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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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“Henrich et al. (2005) studies the prosociality in 15 small-scale societies and compare the results with typical results among western students.”
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von Kotzebue, A., & Wigger, B. U. (2010) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/bep003 · Cited by 7
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“…an important driver of variation in levels of cooperation across human populations (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson 2003; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Choi and Bowles 2007; Gintis 2003; Guzmán, Rodríguez-Sickert and Rowthorn 2007; Henrich et al. 2012; Henrich 2004; Henrich et al. 2005, 2006, 2010).”
BackgroundImitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships
Schumacher, H. (2013) · Journal of Economics Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.008 · Cited by 7
“The considered mechanisms are green beards, kin-based selection, reciprocity, indirect reciprocity and punishment, see Henrich (2004) for a summary.”
BackgroundGerkey, A. P. (2010) · Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University) · doi:10.7282/t3445m8n · Cited by 7
“…theory suggests that cooperative behavior—defined narrowly as “altruism”—can evolve in six ways: (1) kin selection, (2) direct reciprocity, (3) indirect reciprocity, (4) signaling, (5) genetic group selection, and (6) cultural group selection (Nowak 2006; Lehman & Keller 2006; Henrich 2004).”
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“Similar models have been used to investigate the evolution of cooperation and the evolution of group and network structures under conditions of individual and group selection [56, 70, 85].”
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“Further, although evidence for genetic group selection is scant at best, cultural group selection can be seen to account for patterns of social change and intergroup dynamics (Henrich 2004; K García and van den Bergh 2011; Norenzayan et al. 2016b).”
Berl, R. E. W., Fisk, J., van Eeden, L. V., Salerno, J., Fernández-Llamazares, Á., Leong, K., Long, J. W., Boomer, G., Williams, C. K., Arbieu, U., et al. (2025) · Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0262 · Cited by 6
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“Whether through contacts with individuals of their own group or from another group, members of a group of level ℓ are infected at a rate β ℓ .”
Slors, M. (2023) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-023-00688-8 · Cited by 8
“4) strongly enhance between-group variety and within-group similarity (Boehm 1997; Boyd and Richerson 2005; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Henrich 2004; Laland et al. 2000).”
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“While this result might contrast with some social capital studies (Putnam, 1993), it seems consistent with research revealing that economic interdependence can increase prosociality (Henrich & Boyd, 2001), and that that the more the members of a community depend on one another in order to gain access to food and other…”
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“products of purely cultural evolution (driven by cultural group selection), or coevolved products of genes responding to the novel social environments created by cultural group selection’ [18].”
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Eriksson, K., Simpson, B., & Vartanova, I. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.678237 · Cited by 6
“This question is important for a number of reasons, including the possibility that societal differences in cooperation may have played an important role in human cultural evolution (Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016).”
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Davis, T., & Kelly, D. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00561-6 · Cited by 5
“…by a large body of work arguing that culturally inherited institutions—taken to include norms, laws, and policies—will be favored by selection when they effectively suppress free riding and defection in cooperative interactions (Boyd and Richerson 2009; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundThe evolution of productive organizations
Brahm, F., & Poblete, J. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-00957-x · Cited by 6
Micheletti, A. (2020) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2020.12 · Cited by 6
“…the effects of different forms of transmission (e.g. including non-vertical transmission, biased or unbiased; starting from Lehmann et al. 2008; Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Boyd et al. 2011; Birch 2017) and explore interaction with CS2 processes (starting from Henrich 2004b; El Mouden et al. 2014).”
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Gurdal, M., Gürerk, Ö., & Yahşi, M. (2019) · Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3415638 · Cited by 6
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Cai, N., Diao, C., & Yan, B.-H. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems · doi:10.1109/tcss.2019.2913508 · Cited by 6
“Such a mechanism is usually called cultural group selection [11].”
BackgroundGeorge Price, the Price equation, and cultural group selection
Panchanathan, K. (2011) · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.04.001 · Cited by 6
“Iwanttoconcludethisdiscussionbyofferingafewinsightson howthePriceequationcanaddressadebateinourfield,theroleof cultural group selection in explaining the evolution of cooperation (for a lengthier discussion, see Henrich, 2004; McElreathandBoyd,2007,chapter6).”
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Hetzer, M., & Sornette, D. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1927919 · Cited by 6
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Mesoudi, A., Veldhuis, D., & Foley, R. (2010) · Journal of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1556/jep.8.2010.2.1 · Cited by 8
“In the last decade or so evolutionary biologists and evolutionary social scientists have renewed their interest in groups and group-level phenomena in the form of multi-level selection (OKASHA 2006) and cultural (rather than genetic) group selection (HENRICH 2004).”
BackgroundKock, N., Chatelain-Jardón, R., & Carmona, J. (2009) · doi:10.1111/j.1540-4609.2009.00223.x · Cited by 6
Aruka, Y., & Akiyama, E. (2009) · doi:10.1007/s11403-010-0060-z · Cited by 6
“53(1), 2004] has arranged a special issue on the Price Equation in the context of Henrich’s contributions ( Henrich 2004 ).”
BackgroundHet mysterie van de naastenliefde: een evolutionair-sociologische benadering
Koopmans, R. (2006) · Sociologie · doi:10.1347/sogi.2.2.114 · Cited by 6
Medeiros, S. (2024) · Journal of Veterans Studies · doi:10.21061/jvs.v10i1.563 · Cited by 6
Truth and significance: a 3N model (needs, narratives, networks) perspective on religion
Szumowska, E., Czernatowicz‐Kukuczka, A., Kossowska, M., Król, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2020) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-817204-9.00017-2 · Cited by 9
Chapter 22 Reciprocity, altruism, and cooperative production
Putterman, L. (2006) · Handbook on the economics of giving, reciprocity and altruism · doi:10.1016/s1574-0714(06)02022-7 · Cited by 6
Is a group better off with more altruists? Not necessarily
Khalil, E. L. (2004) · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00109-4 · Cited by 6
Schnettler, S., & Huinink, J. J. (2026) · KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie · doi:10.1007/s11577-026-01064-x · Cited by 6
“…selection processes are not confined to the genetic level but also operate at higher K levels of social organization, where social units compete for more adaptive cultural and sociostructural environments that favor societal reproduction (Henrich 2004; Richerson et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 2008).”
Evolution in International Relations
Garlick, J. (2025) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009464154 · Cited by 6
Safarzyńska, K., & Smaldino, P. E. (2023) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2022.0267 · Cited by 6
Phelps, J. R., Pitogo, K. M. E., Emit, A. T., & Hill, K. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0290270 · Cited by 5
“Finally, community-level cooperation frequently extends to common defense, modification of living space, organization of symbolic displays and ritual activities, and the production of public goods such as utilities and transportation systems in larger-scale societies [19, 20].”
BackgroundShibboleth: An agent-based model of signalling mimicry
Goodman, J., Caines, A., & Foley, R. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0289333 · Cited by 6
Polycentricity and Adaptation: A Multilevel Selectionist Approach
Schaefer, A. (2023) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4212250 · Cited by 5
Pathways to cultural adaptation: the coevolution of cumulative culture and social networks
Smolla, M., & Akçay, E. (2023) · bioRxiv · doi:10.1101/2023.02.21.529416 · Cited by 5
“Most studies of cumulative culture rely on either accumulation of a single dimension of cultural complexity (e.g. Henrich, 2004a), with only a few studies (Kempe et al., 2014; Kolodny et al., 2015; Mesoudi, 2011) that consider the accumulation and improvement of different cultural traits.”
Constraints on cooperation shape hierarchical versus distributed structure in human groups
Zefferman, M. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-23454-9 · Cited by 6
Incipient Cultural Evolution in the Xunzi as Solution to the Liyi Origin Problem
Martin, J. B. (2023) · Dao · doi:10.1007/s11712-022-09867-3 · Cited by 5
“…those which militate for ingroup cohesion and enhance between-group competitiveness are theorized to be preferred by cultural group selection, while the representation in the pool of cultural variants of those which have deleterious effects will in the long run be attenuated (Henrich 2004: 26–27).”
BackgroundOrganizational Development as Generative Entrenchment
Moser, C. J., & Smaldino, P. E. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24070879 · Cited by 5
Isufi, S., Poje, K., Vukobratovic, I., & Brcic, M. (2022) · Philosophies · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2205.13370 · Cited by 5
“Different mechanisms have been used to explain the rise of cooperation, norms, and ethics in societies: kinship altruism, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection, and many others (Capraro & Perc, 2018; Henrich, 2004; M. A. Nowak, 2006).”
BackgroundTit for tattling: Cooperation, communication, and how each could stabilize the other
Odouard, V. V., & Price, M. H. (2023) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.06.002 · Cited by 2
“…group selection [Bowles et al., 2003], all ensure that altruists receive a second-order bene t that compensates for the initial cost: either they are more likely (compared to non-altruists) to bene t from altruism or less likely to su er from altruistic punishment [Henrich, 2004, Queller, 1992b]).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe dynamics of social cohesion in response to simulated intergroup conflict in banded mongooses
Preston, E. F. R., Thompson, F. J., Kyabulima, S., Croft, D. P., & Cant, M. A. (2021) · Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.1002/ece3.8475 · Cited by 9
“Theoretical models developed to understand the evolution of human cooperation suggest that intergroup conflict can influence the evolution of within- group social traits (Bowles, 2006; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundLeisterer-Peoples, S. M., Ross, C. T., Greenhill, S. J., Hardecker, S., & Haun, D. B. M. (2021) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0259746 · Cited by 7
“Due to this bias, little is known about how cultural selection pressures [8, 9] on the cooperativeness or competitiveness of games might emerge as a function of variation in the cultural and natural environment.”
BackgroundThe evolution of productive organizations
Brahm, F., & Poblete, J. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.5465/ambpp.2020.271 · Cited by 5
Bendixen, T. (2019) · Evolution Mind and Behaviour · doi:10.1556/2050.2019.00011 · Cited by 5
“However, none of these species exhibit any general tendency to cooperate with every individual they encounter (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundSosyal ve Evrimsel Psikolojide İnsan Özgeciliği Bilmecesi
Üzümçeker, E., Gezgin, G. N., & Akfırat, S. (2019) · Yaşam Becerileri Psikoloji Dergisi · doi:10.31461/ybpd.559805 · Cited by 5
“Henrich (2004), insanlarda kültürel aktarımı gerçekleştiren iki çeşit sosyal öğrenme biçimi olduğunu öne sürmüştür.”
InfluentialSocial cognition, social neuroscience, and evolutionary social psychology: What's missing?
Greenwood, J. D. (2019) · Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour · doi:10.1111/jtsb.12197 · Cited by 5
Yirmiya, K., Segal, N. L., Bloch, G., & Knafo‐Noam, A. (2018) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/desc.12665 · Cited by 6
The Foundations of Human Cooperation in Teaching and Imitation
Laland, K. N. (2016) · The Spanish Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1017/sjp.2016.101 · Cited by 6
“…by a police force) or socially sanctioned retaliation (e.g., the beating up of deserters during warfare) can stabilize cooperative norms within societies, as both data and theory attest (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Henrich, 2004b; Richerson et al., 2014).”
BackgroundNg, Y.-L. (2016) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/gpr0000084 · Cited by 5
“Under the theoretical framework of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b; Henrich, 2004; Trivers, 1971), evolutionary theorists have investigated costly prosocial behavior.”
BackgroundNieman, M. (2016) · Journal of Peace Research · doi:10.1177/0022343316642509 · Cited by 5
The evolutionary origins of human fairness
Debove, S. (2015) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/2100444ez03b9z42b3zb9d9z003407bbfaa8 · Cited by 4
“, 2008), its similarities with other species (Bräuer and Hanus, 2012; Warneken and Tomasello, 2009; Brosnan and de Waal, 2014), and, to a lesser extent, its universality (Marshall et al., 1999; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundGroup Selection in the Evolution of Religion: Genetic Evolution or Cultural Evolution?
Davis, T. (2015) · Journal of Cognition and Culture · doi:10.1163/15685373-12342149 · Cited by 8
“Fortunately, all of this has been done elsewhere, and a growing number of social scientists from across the disciplines of psychology, anthropology, biology, economics and philosophy continues to marshal evidence in favor of this approach (for cultural group selection in general: Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Henrich, 200…”
BackgroundA Theory of Profit and Competition
Battistini, A. (2013) · Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review · doi:10.14441/eier.a2013014 · Cited by 5
“In the case of genetic evolution, however, these conditions are also generally thought to be quite rare, whereas in cultural evolution the prospects of group selection turn out to be better, mainly because of transmission mechanisms such as conformism that decrease variation within the group (see Boyd and Richerson, 1…”
BackgroundCollective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms
Krause, J. (2012) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/0048393111399100 · Cited by 5
““Normative conformity” can already be found in simpler organized systems, for instance, “following the herd” behavior in gregarious animals (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundHodgson, G. (2012) · Journal of Bioeconomics · doi:10.1007/s10818-012-9139-z · Cited by 5
Evolutionary Stability of Kantian OptimizationPreprint
Curry, P., & Roemer, J. (2012) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2112098 · Cited by 5
Schonmann, R., Vicente, R., & Caticha, N. (2011) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1106.4783 · Cited by 5
Models and Anti-Models: The Structure of Payoff-Dependent Social LearningPreprint
Efferson, C. M., Lalive, R., Richerson, P. J., McElreath, R. L., & Lubell, M. N. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.905250 · Cited by 1
“…al., 1992; Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Bowles, 2004; Salganik et al., 2006), extreme behaviors (Boyd and Richerson, 1985), cultural group selection (Henrich, 2004), ethnically marked social groups (Boyd and Richerson, 1987; McElreath et al., 2003), and occasionally even maladaptive behaviors (Boyd…”
BackgroundDialectics and evolutionary materialism: Expanding methodological pluralism in ecological economics
Krall, L., & Gowdy, J. M. (2024) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108487 · Cited by 19
Selektionsmodi der Organisationsgesellschaft: Gruppenselektion und Memselektion
Kappelhoff, P. (2012) · VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-531-94050-2_7 · Cited by 5
“…ergeben, den Akteuren und Gruppen zuzuordnen und aus der Interaktionsstruktur heraus verständlich zu machen (für interessierte Sozialwissenschaftler ist hier insbesondere die Darstellung der Price-Gleichung bei Henrich 2004 und die sich daran anschließende Diskussion ein guter Einstieg).”
BackgroundThe public loss game - an experimental study of public bads
Schosser, S., & Vogt, B. (2011) · Repository KITopen (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) · doi:10.5445/ir/1000024153
More on how and why: cause and effect in biology revisited
Laland, K. N., Odling‐Smee, J., Hoppitt, W., & Uller, T. (2012) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-012-9335-1 · Cited by 218
“This work often relies on formal models that embrace multilevel selection (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich 2004; Nowak et al. 2010; Nowak and Highfield 2011), and on explanations that stress ontogenetic processes such as imitation, teaching, or strong reciprocity as causally…”
BackgroundA Theory of Appropriateness That Accounts for Norms of Rationality
Leibo, J., Vezhnevets, A., Diaz, M., Agapiou, J., Cunningham, W. A., Sunehag, P., Cross, L., Koster, R., Bileschi, S., Chang, M., et al. (2026) · arXiv.org · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2603.14050 · Cited by 4
“…persistence and form are partially shaped by their functional efficacy within a given socio-ecological context, often emerging through undirected cultural evolution, potentially amplified by mechanisms like group selection (Henrich, 2004; Wilson et al., 2013) or deliberate design (Sunstein, 2019).”
The emergence of polarised groups through source filtering
Jansson, F., & Hattiangadi, A. (2025) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-025-06419-x · Cited by 4
“…transmission (Henrich and Boyd, 1998) if individuals disproportionately adopt prevalent traits within their group; through imitation and group pressure (Richerson and Boyd, 2008); and through cultural group selection based on cooperation and coordination (Boyd and Henrich, 2004; Richerson, 2005).”
Defining and classifying models of groups: The social ontology of higher-order networks
St-Onge, J., Harp, R., Burgio, G., Waring, T. M., Lovato, J. L., & H'ebert-Dufresne, L. (2025) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2507.02758 · Cited by 4
The intimate lives of hunter-gatherer children and adolescents
Hewlett, B. L. (2024) · Hunter Gatherer Research · doi:10.3828/hgr.2024.41 · Cited by 3
Evolution of cooperation in games with dual attribute strategy
Song, S., Pan, Q., Zhu, W., & He, M. (2023) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113969 · Cited by 3
What is the extent of a frequency-dependent social learning strategy space?
Bellamy, A., McKay, R., Vogt, S., & Efferson, C. M. (2022) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2022.11 · Cited by 5
“This is consistent with how conformity has previously been modelled over one order of social information (Boyd and Richerson, 1985: chapter 7; Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 2001).”
Stewart‐Williams, S., Wong, X. L., Chang, C. Y. M., & Thomas, A. G. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0266171 · Cited by 8
Cultural Distance and Cross-Border Replication of China Multinational Corporations
Wang, Z. H., Zhou, B., & Horsburgh, S. (2020) · Forum for Social Economics · doi:10.1080/07360932.2020.1787857 · Cited by 4
“…shared value and practices, rule following behaviour (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016); ‘reciprocation norm’ (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005); included four items: normed behaviour in social exchanges (Eisenberger et al., 2001), sharing…”
BackgroundInfluentialSafron, A. (2019) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.13443 · Cited by 7
“…not only were these replicators highly dependent upon each other, but their interactions enabled niche construction to occur with unprecedented rapidity via gene-culture coevolution and cultural groupselection (A. Bell, 2010; Henrich, 2004; Lansing & Fox, 2011; Rendell, Fogarty, & Laland, 2011).”
BackgroundCan Strategic Ignorance Explain the Evolution of Love?
Bear, A., & Rand, D. (2019) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12342 · Cited by 4
Social Preferences in Inter-Group ConflictPreprint
BBhm, R., Fleii, J., & Rybnicek, R. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3043163 · Cited by 4
“Hence, the situation is well described as a multi-level social dilemma, in which the intra-group conflict is embedded in the inter-group conflict (e.g. Bornstein, 2003; Boyd and Richerson, 2009; Henrich, 2004; Darwin, 1871/2009).”
BackgroundUnderstanding Religion from Cultural and Biological Perspectives
Northover, S. B., & Cohen, A. B. (2017) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119181361.ch3 · Cited by 4
“It has been proposed that beliefs and practices that foster intragroup cooperation, such as fear of supernatural punishment and commitment signaling, have spread and multiplied via these mechanisms (Henrich, 2004; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).”
BackgroundA Life-Cycle Model of Human Social Groups Produces a U-Shaped Distribution in Group Size
Salali, G. D., Whitehouse, H., & Hochberg, M. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0138496 · Cited by 4
“They have heritable characteristics and are subject to selection, such that those social and/or cultural features providing greater competitive fitness to their groups tend to prevail [3,4].”
BackgroundLove or fear: Can punishment promote cooperation?
Kroupa, Š. (2014) · Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21430 · Cited by 5
Sthel, M., Tostes, J., & Tavares, J. R. (2013) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su5051944 · Cited by 4
“is well known [77–87] demonstrate that not only humans, but also other species have a propensity to”
BackgroundAndrews, J. B., & Davidson, D. J. (2013) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su5020560 · Cited by 4
“Recent scholarship in evolutionary biology is quite interesting indeed—it suggests not only do we humans, and other species as well, have a proclivity for group belonging, which encourages many forms of cooperation and altruism, but furthermore, this very ―groupishness‖ may actually have been elemental to our successf…”
BackgroundInnovation and Evolution of Business Relations and Networks: Theory and Method
Wilkinson, I., & Young, L. C. (2012) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1203.1332 · Cited by 4
“…(i.e. the interactions of firms have properties distinct from the firms themselves) and these properties can and do result in greater fitness for the firms within the network as well as for the network itself and is selected for in the process of evolution (Ladley et al., 2011, Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundStiff, C. (2008) · The Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.3200/socp.148.5.609-630 · Cited by 4
“That is, humans are the only animals who readily work with individuals with whom they have no genetic material in common, have never met before, and have an extremely low probability of ever encountering face to face again (Dunbar, 2004; Flinn, Geary, & Ward, 2005; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundFunctional unpleasantness: the evolutionary logic of righteous resentment
Heller, W. B., & Sieberg, K. K. (2008) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9269-3 · Cited by 4
“To make punishment coherent, scholars assume that some actors value cooperation enough to punish noncooperators (see, e.g., Boyd et al. 2003; Boyd and Richerson 1992; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003 ;F ehr et al.2002; Fehr and Gachter 2000, 2002; Fehr and Henrich 2003; Fehr and Schmidt 1999 ;F owler2005; Henrich 2004; Ostro…”
BackgroundInfluentialDarwinian Evolutionary Ideas in Business Economics and Organization Studies
Dollimore, D. E. (2006) · University of Hertfordshire Research Archive (University of Hertfordshire) · doi:10.18745/th.14978 · Cited by 2
Lipo, C. P., Mischen, P. A., & Hunt, T. L. (2020) · Knowledge and space · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-47150-7_2 · Cited by 6
“, Eerkens & Lipo, 2007; Laing, 2008; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) with mechanisms that favor pro-social behaviors on the scale of groups (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundPossible Uses of Genetic Methods in Fisheries Under the EU Landing Obligation
Jacobsen, M., Hansen, B., & Nielsen, E. (2018) · The European Landing Obligation · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03308-8_20 · Cited by 4
One-shot reciprocity under error management is unbiased and fragile
Zimmermann, J., & Efferson, C. (2017) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.06.005 · Cited by 4
“Anonymous one-shot altruism has been documented experimentally many times (Camerer, 2003), but providing an evolutionary explanation has proven to be a caustic and controversy-fi lled area of research (Henrich, 2004; Raihani & Bshary, 2015).”
Rosser, J. B. (2011) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-8828-7_7
Sozialer Status und prosoziales Handeln: Ein Quasi-Experiment im Krankenhaus
Liebe, U., Naumann, E., & Tutić, A. (2017) · KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie · doi:10.1007/s11577-016-0399-9 · Cited by 13
Targeting cognitive biases to improve social cognition and social emotional health
Birch, S., Stewardson, C. I., Rho, K., Kataria, A., Craig, S. M., Phan, M. D. H., Savi, I., Voronkova, K., Lee, J., Choudhary, G., et al. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1534125 · Cited by 3
“…social interaction, as it helps us understand human actions (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith and Frith, 2005), underpins cultural learning (e.g., Henrich, 2004; Herrmann et al., 2007), and is vital for effective communication and social decision-making (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Birch et al.,…”
Random walks into democracy and back: The case against causal explanations of democratization
Apolte, T. (2025) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2025.102667 · Cited by 3
Goodman, J. (2023) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-023-09936-8 · Cited by 4
“The logic of cultural group selection (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Henrich 2004, 2020) goes further.”
Odouard, V. V., Smirnova, D., & Edelman, S. (2023) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-023-03380-0 · Cited by 3
“Our result is thus in line with previous results on conformist transmission enhancing inter-group differences (Henrich 2004).”
BackgroundResultInfluentialIntegrating economic and evolutionary approaches to polygynous marriage
Anderson, S., & Bidner, C. (2022) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2022.49 · Cited by 3
“The efficiency view is natural from an evolutionary perspective: the argument is that selection pressures at the level of the group (e.g. via direct inter-group conflict or differential population growth) will favour groups that use resources more efficiently (Henrich, 2004; Pinker, 2015).”
BackgroundHow Language and Human Altruism Evolved Hand in Hand — The Backchannel Hypothesis
von Heiseler, T. N. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.735375 · Cited by 4
“This would be cultural group selection (cf. Henrich, 2004; Boyd and Richerson, 2009).”
BackgroundBaggio, J. (2021) · Climatic Change · doi:10.1007/s10584-021-03146-5 · Cited by 3
“Outside the scientific literature, this phenomenon relates to the imitation of behaviors and strategies of “prestigious individuals”, where prestige can be signaled in different ways, from intellectual to physical traits (Henrich 2004; Henrich and Broesch 2011).”
BackgroundWhy Did Memetics Fail? Comparative Case Study
Chvaja, R. (2020) · Perspectives on Science · doi:10.1162/posc_a_00350 · Cited by 20
“However, GCCE theorists emphasize the role of culture in the process of group selection (Henrich 2004a; Richerson and Boyd 2005), which provides them with a strong argument against Williams.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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