The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
Citations
Cites
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 116
- Alexander, 1974, The evolution of social behavior, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 5, 325, 10.1146/annurev.es.05.110174.001545 · DOI
- Alexander, R., 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine De Gruyter, New York.
- Aoki, 1982, A condition for group selection to prevail over counteracting individual selection, Evolution, 36, 832, 10.2307/2407896 · DOI
- Asch, S.E., 1951. Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. In: Guetzkow, H. (Ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Carnegie, Pittsburgh, pp. 177–190.
- Axelrod, 1986, An evolutionary approach to norms, American Political Science Review, 80, 1095, 10.2307/1960858 · DOI
- Axelrod, 1981, The evolution of cooperation, Science, 211, 1390, 10.1126/science.7466396 · DOI · Paper page
- Axelrod, 1988, The further evolution of cooperation, Science, 242, 1385, 10.1126/science.242.4884.1385 · DOI
- Ball, 2001, Status in markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 155, 161, 10.1162/003355301556374 · DOI
- Baron, 1996, The forgotten variable in conformity research: impact of task importance on social influence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 915, 10.1037/0022-3514.71.5.915 · DOI
- Batson, 1991, Evidence for alturism: toward a pluralism of prosocial motives, Psychological Inquiry, 2, 107, 10.1207/s15327965pli0202_1 · DOI
- Bendor, 1987, Institutional structure and the logic of ongoing collective action, The American Political Science Review, 81, 129, 10.2307/1960782 · DOI
- Ben-Ner, 2000, Some implications of evolutionary psychology for the study of preferences and institutions, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 43, 91, 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00110-4 · DOI
- Bliege Bird, 1997, Delayed reciprocity and tolerated theft: the behavioral ecology of food-sharing strategies, Current Anthropology, 38, 49, 10.1086/204581 · DOI
- Bolton, 1998, Dictator game giving: rules of fairness versus acts of kindness, International Journal of Game Theory, 27, 269, 10.1007/s001820050072 · DOI · Paper page
- Boorman, S., Levitt, P., 1980. The Genetics of Altruism. Academic Press, New York.
- Bowles, S., 2001. Individual interactions, group conflicts, and the evolution of preferences. In: Durlauf, S., Young, P. (Eds.), Social Dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 155–190. · DOI
- Boyd, 1988, Is the repeated prisoner’s dilemma a good model of reciprocal altruism?, Ethology and Sociobiology, 9, 211, 10.1016/0162-3095(88)90022-2 · DOI
- Boyd, 1989, Mistakes allow evolutionary stability in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 136, 47, 10.1016/S0022-5193(89)80188-2 · DOI
- Boyd, 1987, No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner’s dilemma game, Nature, 32, 58, 10.1038/327058a0 · DOI
- Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J., 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
- Boyd, 1987, The evolution of ethnic markers, Cultural Anthropology, 2, 27, 10.1525/can.1987.2.1.02a00070 · DOI
- Boyd, 1988, The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 132, 337, 10.1016/S0022-5193(88)80219-4 · DOI
- Boyd, 1989, The evolution of indirect reciprocity, Social Networks, 11, 213, 10.1016/0378-8733(89)90003-8 · DOI · Paper page
- Boyd, 1990, Group selection among alternative evolutionarily stable strategies, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 145, 331, 10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80113-4 · DOI
- Boyd, 1992, Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups, Ethology and Sociobiology, 13, 171, 10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y · DOI · Paper page
- Boyd, 1996, Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare, Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 77
- Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J., 2000. Memes: universal acid or a better mouse trap. In: Aunger, R. (Ed.), Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 143–162. · DOI
- Boyd, 2002, Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 215, 287, 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515 · DOI · Paper page
- Boyd, R., Richerson, P., 2002b. Solving the puzzle of human cooperation. In: Levinson, S. (Ed.), Evolution and Culture. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Brown, 2001, Apportionment of racial diversity: a review, Evolutionary Anthropology, 10, 34, 10.1002/1520-6505(2001)10:1<34::AID-EVAN1011>3.0.CO;2-P · DOI
- Brown, 2002, Smile asymmetries and reputation as reliable indicators of likelihood to cooperate: an evolutionary analysis, Advances in Psychological Research, 11, 59
- Cavalli-Sforza, L.L., Menozzi, P., Piazza, A., 1994. The History and Geography of Human Genes. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Crow, 1982, Group selection for a polygenic behavioral trait: a differential proliferation model, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 79, 2628, 10.1073/pnas.79.8.2628 · DOI
- Davis, D.D., Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Dawkins, R., 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Dawkins, R., 1982. The Extended Phenotype. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Ekman, 1991, Who can catch a liar?, American Psychologist, 46, 913, 10.1037/0003-066X.46.9.913 · DOI
- Ellison, 1993, Rules of thumb for social learning, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 612, 10.1086/261890 · DOI
- Fehr, E., Henrich, J. (forthcoming). Is strong reciprocity a maladaption? In: Hammerstein, P. (Ed.), Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Fehr, 2002, Strong reciprocity, human cooperation and the enforcement of social norms, Human Nature, 13, 1, 10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7 · DOI
- Fletcher, D.J.C., Michener, C.D., 1987. Kin Recognition in Animals. Wiley, New York.
- Frank, 1995, George price’s contributions to evolutionary genetics, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 175, 373, 10.1006/jtbi.1995.0148 · DOI
- Frank, S.A., 1998. Foundations of Social Evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Frank, 1993, The evolution of one-shot cooperation: an experiment, Ethology and Sociobiology, 14, 247, 10.1016/0162-3095(93)90020-I · DOI
- Fudenberg, 1986, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information, Econometrica, 54, 533, 10.2307/1911307 · DOI · Paper page
- Furnham, 1984, Studies of cross-cultural conformity: a brief and critical review, Psychologia: An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient, 27, 65
- Gintis, 2000, Strong reciprocity and human sociality, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 206, 169, 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2111 · DOI
- Gintis, 2001, Costly signaling and cooperation, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 213, 103, 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 · DOI
- Hamilton, 1972, Altruism and related phenomena, mainly in the social insects, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 3, 192, 10.1146/annurev.es.03.110172.001205 · DOI
- Hamilton, W.D., 1975. Innate social aptitudes of man: an approach from evolutionary genetics. In: Fox, R. (Ed.), Biosocial Anthropology. Malaby Press, London, pp. 133–156.
- Hayek, F., 1979. The political order of a free people. Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. · DOI
- Henrich, 1998, The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of between-group differences, Evolution and Human Behavior, 19, 215, 10.1016/S1090-5138(98)00018-X · DOI
- Henrich, 2001, Why people punish defectors: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208, 79, 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · DOI
- Henrich, 2002, On modeling cultural evolution: why replicators are not necessary for cultural evolution, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2, 87, 10.1163/156853702320281836 · DOI
- Henrich, J., Smith, N., in press. Comparative experimental evidence from Peru, Chile and the US shows substantial variation among social groups. In: Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Gintis, H., Fehr, E., Camerer, C. (Eds.), Cooperation, Punishment and Self Interest: Experimental and Ethnographic Evidence from 15 Small Scale Societies. Oxford University Press, New York, and University of Michigan.
- Henrich, 2001, In search of Homo economicus: experiments in 15 small-scale societies, American Economic Review, 91, 73, 10.1257/aer.91.2.73 · DOI
- Hirshleifer, 1982, Evolutionary models in economics and law: cooperation vs. conflict strategies, Research in Law and Economics, 4, 1
- Hirshleifer, 1988, What strategies can support the evolutionary emergence of cooperation, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32, 367, 10.1177/0022002788032002006 · DOI
- Hirshleifer, 1989, Cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma with ostracism, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12, 87, 10.1016/0167-2681(89)90078-4 · DOI · Paper page
- Hoffman, 1998, Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: experimental economics and evolutionary psychology, Economic Inquiry, 36, 335, 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x · DOI
- Insko, 1985, Conformity and group size: the concern with being right and the concern with being liked, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 41, 10.1177/0146167285111004 · DOI
- Johnson, A., 2003. Families of the Forest: Matsigenka Indians of the Peruvian Amazon. University of California, Berkeley, CA. · DOI
- Johnson, A., Earle, T., 1987. The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State. Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- Joshi, 1987, Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes, Journal of Genetics, 66, 69, 10.1007/BF02934456 · DOI
- Kagel, J.H., Roth, A.E., 1995. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. · DOI
- Keller, 1998, Reasoning about relationships and obligations in close relationships: a comparison across two cultures, Developmental Psychology, 34, 731, 10.1037/0012-1649.34.4.731 · DOI
- Kelly, R.C., 1985. The Nuer Conquest. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
- Kelly, 1992, Restricted migration and the evolution of altruism, Evolution, 46, 1492, 10.2307/2409952 · DOI
- Kroll, 1992, Further tests of the separation theorem and the capital asset pricing model, American Economic Review, 82, 664
- Ledyard, J.O., 1995. Public goods: a survey of experimental research. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 111–194. · DOI · Paper page
- Lee, R.B., 1979. The !Kung San: Men, Women, and Work in a Foraging Society. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Lorberbaum, 1994, No strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 168, 117, 10.1006/jtbi.1994.1092 · DOI
- Lorberbaum, 2002, Are there really no evolutionary stable strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 214, 155, 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2455 · DOI
- Low, B.S., 2000. Why Sex Matters: A Darwinian Look at Human Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Maynard Smith, 1998, The origin of altruism, Nature, 393, 639, 10.1038/31383 · DOI
- McAdams, 1998, The origin, development and regulation of norms, Michigan Law Review, 96, 338, 10.2307/1290070 · DOI
- McCabe, 2000, Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: why does game form matter?, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 97, 4404, 10.1073/pnas.97.8.4404 · DOI
- McElreath, 2003, Shared norms can lead to the evolution of ethnic markers, Current Anthropology, 44, 123, 10.1086/345689 · DOI
- Neto, 1995, Conformity and independence revisited, Social Behavior and Personality, 23, 217, 10.2224/sbp.1995.23.3.217 · DOI
- Ockenfels, 2000, An experiment on the hypothesis of involuntary truth-signaling in bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 90, 10.1006/game.1999.0762 · DOI
- Offerman, 1998, Learning by experience and learning by imitating others, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34, 559, 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00109-1 · DOI
- Patton, J.Q., 2000. Reciprocal altruism and warfare: a case from the Ecuadorian Amazon. In: Cronk, L., Chagnon, N., Irons, W. (Eds.), Adaption and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective. Aldine de Gruyter, New York, pp. 417–436. · DOI
- Pingle, 1995, Imitation vs. rationality: an experimental perspective on decision-making, Journal of Socio-economics, 24, 281, 10.1016/1053-5357(95)90023-3 · DOI
- Pingle, 1996, Modes of economizing behavior: experimental evidence, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29, 191, 10.1016/0167-2681(95)00059-3 · DOI
- Price, 1970, Selection and covariance, Nature, 227, 520, 10.1038/227520a0 · DOI · Paper page
- Price, 1972, Extensions of covariance selection mathematics, Annals of Human Genetics, 35, 485, 10.1111/j.1469-1809.1957.tb01874.x · DOI
- Queller, 1992, A general model for kin selection, Evolution, 46, 376, 10.2307/2409858 · DOI
- Queller, 1992, Quantitative genetics, inclusive fitness, and group selection, The American Naturalist, 139, 541, 10.1086/285343 · DOI
- Rappaport, R.A., 1984. Pigs for the Ancestors. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Richerson, 2000, Complex societies: the evolutionary dynamics of a crude superorganism, Human Nature, 10, 253, 10.1007/s12110-999-1004-y · DOI · Paper page
- Ridley, M., 1993. The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature. Penguin Books, New York.
- Rogers, 1990, Group selection by selective emigration: the effects of migration and kin structure, The American Naturalist, 135, 339, 10.1086/285053 · DOI
- Rogers, E.M., 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. Free Press, New York.
- Roscoe, 2002, The hunters and gatherers of new guinea, Current Anthropology, 43, 153, 10.1086/338289 · DOI
- Rosekrans, 1967, Imitation in children as a function of perceived similarity to a social model and vicarious reinforcement, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 307, 10.1037/h0025072 · DOI
- Roth, 1991, Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study, American Economic Review, 81, 1068
- Sepher, J., 1983. Incest, the Biosocial View. Academic Press, New York. · DOI
- Smith, 1994, Conformity as a determinant of behavior in a resource dilemma, Journal of Social Psychology, 134, 191, 10.1080/00224545.1994.9711382 · DOI
- Sober, E., Wilson, D.S., 1998. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Soltis, 1995, Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? An empirical test, Current Anthropology, 36, 473, 10.1086/204381 · DOI
- Stotland, 1962, Identification, “oppositeness,” authoritarianism, self-esteem, and birth order, Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 76, 1, 10.1037/h0093841 · DOI
- Stotland, 1963, Empathy, self-esteem and birth order, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, 532, 10.1037/h0042891 · DOI
- Tomasello, M., 1994. The question of chimpanzee culture. In: Wrangham, R., McGrew, W.C., de Waal, F.B.M., Heltne, P.G. (Eds.), Chimpanzee Cultures. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 301–317.
- Tomasello, M., 2000. The Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. · DOI · Paper page
- Tooby, 1989, Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture: theoretical considerations, Ethology and Sociobiology, 10, 29, 10.1016/0162-3095(89)90012-5 · DOI
- Trivers, 1971, The evolution of reciprocal alturism, The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 34, 10.1086/406755 · DOI · Paper page
- Vayda, 1971, Phases of the process of war and peace among the Marings of new Guinea, Oceania, 42, 1, 10.1002/j.1834-4461.1971.tb00295.x · DOI
- Wade, 1985, Soft selection, hard selection, kin selection, and group selection, The American Naturalist, 125, 61, 10.1086/284328 · DOI
- Wedekind, 2000, Cooperation through image scoring in humans, Science, 288, 850, 10.1126/science.288.5467.850 · DOI · Paper page
- Weinmann, 1994, Individual behavior in a free riding experiment, Journal of Public Economics, 54, 185, 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90059-0 · DOI
- Wiessner, 1983, Style and social information in kalahari san projectile points, American Antiquity, 48, 253, 10.2307/280450 · DOI
- Williams, G., 1966. Adaption and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Wilson, 1997, Group selection and assortative interactions, The American Naturalist, 149, 336, 10.1086/285993 · DOI
- Wit, 1999, Social learning in a common interest voting game, Games and Economic Behavior, 26, 131, 10.1006/game.1998.0634 · DOI
- Wolf, 1970, Childhood association and sexual attraction: a further test of the Westermarck hypothesis, American Anthropologists, 72, 503, 10.1525/aa.1970.72.3.02a00010 · DOI
- Young, 1992, The numic spread: a computer simulation, American Antiquity, 57, 85, 10.2307/2694836 · DOI
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 301–400 of 811
Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., & Wu, J. (2017) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.001 · Cited by 26
“1 The importance of cultural factors for the evolution of cooperation has been studied, among others, by Henrich and Boyd (2001) , Boyd et al. (2003) , Henrich (2004) , Boyd and Richerson (2009) , and Boyd et al. (2011) .”
BackgroundHow does language affect decision-making in social interactions and decision biases?
Li, K.-K. (2017) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.03.003 · Cited by 26
Religion and the Origins of Anti-Atheist Prejudice
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2013) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199640911.003.0007 · Cited by 27
“That is, neither kin selection nor reciprocal altruism can explain large scale human cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Henrich, et al., 2005).”
BackgroundPersistence and heterogeneity in entrepreneurship: An evolutionary game theoretic analysis
Kuechle, G. (2011) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.12.001 · Cited by 26
“Third, although it is empirically possible, group selection may be subject to parametric constraints (Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundEvolutionary Biology: Biodiversification from Genotype to Phenotype
Pontarotti, P. (2015) · Cambridge International Law Journal · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19932-0 · Cited by 26
Delton, A. W., Jaeggi, A. V., Lim, J., Sznycer, D., Gurven, M., Robertson, T. E., Sugiyama, L. S., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2023) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.01.013 · Cited by 28
“It does so by drawing on theories about social evolution, like kin selection or reciprocity (see cites in Section 1.1 as well as Gervais, 2017; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Organization of Ancient Economies
Hirth, K. G. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108859707 · Cited by 44
The genetic and cultural evolution of unsustainability
Snyder, B. F. (2020) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-020-00803-z · Cited by 31
“See Henrich (2004) for a discussion for both the potential and limits of genetic group selection.”
BackgroundInfluentialRequirements for Documentation, Data Collection and Scientific Evaluations
Rihan, D., Uhlmann, S., Ulrich, C., Breen, M., & Catchpole, T. (2018) · The European Landing Obligation · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_3 · Cited by 25
Learning about tool categories via eavesdropping.
Phillips, B., Seston, R., & Kelemen, D. (2012) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01827.x · Cited by 25
Social and individual learning of helping in humans and other species
Lehmann, L., Foster, K. R., Borenstein, E., & Feldman, M. W. (2008) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2008.07.012 · Cited by 22
“Specifically, it has been argued that humans have a predisposition for conformism—the copying of the majority strategy—which naturally leads to groups where individuals all perform the same strategy [ 46 ,54,56,57].”
BackgroundGowdy, J. M., & Seidl, I. (2004) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2003.12.026 · Cited by 28
“Secondly, the possibility of prosocial behavior can be mathematically demonstrated (Sober and Wilson, 1998, chapter two;Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundLawson, D. W., & Uggla, C. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4939-0280-4_5 · Cited by 29
“Indeed, the extent of cooperation between non-kin is extreme in humans, leading to much debate about the evolutionary mechanisms at play (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Henrich 2004; Lamba and Mace 2011).”
BackgroundFriedman, D., & Singh, N. (2009) · Games Econ. Behav. · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.006 · Cited by 25
“Henrich (2004) and subsequent articles in the special issue of JEBO dissect the biological and cultural basis of human cooperation.”
Measuring frequency-dependent selection in culture
Newberry, M., & Plotkin, J. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-022-01342-6 · Cited by 24
Integrative studies of cultural evolution: crossing disciplinary boundaries to produce new insights
Kolodny, O., Feldman, M. W., & Creanza, N. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0048 · Cited by 30
Selection by consequences, behavioral evolution, and the price equation.
Baum, W. (2017) · Journal of The Experimental Analysis of Behavior · doi:10.1002/jeab.256 · Cited by 24
Evolutionary modelling of the macro-economic impacts of catastrophic flood events
Safarzyńska, K., Brouwer, R., & Hofkes, M. W. (2013) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.01.016 · Cited by 24
“A theory of group selection explains evolutionary processes based selection acting on multiple levels, namely of individuals and groups (Wilson and Sober 1994; Wilson 2002; Henrich 2004; Wilson 2006; van den Bergh and Gowdy 2009).”
BackgroundChabot‐Hanowell, B., & Smith, E. A. (2012) · Archeological Papers of the American Anthropological Association · doi:10.1111/apaa.12004 · Cited by 28
“If enforcement (punishment of free riders) is also costly to group members, a second-order collective action problem (“Who watches the watchmen?”) must be solved (Panchanathan and Boyd 2004; Smith 2003).”
BackgroundCooperative emergence of spatial public goods games with reputation discount accumulation
Tang, W., Wang, C., Pi, J., & Yang, H. (2023) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ad17da · Cited by 24
Norm violations and punishments across human societies
Garfield, Z. H., Ringen, E., Buckner, W., Medupe, D., Wrangham, R., & Glowacki, L. (2023) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2023.7 · Cited by 23
“Such perspectives imply a phylogenetic signal in punishment across societies (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Henrich, 2004), as in other aspects of behaviour and social organisation such as religion, marriage systems and food sharing (e.”
BackgroundHuman Evolution beyond Biology and Culture
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108564922 · Cited by 47
Positioning Multicountry Brands: The Impact of Variation in Cultural Values and Competitive Set
Batra, R., Zhang, Y. C., Aydınoğlu, N. Z., & Feinberg, F. M. (2017) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.13.0058 · Cited by 39
Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?
Kurokawa, S., & 井原, 泰. (2016) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.12.002 · Cited by 20
“…number of candidate mechanisms have been proposed in the last several decades; for example, genetic or cultural group selection (Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004; Wilson and Sober, 1994), punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1992), reward (Rand et al., 2009), indirect reciprocity (Panchanathan and…”
BackgroundIntergroup Biases in Fear-induced Aggression
Mifune, N., Šimunović, D., & Yamagishi, T. (2017) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00049 · Cited by 27
Towards a theory of cultural transmission in minorities
Mchitarjan, I., & Reisenzein, R. (2014) · Ethnicities · doi:10.1177/1468796813505553 · Cited by 23
“The relevance of multilevel selection theory to our concerns derives primarily from the fact that the theory has been applied beyond genetic evolution to culturaltransmission processes (Wilson, 2002; see also Henrich, 2004; Richerson and Boyd, 2005).”
BackgroundSources of Selection in Strategy Making
Canales, J. I. (2014) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.12101 · Cited by 24
Culture and the Evolution of the Human Social Instincts
Boyd, R. T., & Richerson, P. J. (2020) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003135517-23 · Cited by 37
Towards a complex model of disaster behaviour
Savage, D. A. (2019) · Disasters · doi:10.1111/disa.12408 · Cited by 32
Multilevel mutation-selection systems and set-valued duals
Dawson, D. A. (2017) · Journal of Mathematical Biology · doi:10.1007/s00285-017-1145-2 · Cited by 22
The coevolution of culture and environment
Safarzyńska, K. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.01.004 · Cited by 18
Why multilevel selection matters
Field, A. (2008) · Journal of Bioeconomics · doi:10.1007/s10818-007-9018-1 · Cited by 22
“Discussion of Henrich 2004a, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53: 85-88.”
BackgroundA Response to Christian Cordes and Clifford Poirot
Hodgson, G. (2007) · doi:10.1080/00213624.2007.11507004 · Cited by 22
Religion and political affiliation’s influence on trust and reciprocity among strangers.
Fitzgerald, C. J., & Wickwire, J. H. (2012) · Journal of Social Evolutionary and Cultural Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0099217 · Cited by 23
Pereira, B., Fehl, A., Finkelstein, S. R., Jiga-Boy, G. M., & Caserotti, M. (2021) · Psychology & Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21629 · Cited by 21
The Effect of Financial Constraints on In-Group Bias: Evidence from Rice Farmers in Thailand
Boonmanunt, S., & Meier, S. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3525247 · Cited by 21
“The coevolution theory predicts in-group bias because the altruistic cooperation and altruistic punishment of defectors can enhance groups’ survival chances when groups experience any shocks (Henrich 2004; Chudek and Henrich 2011).”
BackgroundWarlike and Peaceful Societies: The Interaction of Genes and Culture
Fog, A. (2017) · doi:10.11647/obp.0173.0066 · Cited by 21
Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
Eckel, C. C., Fatás, E., Godoy, S., & Wilson, R. K. (2016) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0157840 · Cited by 22
“Furthermore, the idea of cultural selection, developed by anthropologists addressing the same question about the prevalence of altruism, provides a mechanism for acquired group norms of altruistic behavior to be transmitted to future generations without relying on gene-level evolutionary processes [2, 8, 9, 28, 29].”
BackgroundPromotion of cooperation by selective group extinction
Böttcher, M. A., & Nagler, J. (2016) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/18/6/063008 · Cited by 20
Evolution of tag-mediated altruistic behavior in one-shot encounters on large-scale complex networks
Hadzibeganovic, T., Lima, F. W. S., & Stauffer, D. (2012) · Computer Physics Communications · doi:10.1016/j.cpc.2012.05.020 · Cited by 21
Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look
Dijkstra, B. (2007) · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.006 · Cited by 21
The Biological Foundations of Organizational Behavior
Colarelli, S. M., & Arvey, R. (2014) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226127293.001.0001 · Cited by 21
Yuan, M., Spadaro, G., Jin, S., Wu, J., Kou, Y., Lange, P. A. M. V., & Balliet, D. P. (2022) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000363 · Cited by 26
“…a relationship history, even when there is no knowledge of these others ’ reputation or when it is uncertain whether they will interact in the future (hereinafter, we refer to this cooperation among strangers as impersonal cooperation; Buchan et al., 2009; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundEvolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Assortative Interactions
Iyer, S., & Killingback, T. (2020) · Games · doi:10.3390/g11040041 · Cited by 21
“This approach was first developed by Hamilton [78], and has been more recently studied in [84].”
MethodJuvenile cleaner fish can socially learn the consequences of cheating
Truskanov, N., Emery, Y., & Bshary, R. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-14712-3 · Cited by 20
Folk theories of nationality and anti-immigrant attitudes
Rad, M. S., & Ginges, J. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0334-3 · Cited by 20
Zefferman, M. R. (2014) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1101/004135 · Cited by 20
“This is because when a norm psychology induces humans to adopt their group's traits, this further reinforces any existing equilibrium and drives down within-group variance relative to between-group variance (Henrich, 2004; Bell, 2010).”
BackgroundHuman Adaptive Behavior in Common Pool Resource Systems
Brandt, G., Merico, A., Vollan, B., & Schlüter, A. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0052763 · Cited by 20
Observational learning, group selection, and societal evolution
Witt, U. (2008) · Journal of Institutional Economics · doi:10.1017/s1744137407000823 · Cited by 20
“In a natural selection environment, the only criterion is differential reproductive success of human groups or societies (whether determined by genetic factors alone or by inherited and acquired, cultural features simultaneously, cf. Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2004).”
Balancing Inertia, Innovation, and Imitation in Complex Environments
Hodgson, G., & Knudsen, T. (2006) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2006.11506906 · Cited by 20
“At one pole (Wi = 1) organizations completely rely on the experience of others (imitation), and on the other pole (Wi = 0) organizations solely rely on their own experience.”
BackgroundCordes, C., & Schwesinger, G. (2014) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2013.11.013 · Cited by 20
“Again, anthropological and psychological evidence indicates the existence of such a heuristic in social learning (e.g., Aronson et al., 2002; Kameda and Diasuke, 2002; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Henrich, 2004).”
An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation, Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games
Hetzer, M., & Sornette, D. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077041 · Cited by 19
“The perception of fairness and the reaction to unfair behavior seems to be deeply rooted in our cultural and genetic heritage [28,39], as experiments and field studies across different locations and cultural groups suggest [15,31].”
BackgroundSeeing storms behind the clouds: Biases in the attribution of anger
Galperin, A., Fessler, D., Johnson, K. L., & Haselton, M. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.06.003 · Cited by 19
“In the absence of readily observed cues of shared group membership (Boyd & Richerson, 2009; Henrich, 2004; Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001), it might generally have enhanced fitness to evaluate strangers with caution, as our participants did.”
BackgroundVianen, A. E. M. V., Stoelhorst, J. W., & Goede, M. E. E. D. (2012) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781118320853.ch7 · Cited by 26
Integrating the human sciences to evolve effective policies
Biglan, A., & Cody, C. (2012) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.018 · Cited by 19
“Groups with a high proportion of prosocial individuals benefit in many ways (Henrich, 2004; Kasser, 2004; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Wilson et al., 2012).”
BackgroundSunitiyoso, Y., Avineri, E., & Chatterjee, K. (2011) · Transportmetrica · doi:10.1080/18128600903244776 · Cited by 19
“This finding is in line with findings in other studies (Smith and Bell 1994, Henrich and Boyd 1998, Sunitiyoso and Matsumoto 2009). In contradiction to this, a strong reliance may also produce negative changes (decreasing level of contribution) when individuals adopt another social learning mechanism, the Cfn model. T…”
BackgroundResultTaxonomizing the Relationship Between Biology and Economics: A Very Long Engagement
Hodgson, G. (2007) · doi:10.1007/s10818-007-9022-5 · Cited by 19
A theory of modern cultural shifts and meltdowns
Hochberg, M. (2004) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2004.0172 · Cited by 19
Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today
Elsner, W. (2014) · Forum for Social Economics · doi:10.1080/07360932.2014.964744 · Cited by 14
“In such a process even genetic selection may add to the result of pro-sociality by additionally selecting particular prosocial genes, something that could not have been expected by conventional genetic evolution (e.g., Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2004; Wilson, 2012).”
BackgroundEvolutionary games of cooperation: Insights through integration of theory and data
Lewis, H. M., & Dumbrell, A. J. (2013) · Ecological Complexity · doi:10.1016/j.ecocom.2013.02.007 · Cited by 19
Can a Generalized Darwinism Be Criticized? A Rejoinder to Geoffrey Hodgson
Cordes, C. (2007) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2007.11507005 · Cited by 18
“Here it is (I rely on Henrich (2004), a source also cited in Hodgson's comment): This equation relates the expected change in the frequency of a gene (f'U) per generation, the absolute fitness of an individual i (w,), the average fitness of the population (iii), and the current frequency of the…”
Emotion-based renewal strategies to promote cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games
Fu, X., Liu, X., Hu, Y., & Huang, S. (2023) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2023.128130 · Cited by 16
The evolution of similarity-biased social learning
Smaldino, P. E., & Velilla, A. P. (2025) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2024.46 · Cited by 23
“Third, they strengthen the theoretical foundation for cultural group selection, which can operate when transmission-isolating mechanisms maintain between-group differences in behaviours, norms, and institutions (Durham, 1991; Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016).”
Did Human Culture Emerge in a Cultural Evolutionary Transition in Individuality?
Davison, D. R., Andersson, C., Michod, R. E., & Kuhn, S. L. (2021) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-021-00382-x · Cited by 19
“Henrich (2004) describes and reviews evidence for four mechanisms that promote what we here call informational uniqueness; see also Boyd and Richerson (2010) and Chudek and Henrich (2011).”
BackgroundPardo-Gordó, S., Rivero, D. G., & Aubán, J. B. (2018) · Journal of Archaeological Science Reports · doi:10.1016/j.jasrep.2018.10.021 · Cited by 15
The Impact of Fisheries Discards on Scavengers in the Sea
Depestele, J., Feekings, J., Reid, D., Cook, R., Gascuel, D., Girardin, R., Heath, M., Hernvann, P.-Y., Morato, T., Soszynski, A., et al. (2018) · The European Landing Obligation · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_7 · Cited by 17
Punishment can support cooperation even when punishable
Fu, T.-T., Ji, Y.-N., Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2017) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.016 · Cited by 17
“Many contributors assign a large role to social norms enforced by peer punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundThe nature of religious diversity: a cultural ecosystem approach
Wilson, D. S., Hartberg, Y. M., MacDonald, I. F., Lanman, J. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2016) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2015.1132243 · Cited by 17
“First, multilevel selection has become the theoretical framework of choice for many authors studying human cultural evolution (e.g., Boehm, 2011; Henrich, 2003; Johnson, Price, & Van Vugt, 2013; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Turchin, 2010; D.S. Wilson, 2002, 2015; E.O. Wilson, 2012; Yaworsky, Horowitz, &…”
BackgroundThe Handbook of Historical Economics
Nunna, N. (2021) · doi:10.1016/c2017-0-04055-7 · Cited by 17
“The stronger group-level selection is, the more likely it is that the former prevails over the latter (Henrich, 2004a).”
BackgroundInfluentialOn the Stability of Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict: A Lab-in-the-Field Panel Study
BOHM, R. M., Fleiß, J., & Rybnicek, R. (2021) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002721994080 · Cited by 23
“Hence, inter-group conflict is well described as a social dilemma (e.g., Bornstein 2003; Boyd and Richerson 2009; Henrich 2004; Darwin [1871] 2009).”
BackgroundGames in the Philosophy of Biology
O’Connor, C. (2020) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108616737 · Cited by 47
“As Boyd and Richerson (1990); Henrich (2004) point out, this can lead to the selection of efficient ESSes in games like the stag hunt.”
BackgroundThe suffering company: Consumer compassion towards companies exposed to negative events
Meyer, F., Huber, F., & Huber, S. (2019) · Psychology and Marketing · doi:10.1002/mar.21181 · Cited by 17
Common fate motivates cooperation: The influence of risks on contributions to public goods
Zhang, H. (2018) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2018.10.012 · Cited by 26
“The definition of risks used in the experiment borrows ideas from evolutionary game theory (Smith and Price, 1973) and multi-level selection theory (Bergstrom, 2002; Henrich, 2004).”
MethodPromotion and Coevolutionary Dynamics in Contemporary Capitalism
Almudí, I., & Fatás‐Villafranca, F. (2018) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.1080/00213624.2018.1430943 · Cited by 19
“Previous studies by John Gowdy (1994); Henk Volberda and Arie Lewin (2003); Joe Henrich and Robert Boyd (1998); Joe Henrich (2004); Dermot Breslin (2011); and John P. Murmann (2003, 2013) have helped us to define coevolution, and to elaborate the concept of coevolution through promotion.”
BackgroundInfluentialA corporation’s culture as an impetus for spinoffs and a driving force of industry evolution
Cordes, C., Richerson, P., & Schwesinger, G. (2013) · Journal of evolutionary economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-013-0335-3 · Cited by 16
“Anthropological and psychological evidence indicates the existence of such a heuristic in social learning (Aronson et al. 2002; Kameda and Diasuke 2002; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Henrich 2004).”
Environmental and Pro-Social Norms: Evidence from 30 CountriesPreprint
Torgler, B., Frey, B. S., & Wilson, C. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1010856 · Cited by 16
“Alternatively, the concept of conformity (cf. Henrich, 2004 ) has been used to”
Kraak, S., & Hart, P. J. B. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_11 · Cited by 17
“Social capital, trust and intrinsic motivation to cooperate tend to be higher in small groups of people who regularly interact with each other in non-anonymous ways (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundZefferman, M. R. (2017) · Sustainability Science · doi:10.1007/s11625-017-0488-3 · Cited by 16
“…by evolutionary theorist George Price (1970, 1972), has been widely used in evolutionary biology (Frank 1995; Grafen 1985) and has more recently been adopted for modeling cultural evolution (Henrich 2004; El Mouden et al. 2014), including small-scale sustainability problems (Waring et al. 2017).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialIn Broad Daylight: Full Information and Higher-order Punishment Opportunities Promote CooperationPreprint
Kamei, K., & Putterman, L. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2079146 · Cited by 16
“…up to some n th order of punishment, the need to punish at that stage might be invoked so rarely that the payoff disadvantage of an n th order punisher would be swamped by the advantages shared by all members of groups in which punishing types predominate (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
Conditions that favour cumulative cultural evolution
Denton, K. K., Ram, Y., & Feldman, M. W. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0400 · Cited by 26
Tempo and Mode in Cultural Macroevolution
Turchin, P., & Gavrilets, S. (2021) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/14747049211066600 · Cited by 18
“…selection (Bowles et al., 2003); self-interested design (Gavrilets & Duwal Shrestha, 2021; Singh et al., 2017); evoked culture (Krasnow & Delton, 2016; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989); cognitive niche (Pinker, 2010; Tooby & deVore, 1987; Whiten & Erdal, 2012); and demographic swamping (Henrich, 2004).”
Institutional adaptation in the evolution of the ‘co-operative principles’
Waring, T. M., Lange, T., & Chakraborty, S. (2021) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s00191-021-00738-3 · Cited by 22
“For example, as group-level traits, the co-operative principles may have evolved as an adaptation among groups via group-level cultural selection (Henrich 2004; Richerson et al. 2016).”
McCauley, R. N. (2020) · Zygon® · doi:10.1111/zygo.12573 · Cited by 63
A touch-scaffolded model of human prosociality
Su, J., & Su, Y. (2018) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.07.008 · Cited by 17
Gene-culture co-inheritance of a behavioral trait
Aguilar, E., & Akçay, E. (2016) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1086/698872 · Cited by 15
Elsner, W., & Schwardt, H. (2015) · doi:10.1080/07360932.2014.980751 · Cited by 15
“, cooperating with a stranger from a larger population in a one-shot interaction, is not representable therein (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialDefectors Cannot Be Detected during“Small Talk” with Strangers
Manson, J. H., Gervais, M. M., & Kline, M. A. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082531 · Cited by 16
Wilson, D. (2005) · doi:10.1016/s1529-2134(04)07009-7 · Cited by 15
Cultural diversity and wisdom of crowds are mutually beneficial and evolutionarily stable
de Courson, B., Fitouchi, L., Bouchaud, J., & Benzaquen, M. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-95914-7 · Cited by 13
Influencing Change: When “Best Practice” Changes and the Prototypical Good Farmer Turns Bad
Green, L., Kaler, J., Liu, N., & Ferguson, E. (2020) · Frontiers in Veterinary Science · doi:10.3389/fvets.2020.00161 · Cited by 14
Acculturation drives the evolution of intergroup conflict
Henriques, G. J. B., Simon, B., Ispolatov, Y., & Doebeli, M. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1810404116 · Cited by 16
Reconceptualizing the Human Social Niche
Palmer, C. T., Coe, K., & Steadman, L. B. (2016) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/685703 · Cited by 20
Godino, I. B. I., Santos, J. I., Galán, J. M., Caro, J., Álvarez, M., & Zurro, D. (2013) · Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory · doi:10.1007/s10816-013-9194-3 · Cited by 16
Altruistic Punishment and Between-Group Competition
Rebers, S., & Koopmans, R. (2012) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-012-9136-x · Cited by 14
“Three types of group selection that have been identified in the literature differ in the way in which cultural groups replace other groups (Henrich 2004; Van Veelen and Hopfensitz 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialKock, N., & Chatelain-Jardón, R. (2011) · Journal of the AIS · doi:10.17705/1jais.00277 · Cited by 14
“In theoretical developments such as the one conducted here, where the main concern is the evolution of a trait over subsequent generations based on natural selection forces, the term E(w i Δx i ) in the Price Equation is usually set to zero (see, e.g., Frank, 1995; Henrich, 2004).”
Kock, N. (2011) · Journal of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1556/jep.9.2011.3.1 · Cited by 14
“…theorizing addressing a range of phenomena, from the evolution of morphological traits in various animals to the evolution of behavioral traits in humans (FLETCHER and ZWICK 2007; FRANK 1995, 1997; GRAFEN 2002, 2006; HENRICH 2004; MCELREATH and BOYD 2007; PAGE and NOWAK 2002; VAN VEELEN 2005).”
BackgroundPerceptions of Fairness and Allocation Systems
Savage, D. A., & Torgler, B. (2010) · Economic Analysis and Policy · doi:10.1016/s0313-5926(10)50026-2 · Cited by 16
Darcet, D., & Sornette, D. (2008) · Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination · doi:10.1007/s11403-007-0027-x · Cited by 15
“A good discussion is provided by the special issue of the journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, organized around the synthesis paper of Henrich (2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialThirteen Misunderstandings About Natural Selection
Al-Shawaf, L., Zreik, K., & Buss, D. (2021) · Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19650-3_2158 · Cited by 14
Is Physical Alteration a Sufficient Reason to Prohibit Ritual Infant Circumcision?
Jacobs, A. J. (2021) · Journal of Religion and Health · doi:10.1007/s10943-020-01139-9 · Cited by 15
“Prosocial behavior, in turn, is bolstered by rituals that encourage solidarity and loyalty, and discourage cheating, defection, or free-riding (Henrich 2004).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review