such as inter-group competition and cultural group-selection (Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundUnderstanding Organizational Evolution: Toward a Research Agenda using Generalized Darwinism
Hodgson, G. (2013) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840613485855 · Cited by 106
“- 14 Seventh, the application of Darwinian principles to the evolution of social entities opens up a further agenda by building a bridge with the rapidly-growing body of research on the evolution of social cooperation (Hammerstein, 2003; Henrich, 2004; Bowles and Gintis 2011).”
BackgroundHuman Identity and the Evolution of Societies
Moffett, M. W. (2013) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-013-9170-3 · Cited by 131
“This would make it advantageous, even as necessary for survival as it is for a displaying animal, for each person to broadcast the correct identity signals as a show of normative conformity (Henrich 2004a).”
BackgroundFogarty, L., Strimling, P., & Laland, K. N. (2011) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01370.x · Cited by 141
Contagion of accounting methods: evidence from stock option expensing
Reppenhagen, D. A. (2010) · doi:10.1007/s11142-010-9128-1 · Cited by 105
“This is because in an uncertain environment when the determinants of success are not directly observable, often the best strategy is to copy the behavior of those that are successful (Alchian 1950, Henrich 2004).”
Towards a mechanistic foundation of evolutionary theory
Doebeli, M., Ispolatov, Y., & Simon, B. (2017) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.23804 · Cited by 104
“This could serve to investigate the phenomenon of cultural group selection (Henrich, 2004; Purzycki et al., 2016).”
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“50See, for example, Henrich (2004), Bowles and Gintis (2011), Chudek and Henrich (2011), and Young (2015).”
BackgroundThe ontogeny of human prosociality: behavioral experiments with children aged 3 to 8
House, B. R., Henrich, J., Brosnan, S. F., & Silk, J. B. (2012) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.10.007 · Cited by 105
“…the evolution of prosocial preferences is linked to derived human traits, including the capacities that give rise to cumulative cultural evolution (Henrich, 2004) and group-level cooperation (Silk et al., 2005; Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, & van Schaik, 2007), in humans, but not our closest primate…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationReciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, F. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000069 · Cited by 526
“In the field, social learning and cultural transmission (learning from peers, teachers, parents) teach people what constitutes socially acceptable behavior and what gets punished (e.g., Henrich 2004).”
Population Thinking, Price’s Equation and the Analysis of Economic Evolution
Andersen, E. (2004) · Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review · doi:10.14441/eier.1.127 · Cited by 102
“JEL: O30, O40.”
MethodModels of the evolution of fairness in the ultimatum game: a review and classification
Debove, S., Baumard, N., & André, J. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.01.001 · Cited by 101
The explanatory logic and ontological commitments of generalized Darwinism
Stoelhorst, J. W. (2008) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/13501780802506661 · Cited by 84
Accounting is an Evolved Economic Institution
Waymire, G. B., & Basu, S. (2008) · Foundations and Trends® in Accounting · doi:10.1561/1400000011 · Cited by 102
“Culture alters an organism’s environment through specific cultural variants (ideas, concepts, or institutions) that have average fitness consequences for all members of the group that adopts such practices (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundCollaborative Enterprise and Sustainability: The Case of Slow Food
Tencati, A., & Zsolnai, L. (2012) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1178-1 · Cited by 97
“Evolutionary models of moral behaviour suggest that the survival and flourishment of altruistic agents depends especially on the effect of their local groups on their fitness (Henrich 2004; Manner and Gowdy 2010).”
BackgroundThe economics of climate change and the change of climate in economics
Maréchal, K. (2007) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.05.009 · Cited by 93
“More precisely, some socially acquired characteristics of human beings (like the above-mentioned ‘‘strong reciprocity’’) are better explained by group-level analysis (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundMethodEudaimonia as a Way of Living: Connecting Aristotle with Self-Determination Theory
Ryan, R. M., & Martela, F. (2016) · International handbooks of quality-of-life · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-42445-3_7 · Cited by 120
“Wilson, 2003) have also been suggested as explanations, although their explanatory power beyond other mechanisms continues to be debated (e.g. Gardner & Grafen, 2009; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundMouden, C. E., André, J., Morin, O., & Nettle, D. (2014) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/jeb.12296 · Cited by 94
Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
Shinada, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.001 · Cited by 115
“) than in the original public good dilemma (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 2001; Sober & Wilson, 1998).”
BackgroundGuzmán, R. A., Rodríguez‐Sickert, C., & Rowthorn, R. E. (2006) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.08.002 · Cited by 88
“Henrich and Boyd (2001) and Henrich (2004) observe that conformism to norms that are costly to the individual is most likely to evolve in tandem with individually beneficial conformism.”
BackgroundResultThe dual evolutionary foundations of political ideology
Claessens, S., Fischer, K., Chaudhuri, A., Sibley, C. G., & Atkinson, Q. D. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0850-9 · Cited by 133
Human large-scale cooperation as a product of competition between cultural groups
Handley, C., & Mathew, S. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-14416-8 · Cited by 135
An evolutionary theory of large‐scale human warfare: Group‐structured cultural selection
Zefferman, M., & Mathew, S. (2015) · Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21439 · Cited by 113
The logic of universalization guides moral judgment
Levine, S., Kleiman-Weiner, M., Schulz, L., Tenenbaum, J., & Cushman, F. (2020) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2014505117 · Cited by 88
“Thus, biologically or culturally evolved moral norms tend toward payoff-maximizing rules that everyone would agree to (49).”
Evolving intrinsic motivations for altruistic behavior
Wang, J. X., Hughes, E., Fernando, C., Czarnecki, W., Duéñez-Guzmán, E. A., & Leibo, J. (2018) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1811.05931 · Cited by 85
“Although there is ecological evidence of assortative matchmaking [33], it cannot explain cooperation in all taxa [17, 18, 25].”
BackgroundMethodNiche Construction and the Evolution of Leadership
Spisak, B. R., O'Brien, M. J., Nicholson, N., & van Vugt, M. (2015) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0157 · Cited by 85
“A version relevant to the study of organizations is referred to as “cultural group selection” (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundIntegrating simultaneous prosocial and antisocial behavior into theories of collective action
Basurto, X., Blanco, E., Nenadović, M., & Vollan, B. (2016) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.1501220 · Cited by 86
Parochial altruism: does it explain modern human group psychology?
Yamagishi, T., & Mifune, N. (2015) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.015 · Cited by 114
Gurven, M., Zanolini, A., & Schniter, E. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.005 · Cited by 82
“These mechanisms include prestige-bias (i.e. imitate actions of high prestige individuals) and frequency-dependent bias (i.e. imitate most common behavior) (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
Reciprocity Outperforms Conformity to Promote Cooperation
Romano, A., & Balliet, D. P. (2017) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797617714828 · Cited by 95
“Another framework emphasizes how people learn norms, including norms to cooperate (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundConcessions, Violence, and Indirect Rule: Evidence from the Congo Free State
Lowes, S., & Montero, E. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w27893 · Cited by 51
Cultural Transmission Can Inhibit the Evolution of Altruistic Helping
Lehmann, L., Feldman, M. W., & Foster, K. R. (2008) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/587851 · Cited by 86
“This result seems to be at variance with the view that group-beneficial norms can spread rapidly as a result of cultural group selection when transmission follows these imitation schemes (Boyd and Richerson 2002; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialCulture-Gene Coevolution, Large-Scale Cooperation, and the Shaping of Human Social Psychology
Chudek, M., Zhao, W.-Y., & Henrich, J. (2013) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9033.003.0024 · Cited by 64
Self-citationGeneralizing Darwinism to Social Evolution: Some Early Attempts
Hodgson, G. (2005) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2005.11506859 · Cited by 78
O'Gorman, R., Wilson, D., & Miller, R. R. (2005) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.12.006 · Cited by 78
“Not only is this claim implausible, based on what we know about the ancestral social environment (Fehr et al., 2002; Henrich, 2004), but it is undermined by our experimental results, which show that people are fully capable of discriminating information regarding genetic relatedness and potential…”
ResultBody counts in lowland South American violence
Walker, R. S., & Bailey, D. H. (2012) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.08.003 · Cited by 86
“Mulitlevel selection is more salient when there is more genetic variance between groups and when these groups are in direct competition with one another, allowing the benefits of being in an altruistic group to outweigh within-group costs of altruistic behavior (Price, 1970; Frank, 1998; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundGummerum, M., & Chu, M. T. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.06.001 · Cited by 97
“Theories of morality suggest that norms are learned and upheld through positive (e.g., praise) or negative (i.e., punishment) reinforcement (Aronfreed, 1961; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundGENERALIZATION OF THE PRICE EQUATION FOR EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
Kerr, B., & Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009) · Evolution; international journal of organic evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2008.00570.x · Cited by 76
Testing major evolutionary hypotheses about religion with a random sample
Wilson, D. (2005) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-005-1016-1 · Cited by 74
Economic Cosmology and the Evolutionary Challenge
Gowdy, J., Dollimore, D. E., Wilson, D., & Witt, U. (2013) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.009 · Cited by 73
Meeting now suggests we will meet again: Implications for debates on the evolution of cooperation
Krasnow, M. M., Delton, A. W., Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01747 · Cited by 79
Can stable social groups be maintained by homophilous imitation alone?
Durrett, R. T., & Levin, S. A. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.017 · Cited by 64
“JEL classification:C0; C7; D7 Keywords:Social norms; Mathematical model; Cooperation; Group formation; Group dynamics; Homophily”
BackgroundZeng, T. C., Aw, A. J., & Feldman, M. W. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-04375-6 · Cited by 118
“It is very plausible that in addition to competition in which size alone confers survival advantage — so-called selection for large groups (see Henrich, 2004) — differences in cultural innovations or toolkits act as a secondary mechanism of selection among these groups.”
BackgroundViewing men's faces does not lead to accurate predictions of trustworthiness
Efferson, C. M., & Vogt, S. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01047 · Cited by 68
Social evolution theory: a review of methods and approaches
Wenseleers, T., Gardner, A., & Foster, K. R. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781360.013 · Cited by 83
Muthukrishna, M., & Schaller, M. (2019) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868319855783 · Cited by 83
“Although there are many sophisticated models of cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2004), it is rare for these models to explicitly simulate the geometric properties that define the social network structures of real human populations.”
BackgroundNatural selection. I. Variable environments and uncertain returns on investment *
Frank, S. A. (2011) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2011.02378.x · Cited by 71
Overcoming inertia: insights from evolutionary economics into improved energy and climate policies
Maréchal, K., & Lazaric, N. (2010) · Climate Policy · doi:10.3763/cpol.2008.0601 · Cited by 70
“CLIMATE POLICY As mentioned by Gowdy (2004), the mainstream paradigm is the dominant standard among economists and their audience.1 It thus provides the theoretical background on which policymaking is based.”
BackgroundThe coevolution of economic institutions and sustainable consumption via cultural group selection
Waring, T. M., Goff, S., & Smaldino, P. E. (2016) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.09.022 · Cited by 77
“Differential between-group imitation, or imitative group selection, is one of three mechanisms of cultural group selection, along with differential between-group proliferation andmigration (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundThe Superorganism Account of Human Sociality
Kesebir, S. (2011) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868311430834 · Cited by 69
“Another example of a positive feedback loop involving human superorganismic traits is the coevolution of cooperative cultural norms and genes for cooperation (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundGenetic differentiation and the evolution of cooperation in chimpanzees and humans.
Langergraber, K., Schubert, G., Rowney, C., Wrangham, R., Zommers, Z., & Vigilant, L. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2592 · Cited by 67
“Thus, the long-term social 42 relationships based on kin selection and reciprocity that underlie cooperation in many 43 other animals, particularly other primates, appear to be insufficient to account for the 44 evolution of cooperation in humans [1-4].”
BackgroundBallistically anomalous stone projectile points in Australia
Newman, K., & Moore, M. W. (2013) · Journal of Archaeological Science · doi:10.1016/j.jas.2013.01.023 · Cited by 67
Children's sensitivity to the knowledge expressed in pedagogical and nonpedagogical contexts.
Gelman, S. A., Ware, E. A., Manczak, E. M., & Graham, S. A. (2012) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0027901 · Cited by 68
“…to be universal (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), there is also cross-cultural variation in the explicitness and frequency of overt pedagogical practices (Henrich, 2004; Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2003), with more direct and formal teaching in Western societies than in traditional societies.”
Koopmans, R., & Rebers, S. (2009) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.01.003 · Cited by 64
“Keywords: Collective action; Public goods; Cultural group selection; Parochialism; Conditional cooperation”
BackgroundInfluentialA naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: the role of cooperation and cultural evolution
Cordes, C., Richerson, P., Mcelreath, R., & Strimling, P. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.008 · Cited by 67
“3 Which is the dominant theme of transaction cost based explanations of the “nature of the firm” (see Coase 1937; Williamson 1985). induced to work more than minimally, and, what is more, perhaps even with initiative and enthusiasm (see Simon 1991).”
BackgroundInfluentialLehmann, L., & Feldman, M. W. (2008) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2008.02.004 · Cited by 85
“…has been proposed as the primary assimilation rule allowing high cultural relatedness to be maintained between groupmembers (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004), and favoring the evolution of culturally-inherited altruistic helping in large groups (Boyd and Richerson, 1982; Richerson and Boyd,…”
BackgroundInfluentialApplying cultural evolution to sustainability challenges: an introduction to the special issue
Brooks, J. S., Waring, T. M., Mulder, M. B., & Richerson, P. J. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0516-3 · Cited by 86
“Thus, there is value in synthesizing the theoretical (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich 2004) and empirical literature (Campbell 1969; McElreath et al.”
BackgroundInfluentialIs cooperativeness readable in static facial features? An inter-cultural approach
Tognetti, A., Berticat, C., Michel Raymond, A., & Faurie, C. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.08.002 · Cited by 61
“…& Maynes, 1998; Keser, 1996; Keser & VanWinden, 2000; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999) and small-scale societies (Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011; Henrich, 2000; Henrich, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005; Lamba & Mace, 2011), remains a puzzle for evolutionary biologists (Alexander, 2006; Boyd & Richerson, 2009).”
Behavior under Extreme Conditions: The Titanic Disaster
Frey, B. S., Savage, D. A., & Torgler, B. (2011) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.25.1.209 · Cited by 65
Reyes‐García, V., Guèze, M., Díaz‐Reviriego, I., Duda, R., Fernández‐Llamazares, Á., Gallois, S., Napitupulu, L., Orta‐Martínez, M., & Pyhälä, A. (2016) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/689307 · Cited by 74
“Furthermore, most previous work on the adaptive nature of culture has focused on group characteristics, such as cultural traits favoring group success (Henrich 2004; Soltis, Boyd, andRicherson 1995), thus largely neglecting individuals’ contributions to the adaptive process.”
BackgroundHerzfeld, T., & Jongeneel, R. A. (2011) · Land Use Policy · doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2011.06.014 · Cited by 61
“Within the literature about reciprocity, several authors describe the orientation of own behaviour with regard to certain reference groups with the terms ‘conditional cooperation’, ‘conformity’ or the ‘desire of social approval’ (Pretty and Ward, 2001; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Henrich, 2004).”
InfluentialThe past and the future of business marketing theory
Wilkinson, I., & Young, L. C. (2013) · Industrial Marketing Management · doi:10.1016/j.indmarman.2013.02.007 · Cited by 60
Caricola, I., Zupancich, A., Moscone, D., Mutri, G., Falcucci, A., Duches, R., Peresani, M., & Cristiani, E. (2018) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207773 · Cited by 67
“The techno-cultural choices of these groups, for example in relation to a general evolution of human cognition and social interaction, could have been much more complex [65].”
BackgroundSelf-Interest and the Design of Rules
Singh, M., Wrangham, R. W., & Glowacki, L. (2017) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-017-9298-7 · Cited by 80
Altman, M. (2005) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2005.06.004 · Cited by 62
Zeder, M. A. (2018) · Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21747 · Cited by 99
“But the efficacy of these mechanisms declines substantially with increasing group size and higher coresidence with more distant relatives or, especially, unrelated individuals.(86,87) Promoting altruistic, cooperative behaviors in such circumstances requires a shift away from within-group selection mechanisms that ten…”
BackgroundPleasant, A., & Barclay, P. (2018) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797617752642 · Cited by 60
“Theories of normative conformity suggest that norm violators are punished simply for deviating from group norms, whether those deviations involve cooperating too little or too much (Henrich, 2004; Van Dijk et al., 2015).”
BackgroundLeibo, J. Z., Hughes, E., Lanctot, M., & Graepel, T. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1903.00742 · Cited by 60
Monitoring, reputation, and ‘greenbeard’ reciprocity in a Shuar work team
Price, M. E. (2006) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.347 · Cited by 63
“…that greenbeard altruism may evolve if genetic altruists can recognize and cooperate preferentially with each other, so that there is a better-than-average chance that their altruism will benefit another genetic altruist, rather than a free rider (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialGoverning the innovation commons
Potts, J. (2017) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137417000479 · Cited by 100
Kovaka, K., Santana, C., Patel, R. N., Akçay, E., & Weisberg, M. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15001077 · Cited by 59
Schaller, M., Norenzayan, A., Heine, S. J., Yamagishi, T., & Kameda, T. (2011) · doi:10.4324/9780203848746-15 · Cited by 59
The Influence of Social Category and Reciprocity on Adults' and Children's Altruistic Behavior
Gummerum, M., Takezawa, M., & Keller, M. (2009) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/147470490900700212 · Cited by 59
“Evolutionary theories have focused on two major accounts to explain altruism among non-kin: reciprocity (e.g., Trivers, 1971) and cultural group selection (e.g., Henrich, 2004; Richerson and Boyd, 2005), with people acting more altruistically toward members of their ingroup.”
BackgroundInfluentialNorenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000655 · Cited by 58
Self-citationProsocial modeling: A meta-analytic review and synthesis.
Jung, H., Seo, E., Han, E., Henderson, M. D., & Patall, E. A. (2020) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000235 · Cited by 80
Generative inference for cultural evolution
Kandler, A., & Powell, A. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0056 · Cited by 70
The evolution of social and moral behavior: Evolutionary insights for public policy
Manner, M., & Gowdy, J. M. (2008) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.04.021 · Cited by 58
“Henrich (2004) notes that a purely genetic approach cannot explain the degree of pro-social behavior observed in humans.”
BackgroundEnvironmental and Pro-Social Norms: Evidence on Littering
Torgler, B., Frey, B., & Wilson, C. (2009) · doi:10.2202/1935-1682.1929 · Cited by 58
“As an alternative to reciprocity, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 2004) has been used to explain conditional cooperation.”
MethodRandom neighbor elite guided differential evolution for global numerical optimization
Yang, Q., Yan, J.-Q., Gao, X.-D., Xu, D., Lu, Z.-Y., & Zhang, J. (2022) · Information Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.ins.2022.06.029 · Cited by 57
Reputation-based strategy persistence promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemma
He, J., Wang, J., Yu, F., & Zheng, L. (2020) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2020.126703 · Cited by 60
Cooperation, Culture, and Conflict
Sterelny, K. (2014) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axu024 · Cited by 81
“and Henrich, J. [2013]: ‘Culture–Gene Coevolution, Large Scale”
BackgroundLadley, D., Wilkinson, I., & Young, L. C. (2015) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.02.020 · Cited by 52
“His results have led others to reexamine theories of cooperation in animal and social systems, for example see research by Henrich, 2004 andWilson & Sober, 1994).”
BackgroundFairness in multi-agent systems
JONG, S. D., Tuyls, K., & Verbeeck, K. (2008) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s026988890800132x · Cited by 46
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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