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Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
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This paper offers an explanation of the use of mandatory-retirement clauses in labor contracts. It argues that the date of mandatory retirement is chosen to correspond to the date of voluntary retirement, but the nature of the optimal wage profile results in a discrepancy between spot wage and spot VMP (value of the worker's marginal product). This is because it is preferable to pay workers less than VMP when young and more than VMP when old. By doing so the "agency" problem is solved, so the contract with mandatory retirement is Pareto efficient. A theory of agency is presented and empirical evidence which supports the hypothesis is provided.
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“According to Lazear (1979), the mandatory retirement age process is designed around “a date at which the contract is terminated and the worker is no longer entitled to receive a wage greater than his VMP [value of marginal product]” (Lazear, 1979, p. 1283).”
From Policy Initiatives to Address the Challenges of an Older Population in the Workforce (2023) · cites this paper as Lazear, 1979
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lazear, E. P.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Corresponding author
- Lazear, Edward P.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1979-12
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1261-1284
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2023050239
- Cited by
- 2,038
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 30 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 48 · 2018: 32 · 2017: 51 · 2016: 58 · 2015: 58 · 2014: 60 · 2013: 65 · 2012: 77
- FWCI
- 67.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Demography › Retirement, Disability, and Employment
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
- Keywords
- mandatory retirement, employment contracts, voluntary retirement, value of marginal product, principal-agent problem, Pareto optimality, human capital
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