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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“Group boundaries based on persistent cultural differences between groups are a condition of cultural-group selection (Boyd, 2018: 98-99;Henrich, 2004;Muthukrishna, 2025: 195-197).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich, 2004
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The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
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Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500 · cited 5×
“The operational details of these learning mechanisms appear to have been 'designed' by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world—that is, from the minds of other individuals (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and Boyd, 1998).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity
Leimar, O., & Hammerstein, P. (2001) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2000.1573 · Cited by 673
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games
McCabe, K. A., Rigdon, M. L., & Smith, V. L. (2003) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00003-9 · Cited by 659
Henrich, J. (2001) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.2001.103.4.992 · Cited by 545
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Ladley, D., Wilkinson, I., & Young, L. C. (2012) · arXiv.org · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1203.1107 · Cited by 2
Response—Evolution of Fairness
Henrich, J., Ensminger, J., McElreath, R. L., Barr, A. M., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cárdenas, J.-C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E. L. M., Henrich, N. S., et al. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.329.5990.389-b · Cited by 10
Self-citationMultilevel Selection Processes in Economics: Theory and Methods
Zinovyeva, N. (2010) · Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review · doi:10.14441/eier.6.277 · Cited by 2
“Still, given the complexity and the multidisciplinary nature of these studies, the borrowed concept is often interpreted in different ways, without having a common view on the role of multilevel selection and the way the evolutionary dynamics should be analyzed in the presence of multilevel selection forces (Henrich,…”
BackgroundPutterman, L. (2009) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1368879 · Cited by 2
A Coevolutionary Model for Stabilizing Collaboration Trust in Supply Chain
Yin, M., & Zhao, S. (2008) · 2008 Fourth International Conference on Natural Computation · doi:10.1109/icnc.2008.8 · Cited by 2
The Evolution of Metanorms: Reproduction, Extension, and InsightPreprint
Prietula, M. J., & Conway, D. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.985605 · Cited by 1
The Power of Stories: Narrative Priming in Networked Multi-Agent LLM Interactions
Großmann, G., Ivanova, L. S., Poduru, S. L., Tabrizian, M., Mesabah, I., Selby, D., & Vollmer, S. J. (2025) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-09315-8_11 · Cited by 1
“From ancient creation myths uniting scattered tribes to modern national narratives binding millions of strangers, shared stories are humanity’s most powerful technology for large-scale cooperation [13,14,5].”
The Evolution of Behavioural Institutional Complexity
Rosser, J., & Rosser, M. (2017) · Evolutionary economics and social complexity science · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-5705-2_4 · Cited by 2
Competition and cooperation: Sociological studies in experimental game theory
Berger, J. L. (2015) · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010568360 · Cited by 2
Altruism, Religion, and Self-Enhancement in a Framework of Ad Hoc Evolutionary Adaptation
Habermacher, F. D. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19932-0_12 · Cited by 3
The evolution of religion and the evolution of culture
Davis, T. (2014) · cIRcle (University of British Columbia) · doi:10.14288/1.0167537 · Cited by 1
Smith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.019 · Cited by 1
Antonetti, P., & Maklan, S. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3095-9 · Cited by 67
“This is consistent with the evolutionary view of sympathy as a source of cooperation and caring (Batson, 1991; Henrich, 2004).”
ResultWilson, D., & Gowdy, J. (2014) · Journal of Bioeconomics · doi:10.1007/s10818-014-9192-x · Cited by 1
“Cultural history will always be important for understanding the mechanisms that govern the dynamics of particular societies (Henrich 2003; Henrich et al. 2004; Boyd et al. 2011).”
BackgroundEmergence of Reputation-Based Cooperation in LLM AgentsPreprint
Horibe, K., Itao, K., & Toyokawa, W. (2026) · arXiv.org · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2608.04507 · Cited by 1
“Whether cultural transmission, which allows rapid behavioral adaptation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Mesoudi, 2011; Henrich, 2004), produces the same cooperation mechanisms as genetic evolution remains an open question.”
Pykälä, M., Dillion, D., & Galešić, M. (2026) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2024.0450 · Cited by 2
Identifying practical pathways from animal culture theory to conservation practice
Wessling, E. G., Samuni, L., Koops, K., Humle, T., Hockings, K. J., Soiret, S. P. K., Scholfield, K., Pintea, L., Luncz, L. V., Lanjouw, A., et al. (2026) · Biological reviews/Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1002/brv.70162 · Cited by 1
“Further, the loss of inter-connectedness within a community or population can hinder social transmission (van Schaik, 2002; Henrich, 2004; Laiolo & Tella, 2007), leading to the irreversible loss of these unique behaviours and the knowledge upon which they are founded (e.g. Malherbe et al ., 2025).”
Rayburn, S. W., García-Tello, L., Anderson, S. T., Fontana, A., & Sierra, J. (2026) · European Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1108/ejm-02-2025-0166 · Cited by 1
Nations as Natural Families: From Kin Selection to Multilevel Selection
Faria, F. N., & Dzenis, S. (2025) · Nations and Nationalism · doi:10.1111/nana.70023 · Cited by 1
“Ethnic identity formation relies on biological cues—such as phenotypic similarity—and on cultural institutions that support altruism, including endogamy, legal boundaries, symbolic signalling and norm enforcement (Henrich 2004).”
InfluentialCultural inheritance is driving a transition in human evolution
Waring, T. M., & Wood, Z. T. (2025) · BioScience · doi:10.1093/biosci/biaf094 · Cited by 24
Altruism and morality: some problems for Max U
Hodgson, G. M. (2025) · Frontiers in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.3389/frbhe.2025.1610022 · Cited by 1
“Bowles and Gintis ( ) provided an excellent overview of the behavioral evidence. payoff solution (Henrich et al., 2001; Henrich, 2004).”
Schroeder, K. B., Darling, L. N., & Blake, P. R. (2025) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0325984 · Cited by 1
“Of theoretical importance, norm psychology could, in concert with transmission biases [14], facilitate the maintenance of cultural differences in prosocial behavior despite migration, which would enable the cultural group selection of prosociality [92–94].”
Clark, K. J., & Walker, R. S. (2025) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-025-09486-w · Cited by 1
“…1989; Gintis et al., 2003; Jaeggi & Gurven, 2013; Nowak & Sig-mund, 1998), originally called reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971), and cultural group, or multilevel, selection (García and van den Bergh, 2011; Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016; Smuts, 1999; Traulsen & Nowak, 2006; Wilson, 1997).”
Chen, F., Nave, G., & Wang, L. (2020) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-024-05865-y · Cited by 1
The Limits of Our Explanation: A Case Study in Myxococcus xanthus Cooperation
Khan, S. (2024) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-024-00479-z · Cited by 1
“Furthermore, studies of rippling behavior, which is also a form of coordinated movement, indicate that these movements can be produced by side-to-side signaling between cells, causing cells to locally align (Igoshin et al. 2001 , 2004 ; Sliusarenko et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2012 ).”
Coevolution of norm psychology and cooperation through exapted conformity
Kido, Y., & Takezawa, M. (2024) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2024.37 · Cited by 1
“These observations are consistent with the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation based on cultural group selection theories (Henrich, 2004) and empirical findings (Bell et al., 2009).”
BackgroundResultNatural origins of social essentialism: Ethnic groups, identities, and cultural transmission
Wagner, W. (2024) · Culture & Psychology · doi:10.1177/1354067x241236722 · Cited by 11
“It has been supposed that certain genes correlate with ingroup cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Sabeti et al., 2007), altruism beyond helping one ’ s next of kin (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Richerson et al., 2016), the development of norms in groups by social learning (Gintis, 2004; McElreath et al.,…”
Taught rules: Instruction and the evolution of norms
Martinez, C. (2024) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02096-1 · Cited by 1
“See Henrich (2004, sect.”
Frerichs, S. (2023) · New Political Economy · doi:10.1080/13563467.2023.2287455 · Cited by 1
“Related works by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Joseph Henrich and co-authors complement the overall approach (Bowles 1998, Fehr and Henrich 2003, Henrich 2004, Henrich and Henrich 2007, Bowles and Gintis 2011, Bowles and Polanía-Reyes 2012, Chudek et al. 2013, Henrich 2016, Gintis 2017).”
InfluentialCan Conformity Bias Transcend Domain Specificity Under Social Dilemma Situations?
Natsumeda, M., Yokota, K., & Nakanishi, D. (2023) · Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science · doi:10.5178/lebs.2023.108 · Cited by 3
A conjoined intellectual journey: Richard H. Day and the journal he founded
Rosser, J., & Rosser, M. (2023) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2023.03.012 · Cited by 1
From one Darwin to another: Charles Darwin’s annotations to Erasmus Darwin’s ‘The Temple of Nature’
Hernández-Avilez, E. G., & Ruiz-Gutiérrez, R. (2023) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-023-01616-y · Cited by 1
“Another theory is the ‘cultural group selection’ theory (Henrich, 2004), which proposes that altruistic behaviours can spread within a population through cultural transmission, such as through learning or imitation.”
BackgroundNo Signs of Inclusive Fitness or Reciprocal Altruism in Advantageous Inequity Aversion
Antfolk, J., Marklund, E., Nylund, I., & Gunst, A. (2023) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/14747049231173401 · Cited by 1
A controversy about modeling practices: the case of inequity aversion
Truc, A., & Jullien, D. (2023) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2023.2180153 · Cited by 3
“In particular, Houser, McCabe, and Smith (2004, 88) questioned the very existence of non-selfish behavior and suggested that pro-social behavior could be interpreted through the notion of reciprocity and that it is in the self-interest of individuals to reciprocate.”
BackgroundThe relevance of communal altruism for sexual minority men in contemporary contexts
Skakoon‐Sparling, S., Card, K. G., Novick, J. R., Berlin, G. W., Lachowsky, N. J., Adam, B. D., Brennan, D. J., Sang, J. M., Noor, S. W. B., Cox, J., et al. (2022) · Journal of Community Psychology · doi:10.1002/jcop.22923 · Cited by 2
Shin, H. C., Vallury, S., Janssen, M. A., & Yu, D. J. (2022) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0268019 · Cited by 1
“A fundamental logic of group selection is that fitness variations owing from group-level properties cause differential reproductive success [13, 14].”
BackgroundMuthukrishna, M. (2021) · LSE Public Policy Review · doi:10.31389/lseppr.35 · Cited by 1
Affiliative terms as a linguistic tool for improving perceptions of out-group members?
Grueter, C. C., Roncevich, I., & Fay, N. (2021) · Human Ethology · doi:10.22330/he/36/096-108 · Cited by 1
“…favouritism relies on the paradigm of cultural group selection : powered by the propagation of group-specific norms, a group of altruists is more likely to be competitive and victorious when confronted with between-group conflict (Boyd & Richerson, 1990; Henrich, 2004; Richerson et al., 2016).”
BackgroundWhy does individual learning endure when crowds are wiser?Preprint
de Courson, B., Fitouchi, L., Bouchaud, J., & Benzaquen, M. (2020) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3756565 · Cited by 1
WEIRD Politics: Towards a Theory of Cooperative Grammatical PerformancePreprint
Gil-White, F. J. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3581263 · Cited by 1
An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Collaborative Remembering?
Amici, F. (2018) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12398 · Cited by 1
Gat, A. (2018) · doi:10.26613/esic.2.1.73 · Cited by 1
“On the one hand, there is growing agreement that inclusive fitness and multilevel selection are mathematically equivalent (Grafen 1984; Henrich 2004; West and Gardner 2007; Bijma and Wade 2008), though some disagree (Simon, Fletcher, and Doebeli 2012; Van Veelen et al. 2012).”
BackgroundMicrofoundations, behaviour, and evolution: Evidence from experiments
Bogliacino, F., & Codagnone, C. (2017) · Structural Change and Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.strueco.2017.11.003 · Cited by 1
“19 Finally, in recent theoretical development on gene-culture co-evolutions (Gintis, 2007; Henrich, 2004) based on dynamics in which fitness is shaped by a culturally embedded landscape and mutation contributes to alter the environment, including the cultural aspects, it is possible to show that social learning (in th…”
BackgroundPunishment and status in collective action: How status hierarchies f oster optimal punishment use
Vincent, A. D. (2017) · Sociology Compass · doi:10.1111/soc4.12478 · Cited by 2
Better Than Rational: A Naturalistic View of Economic Governance
Stoelhorst, J. W. (2017) · Complexity Governance & Networks · doi:10.20377/cgn-39 · Cited by 2
“…selection acting on genetic evolution alone is possible (Sober & Wilson, 1998), the explanatory value of the multi-level selection framework is much increased if, in addition to genetic mechanisms, we allow cultural mechanisms to play a role as well (e.g. Bell et al., 2009; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundGuodian Laozi and Taiyi Sheng Shui: A Cognitive Science Reading
Ritchie, J. (2017) · Journal of Daoist studies · doi:10.1353/dao.2012.0000 · Cited by 1
When reciprocity becomes back-scratching: an economic inquiry
Murray, C. K. (2016) · The University of Queensland · doi:10.14264/uql.2016.88 · Cited by 1
Antunes, L., Nunes, D., & Coelho, H. (2014) · Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.65109/dtyz3878 · Cited by 1
“From an evolutionary perspective, imitation seems to have been ‘designed’ by natural selection to extract useful information from the social world [10] and supply the basis for emergent cooperative behaviour.”
BackgroundWith God We Trust: Religion, Trust and Cooperation in Large-Scale SocietiesPreprint
Gagnon, J. (2014) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · doi:10.17863/cam.4958 · Cited by 1
“In particular, it is closely linked to the theoretical work in evolutionary game theory investigating the role of altruistic punishment in cooperation (Henrich, 2004; Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundPartner selection, coordination games, and group selection.
Alvard, M. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000702 · Cited by 1
Ultimatum Games, Solved with Human Root Motivation to Be Number One among Acquaintances
Yu, X.-Z. (2011) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1965373 · Cited by 1
What's important for you in life? A general and pluralistic model of economic agents’ motivation
Zibell, L. (2011) · The Journal of Socio-Economics · doi:10.1016/j.socec.2010.12.015 · Cited by 1
Spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation and spite behavior by conformist transmission
Wakano, J. (2011) · doi:10.3934/cpaa.2012.11.375 · Cited by 1
THE JERUSALEM GAME: CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF THE GOLDEN RULE
Wilkins, J. F., & Stefan Thurner, A. (2010) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s0219525910002785 · Cited by 2
“Advances in Complex Systems, Vol. 13, No. 5 (2010) 635–641 c© World Scientific Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S0219525910002785 THE JERUSALEM GAME: CULTURAL EVOLUTION”
BackgroundInfluentialEnhancing Cooperative Behavior for Online Reputation Systems by Group Selection
Ren, Y.-Z., Li, M.-C., Cui, Y.-R., Guo, C., & Sakurai, K. (2009) · 2009 Symposia and Workshops on Ubiquitous, Autonomic and Trusted Computing · doi:10.1109/uic-atc.2009.81 · Cited by 1
“Recently, people also use group selection theory to explain the cooperative behavior in other applications filed, such as [ 11 ], [12].”
BackgroundECONOMICS EVOLVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VOLUME
Koppl, R. (2005) · Advances in Austrian economics · doi:10.1016/s1529-2134(04)07001-2 · Cited by 1
Conceptual Frameworks for Thinking about Primate Economies: Comments on Pryor's Paper
Wilson, D. (2003) · doi:10.1023/a:1025885900186 · Cited by 1
Ethics and Finance: The Unresolved Puzzle
Carè, R. (2018) · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73389-0_2 · Cited by 1
Building on shifting sands : co-operation and morality in the new Chinese co-operative movement
Stanford, M. (2017) · doi:10.21953/lse.7lk4cpw5pyz9 · Cited by 1
“Solutions may include social, psychological, or ecological mechanisms; and these may arise through conscious design or imitation, or through processes which may be described using evolutionary equations, whether genetic or cultural (Mesoudi, et al., 2006; Henrich, 2004; Boyd & Richerson, 1985).”
BackgroundSunitiyoso, Y. (2016) · Translational systems sciences · doi:10.1007/978-4-431-55273-4_5 · Cited by 2
“Individuals can use several mechanisms in order to learn from others as suggested by Henrich (2004), including conformist transmission (imitate high-frequency behaviours), payoff-biased transmission (imitate people who are more successful), self-similarity transmission (imitate individuals with similarity at some trai…”
BackgroundTheory of Mind and the Role of Target Individuals' Group Affiliation
Batiste, F. (2015) · doi:10.7282/t33j3fx5 · Cited by 1
Hunter-Gatherers and Neo-Darwinian Cultural Transmission
Bettinger, R. L. (2015) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-0658-8_8 · Cited by 1
Biological and Experimental Perspectives on Self-Interest: Reciprocal Altruism and Genetic Egoism
Rusch, H., & Frey, U. J. (2012) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_28 · Cited by 3
“, [44–46]), which it does not in other species [38].”
BackgroundInfluentialTheory of conformist social learning
Eriksson, K., & Coultas, J. C. (2012) · doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-1428-6_755 · Cited by 1
“The second part of the theory deals with the within-group cultural homogeneity that conformist social learning would tend to lead to over time, and its possible implications for cooperation and group selection (e.g., Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundThe coevolution of renewable resources and institutions - implications for policy design
Richter, A. P. (2011) · doi:10.18174/163232 · Cited by 2
“First, if groups that hold different social norms compete with each other, this can explain why the community with the most group-beneficial social norm survives (Henrich, 2004; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Wilson, 1975).”
BackgroundFree Riders as a Blind Spot of Equity Theory
Price, M. E. (2009) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203852460-21 · Cited by 1
“A standard finding of formal models of the evolution of cooperation is that free riders, if unchecked, will eventually exploit cooperators to extinction (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Henrich, 2004).”
BackgroundFrance, V. (2008) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203117668-10 · Cited by 1
“…and that the empirical evidence has convincingly shown that group-level analyses where equally important in explaining the existence of socially-acquired characteristics of human beings (Henrich 2004), we thus need to turn to a framework allowing for both sources of explanation to be accounted for.”
BackgroundSmith, V. L. S. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511754364.011 · Cited by 1
Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality
Windzio, M. (2026) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-026-09531-2
Metadata
- Authors
- Henrich, J.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Henrich, Joseph
- ORCID
- Henrich, Joseph
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2004-01
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-35
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2167287869
- Cited by
- 1,096
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 66 · 2021: 44 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 55 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 49 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 52
- FWCI
- 104.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- cultural group selection, prosocial behavior, altruism, altruistic punishment, cultural evolution, equilibrium selection, cultural learning, imitation learning, large-scale cooperation
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