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Reputation and reciprocity
Open accessAbstract
Reputation and reciprocity are key mechanisms for cooperation in human societies, often going hand in hand to favor prosocial behavior over selfish actions. Here we review recent researches at the interface of physics and evolutionary game theory that explored these two mechanisms. We focus on image scoring as the bearer of reputation, as well as on various types of reciprocity, including direct, indirect, and network reciprocity. We review different definitions of reputation and reciprocity dynamics, and we show how these affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We consider first-order, second-order, as well as higher-order models in well-mixed and structured populations, and we review experimental works that support and inform the results of mathematical modeling and simulations. We also provide a synthesis of the reviewed researches along with an outlook in terms of six directions that seem particularly promising to explore in the future.
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Cited by
Chen, Q., Ilami, S., Lore, N., & Heydari, B. (2026) · Journal of Mechanical Design · doi:10.1115/1.4070755 · Cited by 3
Metadata
- Authors
- Xia, C., Wang, J., Perc, M., & Wang, Z.
- Venue
- Physics of Life Reviews
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2023-09
- Volume
- 46
- Pages
- 8-45
- ISSN
- 1571-0645 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4376113525
- Cited by
- 339
- References
- 162
- FWCI
- 147.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.