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Cited by 1,714Action Observation and SynchronizationChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentFace Recognition and Perception

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Interacting Minds--A Biological Basis

Frith, Chris D., Frith, Uta·1999·Science
DOI 10.1126/science.286.5445.1692
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Abstract

The ability to "mentalize," that is to understand and manipulate other people's behavior in terms of their mental states, is a major ingredient in successful social interactions. A rudimentary form of this ability may be seen in great apes, but in humans it is developed to a high level. Specific impairments of mentalizing in both developmental and acquired disorders suggest that this ability depends on a dedicated and circumscribed brain system. Functional imaging studies implicate medial prefrontal cortex and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) as components of this system. Clues to the specific function of these components in mentalizing come from single cell recording studies: STS is concerned with representing the actions of others through the detection of biological motion; medial prefrontal regions are concerned with explicit representation of states of the self. These observations suggest that the ability to mentalize has evolved from a system for representing actions.

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Research works printed but not linked: 46

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Metadata

Authors
Frith, C. D., & Frith, U.
Affiliations
  • UCL Queen Square Institute of Neurology (GB)
  • Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Department of Psychology, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London, WC1N 3AR, UK.
Corresponding author
Frith, Chris D.
ORCID
Frith, Chris D.
Venue
Science
Publisher
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Published
1999-11-26
Volume
286
Issue
5445
Pages
1692-1695
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
DOI
10.1126/science.286.5445.1692
OpenAlex
W1965008419
Cited by
1,714
References
8
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 42 · 2024: 48 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 54 · 2019: 55 · 2018: 64 · 2017: 46 · 2016: 70 · 2015: 67 · 2014: 52 · 2013: 84 · 2012: 98
FWCI
6.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Face Recognition and Perception
Keywords
mentalization, theory of mind, social cognition, great apes, medial prefrontal cortex, posterior superior temporal sulcus, biological motion, action representation, self-representation, developmental disorders, acquired disorders, evolution of social cognition
MeSH terms
Animals, Autistic Disorder, Brain Mapping, Cognition, Humans, Deception, Schizophrenia, Schizophrenic Psychology, Social Behavior, Temporal Lobe, Prefrontal Cortex, Patch-Clamp Techniques

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